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ABSTRACT 
Shakespeare’s Fortune 
How copyright has failed authors and why it matters 
A key policy rationale for the system of copyright is to give authors an 
incentive to create new works. But what if actual financial returns to 
authors were very poor — so poor that no rational agent could be 
expected to respond to the incentive? In this thesis I present data from a 
large sample of Australian films showing that returns are consistently 
poor even for ‘hit’ films. Data from other countries confirms the finding 
and there is evidence that returns from other forms of copyright asset such 
as literary works are also poor. 
The thesis explores how this situation can have persisted for so long 
without the system breaking down or eliciting strong protests from 
authors. Drawing on a survey of Australian film producers, I confirm 
anecdotal evidence that authors are driven by non-financial considerations 
as well as financial incentives. The Hollywood studios have evolved 
sophisticated business practices that take advantage of these non-financial 
motivations. In this they are following the example of London’s 
booksellers of the early 18th century. 
Does it matter that authors earn low returns from their copyright assets? I 
identify two classes of author for whom poor returns present a real 
obstacle to authoring — authors whose work requires independence (such 
as dissidents) and authors who do not have access to patronage or other 
forms of subsidy to offset the poor returns from copyright (such as 
authors from the ‘third world’). Finally, I consider possible reforms to 
copyright that might improve returns to authors and examine the public 
policy case for pursuing these reforms. 
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1. Introduction 
You can make a killing in the theatre, but not a living. 
 —  Robert Anderson1 (c1954)  
For surely it is time that the effect of discouragement upon the mind of the 
artist should be measured. 
 —  Virginia Woolf (1928) 
This thesis is about the economic status of creative work. It is an 
investigation of the viability of authorship in any medium but particularly 
writing and filmmaking and more particularly the work of authors who 
are dissident or independent. Because the viability of authorship rests on 
the set of rights called copyright, it is largely about the copyright system 
and the markets and practices that have co-evolved with that system. It is 
also about the social attitudes the system embodies. 
There is not a lot written about copyright from the viewpoint of authors. 
Most people believe without reflection that copyright is good for authors. 
A frequent question in the copyright literature is whether it might be too 
good, too beneficent. My purpose here is to shake that belief — shake it 
hard — and having shaken it, bring into focus the implications of a 
copyright system that is not good for authors. These go right to the heart 
of the intellectual enterprise of authorship, not just the financial aspect. 
There is more at stake here than just money.  
I bring to this study a long involvement in the film industry, an industry 
founded on copyright. In the mid-1980s I was appointed policy adviser at 
the Australian Film Commission and in that capacity was closely 
involved in the creation of the Australian Film Finance Corporation, a 
government-owned investment agency (discussed in chapter 2). Not long 
after I launched a newsletter, Entertainment Business Review, and became 
a director of a licensed dealer in film securities and later of a film 
investment company, Content Capital Ltd. In these capacities I was 
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involved in financing a number of films, among them John Weiley’s 
Antarctica, Baz Luhrmann’s Strictly Ballroom, Dean Cavell’s The 
Wiggles Movie, Jerzy Domaradski’s Lilian’s Story, Bruce Beresford’s 
Sydney, Story of a City, Robert Connolly’s The Bank and Don 
Featherstone’s The One Percenters. In 2005 I was appointed founding 
director of the Centre for Screen Business at the Australian Film 
Television & Radio School, a role in which I have combined teaching 
with research into the screen industries. More recently, with filmmaker 
Sir Peter Jackson, I undertook a review of the New Zealand Film 
Commission for the New Zealand Government. In all of these roles the 
viability of filmmaking has been a pressing concern.  
To understand the copyright system, it is not enough to study the 
legislation and case law. We need economic data. I therefore begin this 
investigation with a profit-and-loss report on 158 Australian films 
produced between 1988 and 2002 — a rare window into the financial 
machinery of the film industry. From this data set (and drawing on other, 
comparable data from the UK and the US) I build a profile of the risks 
and rewards of copyright, considered as an asset class. With this 
empirical grounding we may then venture into the copyright literature and 
see how it squares with the lived reality of authorship.  
Copyright is not a settled thing intellectually. There is no consensus about 
either its meaning or purpose, despite three centuries of statute and case 
law. It is a contested idea. At one extreme it has been described as ‘an 
obnoxious combination of medieval institutions’, without merit, fit only 
for scrapping (Boldrin & Levine 2008, p244). At the other it is a solution 
‘protecting the rights of all who make something of value with their 
minds, their passion and their unique creative vision’ (Motion Picture 
Association of America 2011a). In between is every kind of opinion. The 
long shelves of commentary are crammed with disputes, many of them 
still hot. Is copyright a kind of property, as its membership of the genus 
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‘intellectual property’ implies? Or should it be viewed as a privilege, 
specially granted by the state?2 If it’s property then it sits with free 
markets and the rule of law, a bastion of capitalism, safe. If it’s privilege 
then perhaps its age counts against it — an anachronism in this digital 
era? The arguments swirl about.  
The most basic questions remain in dispute. Is copyright really an 
author’s right? Certainly the official language of copyright would suggest 
so, with its recurrent references to authorship and the creative act.3 But 
some scholars say it is more like a publisher’s right in the way it works 
commercially and in its origins. One school of thought goes further and 
questions the very idea of authorship. Following French philosopher 
Michel Foucault they recast the author as ‘a certain functional principle… 
by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, the free 
composition, decomposition and recomposition of fiction’ (Foucault 
1984, p119). On this view the author is ‘a cultural formation… 
inseparable from the commodification of literature’ (Rose 1993, p1). 
Authoring is thus an artifact of publishing, a fiction. Others have taken an 
opposite tack, investing authors with moral as well as economic rights, in 
particular the right to assert their authorship and fend off interference 
with their works.4 The two sides could not be further apart.  
Yet all this intellectual ferment barely disturbs the institutions of 
copyright. With its law courts and thriving legal practices, its 
international conventions, its government agencies and collecting 
societies, the copyright system has the inertia of a freight train. It rolls on, 
heedless of its critics. It has been rolling for 300 years, always in the same 
direction — always expanding. Beginning in 1710 with just maps and 
literary texts, it has stretched over time to accommodate successive new 
technologies of photography, film, sound, radio and television, software 
and industrial design. Its duration has expanded too, from a maximum of 
28 years in its first statutory expression to its current term of author’s life 
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plus 70 years. US law professor Lawrence Lessig has called this its 
‘almost limitless bloating’, noting that Congress extended the term of 
copyright 11 times in the 40 years to 2001 (2001a, pp106-7).  
One could be forgiven for believing that all this attention, all this 
expansion must be good for authors. After all, they are the intended 
beneficiaries. Even if copyright is more like a publisher’s right, it seems 
reasonable to assume that it works in authors’ interests too. That 
assumption sits just behind most thinking about copyright, as we will see. 
The sheer size of the copyright system, its institutional heft, implies that it 
must be working, just as its longevity implies that authors (and others) 
consent to its workings. It is the state’s answer to the author’s existential 
question: how can I make a living doing this? Without copyright, writers 
would have only their manuscripts (filmmakers their negatives) and no 
defensible interest in copies made from them. Even if they could contract 
with the first publisher of their work, the economic interest so created 
would be dissipated as soon as a copy fell into the hands of a second 
publisher. 5  Copyright was the state’s solution to this problem, the 
intervention that bottled the author’s interest.  
Authors therefore find themselves tethered to the copyright system, its 
presumed beneficiaries, suitably grateful, though their thoughts may swim 
with doubts.  
Copyright is after all the practical ground of the business of writing and 
filmmaking. It’s the core asset of the business and the asset class for the 
whole value-chain of authoring, publishing and distributing. To entertain 
doubts risks alienating those necessary allies, the publishers and 
distributors, who appear to entertain no doubts at all. And yet grounds for 
doubt are all too evident. There’s a niggling feeling of manipulation, of 
publishers speaking over the top of authors, purporting to represent them; 
there’s the slightly-too-flowery rhetoric (‘protecting the rights of all who 
make something of value with their minds, their passion and their unique 
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creative vision’, to quote the Motion Picture Association of America 
again). Among policymakers, there’s the apparent lack of interest in 
whether the copyright system actually delivers, from an author’s 
perspective — as though this didn’t matter. And there’s the simple fact 
that the great majority of authors live and work in poverty.  
This thesis is an inquiry into the doubts. The focus throughout is on the 
copyright author — the writer or filmmaker. Later in the thesis the focus 
goes tighter still, on writers and filmmakers who are sources of dissent, of 
witness-bearing or critical inquiry. For these are the authors who more 
than any others stand in need of a viable copyright living and are 
therefore most at risk from copyright’s failure.  
 
HERE IN PREVIEW are some of the ideas I will explore as we pursue 
this investigation:  
1. The returns earned by copyright assets are too small to compensate for 
the risks of investing in them.  
This is the fundamental finding of this inquiry, from which everything 
else follows. A copyright work in the hands of its creator is an unbank-
able, unfinanceable asset — junkier than a junk bond. The consequences 
of this unfinanceability ripple all the way through the copyright 
industries. Nothing else better describes the economic circumstances of 
the author. To invest your art and capability, to pile up all your work in an 
asset that no right-thinking investor would buy from you, except at 
discount — such is the prospect that copyright holds out to the author.  
It will be objected that some authors earn tremendous incomes from their 
copyrights. And of course they are the ones who come most readily to 
mind: J K Rowling, Robert Ludlum or Charles Dickens, say. The 
difficulty here is of inferring too much from the experience of the very 
few. For copyright incomes are highly skewed. It is not just movies that 
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separate into a few extreme ‘hits’ and many ‘misses’: the skew is 
characteristic of markets in copyright works of all kinds. Martin 
Kretschmer and Philip Hardwick (2007) reviewed data on 25,000 British 
and German authors’ earnings and reported: ‘It appears that the more 
copyright related the income stream, the more extreme is the distribution 
of income... A small number of very high earners earn a disproportionate 
share of total income.’ When incomes are averaged the picture is one of 
very low incomes, with professional UK authors earning a median 
(‘typical’) income of about 64 percent of national gross median wage and 
German authors about 42 percent of national net median wage.  
It will also be objected that publishers routinely invest in copyright assets, 
with no apparent ill effects. And it’s true, publishers do earn viable 
returns from copyright assets.6 But the comparison is apples with oranges. 
Publishers have earlier and safer access to the revenues of copyright 
works and they reserve to themselves the lion’s share. Where authors are 
paid royalties, they are typically just 10 cents in the retail dollar; where 
profits are shared, they are so contingent and delayed as to be vanishing. 
Stories are commonplace of movies earning hundreds of millions of 
dollars but, according to studio accounts, being still in the red — yielding 
no profits to the filmmakers — so much so that no one talks any longer of 
movie profits.7 Instead agents negotiate ‘participations’, shares that kick 
in when revenues hit defined points. Historically, publishers have also 
had the benefit of scale. Over time they have built big portfolios of rights 
with which to smooth the cashflows and cushion the risks of publishing. 
An individual author, by contrast, can produce at best a handful of works 
with no possibility of diversification.  
This ability of publishers to levitate above authors when it comes to 
sharing the money and managing the risks means that their risk-reward 
ratios are very different. From the very same work the publisher can make 
a silk purse, while the author earns a sow’s ear.  
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2. The copyright system depends for its efficacy on an elaborate system of 
subsidies with which it has co-evolved.  
Since copyright is a low quality asset producing a poor and uncertain 
income, authors need supplemental income to keep working. Even if they 
are successful, they will need help to cover the lean period before success 
arrives. But for most the need will be continuing, since they’ll never make 
enough to live by their work. Their choices then are to subsidise 
themselves, for example by taking a ‘day job’, or to induce others to 
subsidise them.  
The institution of subsidy is older than copyright but more fluid and 
innovative. An early form was patronage, where the artist/author/ scientist 
entered the service of a wealthy patron. Shakespeare himself wore the 
king’s livery as a member of the King’s Men, London’s leading theatre 
company. Later authors sometimes syndicated their patronage, inviting 
wealthy readers to subscribe to their works ahead of publication. The 
career of Dr Johnson illustrates the variety of subsidy. He was supported 
early in his career by a well-to-do widow, ‘Tetty’ Porter, whom he 
married; famously railed against the Earl of Chesterfield for his dilatory 
and inadequate patronage of Johnson’s Dictionary, a nine-year project; 
but on publication the Dictionary attracted the attention of King George 
III, who granted Johnson a pension for life of £300.8 With time the 
system of subsidies has grown still more elaborate and intertwined with 
the copyright system. There are grants for travel, research, writing, 
workshops and read-throughs; there are production incentives, tax 
concessions, rebates, bounties, ‘soft’ investments and limited recourse 
loans. The number of subsidy-granting entities has multiplied too. As well 
as governments and their agencies, there are philanthropic foundations, 
academic institutions, public corporations, private trusts, and not to forget 
those three much put-upon backers, Family, Friends and Fools.  
Although it is the formal programs of subsidy that claim our attention, the 
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most pervasive mechanism of subsidy may be the simple acceptance of 
poorly correlated risk and reward that is characteristic of creative work. It 
is the author (or investor) who accepts a level of risk they would reject in 
any other context, or a rate of return they would ordinarily consider too 
low for the risks entailed. Poor returns and outsize risks, accepting one 
and running the other — there it is, the engine of subsidy at work.  
The copyright system works because it sits propped up on a system of 
subsidies that compensates for the poverty of the copyright asset. The two 
need to be seen in tandem, a twin-system. From this much follows.  
3. The Hollywood studios have perfected a business model pioneered 
centuries ago by London’s book publishers and based on the willingness 
of authors and other participants to subsidise their own participation. 
The Hollywood studios were not the first to see the possibilities of the 
self-subsidizing author (and star-struck investor). That distinction belongs 
to London’s publishers of the 18th century, who saw that the gentleman-
author, disdaining money, might write for fame instead. But the studios 
have perfected the business model based on the insight. They are masters 
of the Dream. They have held the world’s gaze for nearly a century and 
made Hollywood the global epicentre of movies, glamour, stardom and 
therefore movie aspiration. It is a running gag that every waiter in Los 
Angeles is really an actor or writer. But then consider that the Writers 
Guild of America registers more than 40,000 screenplays each year, while 
the industry makes around 750 movies annually9, implying that 98 
percent of screenplays are never made into films (MPDA 2011b). The 
great majority of these are ‘spec’ screenplays, developed at the writer’s or 
producer’s risk, without remuneration. Of course they are fully available 
to the studios — they are proffered to them, in the hope the studios will 
take them up. In effect, by holding out the possibility of a deal, a movie, a 
‘hit’, the studios induce a vast, self-organizing factory of effort. They 
outsource nearly the entire troublesome business of generating new story 
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ideas and turning them into filmable screenplays, at the cost only of 
paying — handsomely — for some small fraction of them.  
And it is not just stories and scripts. The movie studios have perfected a 
financing model that works on the same principle. Investors are recruited, 
like writers and actors, with the possibility of wild success, though with 
low, lottery-like prospects of winning it. The effect of the model is to 
leave most of the equity risk with these investors, while the studios keep 
most of the revenues. If this seems improbable — if it seems unlikely that 
sophisticated investors would embrace such a model — we need only 
review the long line of investors recruited by Hollywood over the years. 
A story in the Los Angeles Times listed some of them: ‘…old-line 
industrialists, Wall Street financiers, insurance conglomerates and 
corporate raiders, New Economy wunderkinds from this country, plus 
Dutch, Japanese, British, Italian and Israeli hopefuls’ (Kiger 2004). The 
story was headlined ‘Chew. Spit. Repeat.’ 
Why would industrialists, financiers, corporate raiders and wunderkinds 
invest their money on such ‘soft’ terms? The answer is that Hollywood 
offers them things they cannot find readily elsewhere, things they value 
highly although they are intangible. They include: fame (or close 
association with it), the chance to walk the red carpet, the opportunity to 
be part of something larger than ordinary life or to create something of 
lasting value — and the dinner party bragging rights. These are things 
that economists call ‘psychic income’, the subjective rewards of a job or 
undertaking beyond just money. Hollywood has made an art of 
deciphering and satisfying the psychic needs of its investors; the film 
industry is awash in psychic currencies. To earn them investors are 
willing to let down their financial guard and, like authors and filmmakers 
themselves, accept too-high risks and too-low returns. There is thus a 
deep economy of creation, where fame and glamour are fungible with 
money, an ‘economy of esteem’ (Brennan & Pettit 2004). So it comes 
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about that the movie business, despite its risks, attracts a class of 
imprudent capital prepared to subsidise the creation of its copyright 
assets.   
4. The poverty of copyright disables at least two classes of author whose 
silence is a direct and substantial loss to the cause of knowledge creation. 
Why should it matter that writers and filmmakers (and their star-struck 
investors) are paid out in psychic income as well as, or instead of, actual 
money? They are not coerced after all: they could make different choices. 
Certainly, if authors were all substitutable, there could be no real cause 
for concern if some responded to the copyright incentive and others did 
not. As long as the combination of copyright income and psychic income 
were sufficient to induce an adequate supply of works, we could be 
indifferent about who wrote them. The question of substitutability 
therefore is key. A reader with a stack of books by their bed or a pile of 
DVDs by their television might readily pick up one title rather than 
another and not make too much of it. Generalizing, we might argue that if 
the world is sufficiently stocked with copyright works then the absence of 
this or that author could not matter much (provided it were not 
Shakespeare or some other author deemed essential to the canon). A 
problem could only arise if the copyright system worked to deter or 
exclude whole classes of author.  
Now we are at the nub of it. For the copyright system, with its poor 
incomes and dependence on compensating subsidies, is a deterrent and 
exclusionary mechanism for at least two important classes of author. The 
first is the class of author for whom independence is a necessary 
condition of work. The second (which overlaps with the first) is the class 
of authors for whom a viable money income is a necessary condition of 
work.  
Independence is highly prized by authors and artists of all kinds. They 
prize it because intellectual advance so often requires breaking with past 
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practice or with established thinking. Originality is the fruit of 
independence. It is the same in science where, as Kuhn (1962) showed, 
scientific progress depends at times on non-conforming individuals able 
to effect paradigm change. But independence is not just an intellectual 
quality; it has an economic aspect too. Authors who cannot make a living 
from their work, reduced to dependence on subsidy, from whatever 
source, are in a difficult position intellectually. If the subsidy is from the 
state and they are opposed to state policy, then what will their position 
be? If it is from an institution controlled by their peers and they are at 
odds with their peers, what will they say? Conversely, if they are truly 
independent and therefore not in the swim of things politically, what 
chance do they have of subsidy?  
Authors who decline subsidy in order to protect their independence find 
themselves in the second, wider class of authors disabled by copyright: 
those who need to make a living from their work. This is a class whose 
size can only be guessed at, although it is surely large. It is everyone who 
struggles to write in the cracks of a life already taken up with work (think 
of Franz Kafka, insurance worker); it is those who write for a living but 
not what they burn to write; it is those who give up early or mid-career 
and also those who never start. It is authors from the Third World, from 
among the impoverished, the disempowered, the very people with no 
resources to subsidise their work and no access to the first world’s 
institutions and privileges. But of course we don’t know them, they are an 
absence in the world of authoring, an hypothesis, a might-have-been.  
This second class of ghost authors is an indictment of the copyright 
system, considered as a solution to the problem of authoring, of making a 
living by writing or filmmaking. Society pays a price for this failure, 
losing access to the work and innovations of the whole class.  
5. The poverty of copyright is a failure of policy not a market failure. It 
could be remedied.  
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It is tempting to pin the failure of copyright on the asymmetries of power 
and information that publishers enjoy over authors. But the asymmetries 
are the symptom not the cause. The real failure is that of the policy rules 
shaping the market for creative works — the rules of copyright.  
Copyright can be thought of as a system that resolves the competing 
interests of authors, publishers and readers. The challenge then is to re-
imagine copyright in a way that improves the economic outcomes to 
authors without damaging the interests of readers. The path to this must 
lie through a re-balancing of the interests of authors and publishers. Their 
interests after all are not the same. They were divergent from the very 
start of publishing, long before the first copyright legislation was passed 
by the English parliament in 1710. At the heart of the divergence is 
publishers’ demand for exclusivity, the right to publish without 
competition. Copyright’s framing as a monopoly right serves this 
publisher interest. But exclusivity doesn’t serve the author’s interest. 
Authors would do better in a commodified publishing market where 
publishers competed to publish rival editions of their works. As English 
economist Sir Arnold Plant wrote in 1934: ‘The author’s interest… will 
be better served by a larger edition and lower selling price than will pay 
the publisher best… Only when the author becomes a joint entrepreneur 
and shares the net profits with the publisher… do their interests in 
monopoly restriction coincide.’  
Plant went on to argue for a fundamental reform of copyright. His 
solution was to shrink the window of exclusivity to a five-year term 
available only to the first publisher of a work. Thereafter ‘any publisher 
might issue an edition of [the] work subject only to payment, during the 
term of the copyright period, of a percentage of the published price to the 
author or his assigns’ (1934) 10 . While Plant had in mind a fixed 
percentage, we could leave it to authors to set their own prices (that is, the 
price of the royalties to be paid to them). Some might set them at zero 
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(not needing the income); others might price to reflect the work they had 
done. As a further reform, we could require that the royalty paid to an 
author be disclosed as part of the price information at point-of-sale. That 
way readers could see for themselves how much of what they pay flows 
back to the author. Finally, it could be a requirement that the royalty be 
paid directly to the author, so that readers could be confident that it was 
actually paid to them.  
With these conceptually simple reforms, authorship would be 
transformed. Authors could negotiate the necessary publishing inputs on 
competitive terms, set the price of a work and collect the money. These 
three functions are fundamental to good business. Applied here, they 
would give authors business control of their work and almost certainly 
improve their incomes. And while authors would have a continuing right 
of remuneration, the publishing monopoly would be much reduced.  
Of course the opposition of the publishers would be cacophonous and the 
prospects of reform therefore must be judged distant, if not remote. But 
the thought experiment of reform demonstrates its possibilities. There is 
no substantive reason why copyright could not be made a more effective 
policy instrument, better answering the need of authors for viable 
incomes.  
6. A possible, alternative conclusion is that poor returns to authors are an 
unacknowledged but tolerated, perhaps even intended outcome of 
copyright policy. What-you-see-is-what-is-meant.  
How should we interpret the persistent gap between the rhetoric of 
copyright (protection-asset-incentive) and the reality (poor asset, low 
average income)? This is a question about the intentions of policymakers 
and the evidence they use to judge results. One possibility is that they 
simply haven’t paid much attention to outcomes. They may have relied on 
the positive evidence of books in bookstores and films playing in 
cinemas. Or they may have been swayed by the visible success of hits like 
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Oliver Twist and The Bourne Identity and Harry Potter. The evidence of 
absence — missing classes of author, their unknown works — is 
swamped by the evidence present to eyes and ears. Another possibility is 
that policymakers have observed copyright’s outcomes but not been 
moved to act upon them. Perhaps they recognised that authors’ incomes 
were inadequate but concluded that subsidy was the appropriate remedy 
and turned their efforts in that direction. It is also possible that copyright 
is after all a publisher’s right or has become one. Drahos and Braithwaite 
(2002) have described how big business ‘colonised’ copyright during the 
20th century, lobbying for term extensions and other measures that served 
publishers’ interests. Perhaps authors’ interests simply receded from 
policymakers’ view.  
Any or all of these conjectures might be true. But they don’t explain 
policymakers’ persistent lack of curiosity about the outcomes of their 
decisions. Google’s legal counsel, William Patry, has observed (2012, 
p51) that ‘policymakers have been operating in a evidence-free copyright 
policy zone for many decades’. In fact, the lack of curiosity goes back 
centuries. No questions, no surprises. For all the antsing about copyright’s 
term and application, the forensic interrogation of cases and dicta, there’s 
barely a flicker of interest in the actual, concrete outcomes to authors. 
Instead a blanket of complacency lies across the whole question.  
Why? Perhaps after 300 years we are entitled to conclude that copyright’s 
outcomes are the ones policymakers intended. The words may say that 
copyright is a form of protection and an asset and an incentive to authors, 
but the outcomes say different. They say authorship is to be paid lip 
service and gently discouraged, while those who persist should be 
rounded quietly into dependence. The outcomes oblige us to question the 
intentions.  
 
CELEBRATED ECONOMIST William Landes and jurist Richard 
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Posner in a discussion of how to think about copyright take the 
simplifying step of ‘generally ignor[ing] differences in costs or incentives 
between authors and publishers, instead using “author” or “creator” to 
mean both’ (2003, p38). It is a telling step. Nearly the whole of this thesis 
could fit inside that ellipsis. For the differences between publisher and 
author are fundamental. Publishers are gatekeepers, inhabiting a world 
whose social and economic odds are bent in their favour. Authors are 
aspirants, with the odds against them. When they reach the gate, authors 
have a great deal more at stake.  
 
THIS THESIS is offered as a contribution to the literature on copyright. 
It is an author-centric contribution focusing on the relationship between 
authors (a term I have used throughout to encompass both writers and 
filmmakers) and publishers (encompassing book publishers, movie 
distributors and other intermediaries between author and audience). The 
specific contributions are these: 
• Highlighting the differences between author and publisher: Lyman Ray 
Patterson called this one of the ‘forgotten ideas’ of copyright (1968, 
p228). In chapter seven I set out the differences in detail. Taking them 
seriously puts the problems of copyright in a very different light. 
Policymakers should pay attention. 
• Giving evidence of the returns to copyright assets: Martin Kretschmer 
and Ruth Towse (2013) have made the case for wider use of empirical 
evidence in developing copyright policy. Evidence might be ‘qualitative, 
quantitative, experiential and even of the ‘story’ type’  (p10). In chapters 
three and four I present data from a large sample of films from Australia 
and other countries revealing a structural pattern of poor returns.  
• Exploring the motivations of creators: Why do authors accept 
copyright’s poor returns? One reason is that they are not just ‘in it’ for the 
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money. In chapters five and six I present the results of a survey probing 
what drives film producers. Most producers say ‘satisfying my creative 
vision’ matters more than ‘making a lot of money’.  
• Describing the Hollywood business model: The responsiveness of 
filmmakers to non-financial incentives has not escaped the Hollywood 
studios. In chapter five I show how they have used this insight to push 
many of the costs and risks of the filmmaking process onto filmmakers 
themselves and their investors — perfecting a business model used by 
London’s booksellers from the earliest days of the copyright system. 
• Showing how copyright shapes the value chain: Copyright does more 
than define the contractual relationship between author and publisher — it 
has armed one against the other. Publishers have used copyright’s 
monopoly to build great libraries of works and thus acquire weight, 
cashflow and influence; authors have remained micro and weightless. In 
chapter eight I explore counterfactually how a different system of 
copyright might alter the balance of power between them.  
Finally, there is a common perception of authors as people who are 
essentially unbusinesslike. But what if this too were an artifact of the 
copyright system? In a concluding chapter I profile William Shakespeare 
and his theatre company, the King’s Men. Operating in the very early 
days of copyright they offer a vision of the possibilities of authorship — 
in touch with their audiences, creative, profitable, businesslike. Modern 
authors should study them. There is much to learn.  
 
A note about terms 
In this thesis I use the term ‘author’ generically, to mean both writer and 
filmmaker. I occasionally use the term ‘creator’ in the same way. 
Similarly, I use the term ‘publisher’ as a catch-all description of the 
intermediaries who bring books and films to market — thus movie 
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studios, television broadcasters, book publishers and in eighteenth century 
London, the booksellers who lobbied for the first copyright legislation. In 
using these terms it is my intention to emphasise the common ground 
between these different professions and industries. What they share is a 
dependence on copyright and the business practices that have co-evolved 
with copyright. There is nothing in the business experience of a writer 
that would surprise a filmmaker, and vice versa; the territory is the same.  
Similarly, I have used the terms ‘copyright’ and ‘copyright system’ to 
describe the laws and institutions that govern authoring and publishing in 
the West, with a particular focus on Australia, the UK and the US. While 
there are notable differences between the copyright laws in these 
countries, they bear a strong ‘family resemblance’ that reflects both their 
shared historical antecedents and the harmonizing influence of the Berne 
Convention and other international agreements to which the three 
countries are signatories. It is the family characteristics that matter here.  
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PART ONE 
 
EVIDENCE 
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2. Australia decides to have a film industry 
Then, in 1972, something really odd happened: after 23 years of 
conservative government, someone my parents voted for actually got 
elected. It's Time, Gough Whitlam had said… The Australian diaspora 
began coming home, and suddenly we stopped cringing about our culture. 
We had our own films, our own books, our own voices on the radio and 
TV instead of the plummy pseudo-Pom accents that had once been de 
rigueur. Even our gardens got a makeover: out with the wilting hybrid tea 
roses, in with grevillea and callistemon. 
— Geraldine Brooks (2011) 
In the late 1960s some filmmakers, working in various alliances, began to 
make films together. They worked mostly in Melbourne and Sydney, 
unofficially, after work and on weekends. Some of them were students; 
quite a few were employed in advertising agencies or worked for the 
Australian Broadcasting Commission or the Commonwealth Film Unit. 
They shared the skills and equipment they had and ‘begged, borrowed or 
stole’ everything else they needed. They got some of their momentum 
from the student activism of those years and the rest from a bowerbird 
blend of influences. French new wave cinema, swinging London, 
California dreaming, the Sydney Push — all figured in the mix. People 
felt that new things were possible and that they were possible here, in 
Australia, without leaving the country. It was the beginning of the end of 
the Cringe.11 
And they were not alone. Among the postwar generation there was a 
growing confidence about Australia and being Australian. With Hector 
Crawford’s long running television series Homicide (1964-75), many had 
their first encounter with vernacular Australian drama in that validating 
medium. People were buoyed too by the construction of the Sydney 
Opera House, widely reported as a new wonder of the world despite 
financial troubles and the sacking of architect Jorn Utzon. And they were 
! 28 
bemused by the antics of underground magazine OZ and the obscenity 
trials it attracted in Sydney and then in London. It was one in the eye for 
the Law and a dig in the ribs for the Poms. 
Film critics also found things to like in the early offerings of the new 
generation. Films like Brian Davies’ The Pudding Thieves (1967) and 
John Murray’s The Naked Bunyip (1970), for all their amateurism, looked 
like the start of something. There was talk of a rebirth of Australian 
cinema after a near 40-year fallow. For a country boxed between a British 
past and an American future, this was heavily freighted talk. At the 
Melbourne and Sydney Film Festivals audiences gave the filmmakers a 
home crowd welcome.  
The new mood among the public was not lost on its politicians. They saw 
the raw political power of the new generation demonstrated on campuses 
around the country by the Vietnam moratorium movement. And they 
knew about the bulge in postwar births — the ‘pig in the python’ then 
reaching voting age. So where the Menzies government was content in 
1962 to ignore the spindly film industry and its advocates12, Menzies’ 
successor, Harold Holt, was far more attentive. In 1969 he gave his 
support to a three-pronged strategy designed to kick-start the infant 
production industry. The first prong was the setting up of an Experimental 
Film and Television Fund, worth $100,000. The Fund’s managers began 
making grants in 1970 and had soon seeded nearly 70 short films — 
‘piggy bank handouts to starry-eyed amateurs’ as one churlish observer 
had it (Shirley and Adams, p236). The second prong was another 
$100,000 to begin work on a national film school (opened in 1974). The 
third prong was the Australian Film Development Corporation, formed in 
1970. The Corporation was charged to ‘encourage the making of 
Australian Cinematographic and Television Films and encourage 
distribution of such films within and without Australia’. Its chairman, 
John Darling, a merchant banker, wanted to create an industry that could 
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survive on its own two feet. ‘The corporation will be commercially 
oriented,’ he said in an interview with the Sydney Morning Herald. ‘We 
have to create the conditions for the industry to grow and for investors to 
invest with confidence.’ (Shirley and Adams, p242)  
This aspiration was very nearly realised with the Corporation’s first major 
investment, in Bruce Beresford’s The Adventures of Barry McKenzie. 
After the film’s commercial backers pulled out at the last minute the 
Corporation took their place (reluctantly, according to Dermody and 
Jacka), funded the entire film and earned back most of its $250,000 
investment within three months of the film’s release. The following year 
the Corporation repeated the success with Alvin Purple, another ocker 
comedy, then made it a hat-trick with Stone, a biker film that built a long-
lived cult following. Sequels to Barry McKenzie and Alvin Purple were 
also successful. 
Despite the hat trick, the AFDC was considered a failure by the 
commercial cinema industry and by the filmmakers it funded: it pleased 
no one. Barely three years after its launch, the government commissioned 
a new inquiry by the Tariff Board, a key institution in the setting of 
industry policy. The presiding members were Richard Boyer and C H 
Grace. They invited public submissions and took evidence during two 
months of hearings at the end of 1972. The result was a searching 
examination of the cinema industry and the business conditions faced by 
local producers.13 It was not flattering to the commercial interests. There 
was ‘an unhelpful level of monopoly’ in cinema distribution and 
exhibition, Boyer and Grace reported. Australian films were 
discriminated against in their quest for cinema screens and were not 
looked after by distributors. A telling line of evidence led by the 
producers was the success achieved by Australian films outside the 
commercial system, in church halls and other unlicensed venues. It 
seemed the commercial industry was out of step with the public in its 
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attitude to these emerging filmmakers, finding faults that audiences were 
prepared to overlook. 
The Tariff Board delivered a more aggressive plan than anything 
previously considered by the government. It proposed legislation to 
‘adjust and regulate the ownership and control of cinemas’, with limits on 
the number of cinemas held by one person or company — limits that 
would require divestitures by the major chains. The AFDC would be 
replaced by a new statutory agency, the Australian Film Authority. This 
would have power to make investments as well as loans; it would take 
over the Commonwealth Film Unit; and it would have the power to 
intervene in the film distribution market on behalf of Australian 
producers.   
Before the report could be considered the Liberal government was swept 
out of office. The incoming Labor government, led by Gough Whitlam, 
had a reforming zeal fueled by 23 years on the opposition benches. Yet it 
stopped short of adopting the bolder elements of the Tariff Board’s plan. 
Yes to a new Australian Film Commission, replacing the AFDC; yes to 
the takeover of the Commonwealth Film Unit; but no to regulating the 
cinema market and no to giving its new agency power to intervene in the 
market. The industry’s young producers were angered by this unexpected 
fallback; the distributors were relieved but understood the writing on the 
wall. There had to be an engagement with this ambitious new wave. 
Ignoring it was not politically acceptable.  
 
WHAT CAME NEXT was a kind of flowering that changed the way 
people thought about Australian films. A succession of films took the 
industry’s case directly to the public and the public voted, decisively, to 
support it. Among these films were Peter Weir’s Picnic At Hanging Rock 
(1975), Ken Hannam’s Sunday Too Far Away (1975), Donald Crombie’s 
Caddie (1976), Henri Safran’s Storm Boy (1976), Phil Noyce’s Newsfront 
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(1978), Gillian Armstrong’s My Brilliant Career (1979), Dr George 
Miller’s Mad Max (1979), Bruce Beresford’s Breaker Morant (1980) and 
Peter Weir’s Gallipoli (1981). They went beyond the sex romp and ocker 
comedy — those early beachheads. Here instead was an industry grasping 
and handling items from the country’s glass cabinet of history and self-
definition. Of course the industry did not escape the hit-and-miss dynamic 
of the box office; failure was common and ordinary. But with these films 
it built a following among critics and cinemagoers, a rare unanimity.  
The new kid on the block, the Australian Film Commission, was an 
investor in many of these films. It was joined by counterpart agencies in 
New South Wales, Tasmania, Victoria and South Australia (and 
eventually Queensland and Western Australia). There were rival funding 
models. For example, the South Australian Film Corporation saw itself as 
a production studio, actively developing and producing films, whereas the 
AFC was always more hands-off, an investor but never a producer. The 
rivalry was intense because it went beyond questions of management 
style. Should an agency like the Australian Film Commission act like a 
banker to the industry or be an entrepreneur in its own right? The 
question runs like a fault line through policy thinking about the film 
industry. The argument for banker says: decision-making happens in the 
market, so the agency role is purely facilitative. The argument for 
entrepreneur says: the market is too thin, so the agency must play a 
strategic role. The contest was never permanently resolved. One side 
would swing into fashion as the other swung out. The evidence, measured 
in terms of successful films produced under this or that regime, is not 
conclusive. 
Faith in markets gave rise to another, deeper fracture in the policy 
thinking. In 1979, barely four years into the AFC’s incumbency, the film 
producers ran and won a political campaign to reduce the AFC’s 
influence by luring private investors into the market with tax 
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concessions.14 These private investors, so the argument went, would bring 
a commercial focus to film production. They would make better funding 
decisions than the funding agencies and bring the organising skills of the 
private sector to bear on the problems of the film producers. Over time 
the infant industry might be weaned from its dependence on government 
subsidies.  
As it turned out, private investors were hard to find. The proffered tax 
concession was not competitive with other tax-driven possibilities then 
available to adventurous investors. There was no real interest from 
investors until the government, spurred on again by the producers, 
dramatically upped the stakes. In May 1981, guided by Treasurer John 
Howard, it passed legislation that gave film investors a write-off equal to 
150 percent of their investments and a tax holiday on the income of the 
investment until they were 50 percent recouped.15 The new provision, 
called Division 10BA, transformed the industry. Film production 
doubled, in terms of numbers of films produced; in dollar terms, it 
doubled, then doubled again (see Figure 1 below). Intermediaries arose to 
manage the connections between producers and investors. Distributors 
stepped up their interest in the Australian film ‘renaissance’, buying 
rights to films and sometimes getting directly involved in production. 
Things moved so quickly and so far beyond the government’s original 
expectations that by 1984 the Labor government (back from another spell 
on the opposition benches) was forced to wind back the concession. It 
went from the very generous 150/50 structure to a more modest 133/33 
structure. And when that didn’t work — production kept booming — they 
tightened it again, to 120/20.16 Slowly the runaway train wound down to a 
walk. 
Among the films made during the 10BA period were Dr George Miller’s 
Mad Max 2 (1982), (a different) George Miller’s The Man From Snowy 
River (1982), Peter Faiman’s Crocodile Dundee (1985) and Yahoo 
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Serious’ Young Einstein (1988). These were four big hits, with Crocodile 
Dundee the second-highest grossing film in the world in 1986 (after Top 
Gun) and rated by US analyst Paul Kagan as one of the most successful 
independent films of all time. But as before, with the hits came the many 
misses. Many in the industry were skeptical about the tax concession, 
believing it subordinated creative and even commercial values to the 
pursuit of tax benefits. A story about a yacht purchased as part of a film 
investment scheme took hold in the industry with the tenacity of an urban 
myth. Film financier Peter Fox exited the industry in the fiery crash of his 
Ferrari (rumour said there were no skid marks). There were fears the US 
studios would bend the local content rules to get access to the 
concession.17 These fears seemed to be realised in the case of Philippe 
Mora’s The Return Of Captain Invincible (1983), whose eligibility for the 
concession was revoked by the Minister for Arts and then litigated in the 
Federal Court. The government lost. Among filmmakers there was a 
sense of fragility, of art being pitted against a much wilier commerce.  
Figure 1: Australian film production 1971-1990 
 
Source: Screen Australia  
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Almost as telling politically was the rising cost of the 10BA scheme. The 
Treasury released figures that showed the cost to government rising faster 
than production itself and far exceeding early estimates. The timing could 
hardly have been worse. Newspaper stories about so-called ‘bottom of the 
harbour’ tax schemes had shredded public confidence in the integrity of 
the tax system. In 1985 the government convened a Tax Summit to 
review the whole system. A consumption tax was on the agenda and so 
was the elimination of ‘tax expenditures’ like the 10BA scheme. The film 
industry studied the politics and concluded that some form of ‘cap’ was 
necessary. To this end a working group was formed and came up with a 
model where film financiers would be issued licences to raise specified 
amounts of tax-deductible capital. The method of allocating licences 
would be a ‘beauty parade’. The proposal got as far as Federal Cabinet 
before the thin alliance of industry interests sagged and broke. Cabinet, 
predictably, threw it out.  
By 1986 the industry was at an impasse: bigger than it had ever been 
before, struggling to be commercial, but with an investment base built on 
a doomed tax concession. The solution — not a happy one for many in 
the industry — was the creation of a government-owned ‘film bank’. Its 
chief virtues, according to its advocate, the Australian Film Commission, 
were its fixed cost to government and the commercial orientation it would 
bring to bear as a market-led investor.18 About the fixed cost there was 
little doubt, although the cost was still substantial. The commercial 
orientation, however, was contested. Critics feared the new entity would 
be a kind of ‘Film Bulgaria’, a quasi film studio run by government 
bureaucrats. But these concerns did not prevail. After two years of 
negotiation, the industry and the Federal Treasury came to terms and the 
Film Finance Corporation Ltd was formed. Treasurer Paul Keating 
unveiled the plaque at its swank North Sydney offices.  
The FFC quickly became the dominant player in film financing. Few 
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Australian films got up without its help, although there were stand-out 
exceptions, among them US studio-backed pictures like Chris Noonan’s 
Babe (1995), Baz Luhrmann’s Moulin Rouge (2001) and Dr George 
Miller’s Happy Feet (2006) as well as low budget independent films like 
Clayton Jacobson’s Kenny (2006). The FFC’s policy was to invest in 
films that had ‘marketplace attachments’ — typically a minimum 
guarantee posted by a distributor or sales agent. Following industry 
practice, the FFC allowed these participants to recoup in first position. 
They got back their costs plus any payments made in honour of their 
guarantees, plus their commissions, before any money was distributed to 
the FFC and other participants. Private investors who were not already in 
the film business got shorter shrift; they were expected to invest alongside 
the FFC and recoup on the same terms. Predictably, private investment 
dried up, leaving the field to the FFC.  
With the creation of the FFC, the industry entered a long period of 
relative stability lasting nearly 20 years. There were no big shifts in 
government policy in this period; equally, there were no big increases in 
government investment. The FFC’s annual funding waxed and waned in 
the buttoned-down world of Ministerial portfolio budgeting. Certainly 
fewer films were produced each year than during the heyday of 10BA — 
less than half. Film budgets drifted out into a no-mans-land, too big to be 
independent, too small to warrant wide release. Still, there was the 
familiar smattering of hits: Baz Luhrman’s Strictly Ballroom (1992), P J 
Hogan’s Muriel’s Wedding (1994), Stephan Elliott’s The Adventures Of 
Priscilla, Queen Of The Desert (1994), Scott Hicks’ Shine (1996), Phil 
Noyce’s The Rabbit Proof Fence (2002). But the ratio of hits to misses 
seemed to fall in the 1990s and fall again in the 2000s. There was finger-
pointing in the industry: ‘not enough good writers’ was one view; ‘too 
much safety in decision-making’ was another. That filmmakers had lost 
touch with audiences perhaps came closest to a consensus view, though 
why that should be and what might be done about it were not determined. 
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THERE WAS ANOTHER BIG TURN of the policy wheel in 2007. 
Once again it was a newly installed Labor government acting on the 
findings of a review begun by the previous Coalition government. The 
new turn of the wheel merged the Film Finance Corporation, the 
Australian Film Commission and Film Australia (remnant of the old 
Commonwealth Film Unit) into one ‘superagency’, Screen Australia. It 
also established a new funding instrument, the ‘Producer Offset’. The 
new instrument grants producers a lump sum payment worth 40 percent 
of a film’s eligible production costs, not as a loan or equity investment 
but as an outright grant, payable when the film is completed. Two things 
about the offset are worth remarking. The first is that the government has 
entered into an open-ended funding obligation (20 years of stasis have 
blunted fears of funding blow-outs). The second is that the scheme 
deliberately and explicitly rewards producers for commercial success by 
giving them a big equity stake in the films they produce, something they 
rarely achieved in the past.19 Rewarding success in this way amounts to a 
sea change in policy thinking. 
This chapter has been a brief recounting of a 40 year history of 
government intervention in the film industry. The intervention has always 
been politically driven, not an administrative matter. An economist might 
want to put the whole thing down to rent-seeking by a privileged elite — 
and there is some truth in that. But successive governments in a mature, 
well-functioning democracy have been ready to pay the rent, year in, year 
out. When arguments have arisen they have been about the means, not the 
ends. Is a tax concession better than direct investment? Should any film 
made in Australia qualify for assistance? Or only those with ‘significant 
Australian content’. Questions like these have been grist to the mill of 
policy conflict. But there has been no serious questioning of the policy 
goal: a continuing capacity to make Australian films. 
In the late 1960s the industry, tiny and aspiring, got on to the national 
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agenda. Its time had come. It was part of a larger, generational aspiration, 
perhaps emblematic of it. People cared about the fate of the film industry, 
even if they sometimes lost faith in its ability to return their interest. They 
went to the film festivals; they argued about the films; they got behind the 
industry. They saw their streets and car-makes and favourite actors on the 
big screen; they heard their accents and bands and even birdlife on the 
soundtracks. It was a tremendous legitimation. The enthusiasm this bred 
among audiences was at least as important as the passion of the 
filmmakers and the support they won from governments. All three 
together, working off each other, brought about the so-called Australian 
film renaissance.  
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3. How it all turned out 
 
Profit is a dark secret in the movie business. 
— Arthur De Vany, Hollywood Economics (2004, px) 
The currency of talk about the movie business is the box office dollar. 
Someone will say, this film has earned x million dollars at the box office. 
It’s a measure of popularity and perhaps something more, a finger on the 
pulse of the zeitgeist. Because people talk about box office socially there 
can be an ‘information cascade’, where the very fact that a film is selling 
well at the box office induces still more people to buy tickets. Success 
breeds success and vice versa.20 If the film is a big film with major stars, 
the speculation will be about just how well it might do at the box office: 
enough perhaps to qualify as a ‘hit’, or even a ‘blockbuster’?21 If it’s a 
little film with unknown stars, success will make it a ‘breakout’ film, 
defying expectations. If it’s big but disappoints, it will be a ‘flop’. Stories 
about the movie business are spun around this compass of hit and flop, 
blockbuster and breakout.  
It is surprising then how little information the box office conveys about 
the actual money outcomes to the filmmakers. They are not closely 
connected. There is a long chain of transactions between a cinemagoer 
handing over the price of a ticket and an accountant at a distribution 
company finally remitting funds to the filmmaker and the other owners of 
the film. The chain is not only long but contingent because at any point 
along the way the money flow may be exhausted by the claims made on 
it.  
To begin with there are the claims of the exhibitors, who collect the ticket 
money from the public. These are usually negotiated as a sliding 
percentage of the box office takings, with the exhibitors’ share increasing 
over time so as to give them an incentive to keep playing the film. In the 
United States the exhibitors’ share averages out to about 50 percent of the 
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box office. In Australia, they keep a bigger share, between 60 and 70 
percent of box office. The remainder is paid over to the film’s distributor 
and is called the Gross Rentals. So if we imagined a relatively successful 
film that took $10 million at the Australian box office, there would be $1 
million paid to the government as Goods & Services Tax, the exhibitors 
would keep about $5.4 million and pay the balance, $3.6 million, to the 
distributor. (The cashflow analysis presented here is summarised in Table 
1 below.) From this the distributor in turn would deduct the costs of prints 
and advertising. These are the costs of printing copies of the film to show 
in the cinemas, which might run to $500,000 for a 200 print release22, 
plus the costs of an advertising campaign, which for a release of this size 
would be at least $1 million. Deducting these costs from the $3.6 million 
Gross Rentals leaves $2.1 million. Next the distributor recovers any 
advance paid to the film’s owners as part of the financing of the film; let’s 
allow a generous $500,000 in this case. That leaves $1.6 million. Then 
there’s the distributor’s commission, normally 35 percent of the Gross 
Rentals — so about $1.4 million in this case. After paying this we’re 
down to $200,000, the Net Rentals, which will be the amount remitted to 
the film’s owners.  
Table 1 From Gross Box Office to Net Rentals 
Box Office $10,000,000 
Less GST ($1,000,000) 
Less exhibitors’ share ($5,400,000) 
Leaves Gross Rentals $3,600,000 
Less prints and advertising ($1,500,000) 
Less advance ($500,000) 
Less distributor’s commission  (1,400,000) 
Leaves Net Rentals $200,000 
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Only now do the equity investors who financed the film begin to recover 
their investment. This can be a very drawn out process and of course 
continues long after the cinema release has come to an end. The typical 
‘life’ of a film in first release is three or four years and progresses from 
cinema release through the ancillary ‘windows’ of pay-per-view, home 
entertainment (DVD, downloads and streaming services), pay TV, free-
to-air TV and so on all the way down the line to prisons and ships-at-sea. 
The sequence of windows is tightly controlled and each market sets its 
own terms — the DVD release, for example, typically offering a royalty 
of say 25 percent of the wholesale price, whereas the TV markets offer a 
straight license fee (though sometimes with an ‘escalator’ tied to ratings 
performance). The sequence is repeated in each overseas territory where 
the film is sold. Sometimes the rights and territories are bundled up in an 
‘all rights’ deal and ‘cross-collateralised’ so that losses in one market can 
be set against profits in another.  
But focusing now on the $200,000 Net Rentals generated by our film’s 
cinema release we may note that it will be applied first to repay any funds 
contributed by the film’s completion guarantor (an insurer who takes on 
the obligation to complete the film if the filmmakers should fall under a 
bus). Second, any funds borrowed to complete the film will be repaid 
with interest. Third, any party to the making of the film who deferred 
their fee will be repaid. Fourth, any funds contributed by a ‘priority’ 
investor will be fully (or perhaps partly) repaid. Fifth, the remaining 
‘equity’ investors will recoup their investments. Then and only then will 
the filmmakers begin sharing in the proceeds, usually 50:50 with the 
equity investors.23 Of course in our case, since there was only $200,000 to 
share around, it’s very unlikely anything will drop out the bottom to the 
filmmakers.  
An instructive example is David Yates’ Harry Potter And The Order Of 
The Phoenix, released in 2007. The film was a worldwide hit — a 
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blockbuster — grossing US$940 million. However, according to a 
‘statement of participation’ issued by Warner Bros Entertainment Inc. in 
September 2009, the film had still to turn a profit — in fact, was still 
showing a substantial loss. Table 2 shows where the money went. 
Table 2 Harry Potter And The Order Of The Phoenix Statement of 
Participation 
Worldwide box office* $939,885,929 
Yielding gross rentals# $609,912,843 
Less distribution fee ($211,800,286) 
Less prints & advertising ($160,338,011) 
Less other distribution expenses ($31,543,197) 
Leaves net receipts $206,231,349 
Less negative cost ($315,892,107) 
Less interest ($57,637,019) 
Leaves deficit  ($167,297,777) 
*Box offices figures from International Movie Database (IMDB) as at 
November 2011. #Gross rentals include proceeds from Pay TV, Video Cassette 
and Merchandising. All funds in US$. Source: Deadline.com (Fleming 2010)  
 
What these numbers describe is a process that resembles that party trick 
where champagne glasses are stacked in a pyramid and the master of 
ceremonies produces a magnum of champagne and begins to pour it into 
the topmost glass. The glass quickly fills to the brim and then overflows 
to the tier below, which in turn fills to the brim and overflows to the next 
tier and so on until eventually — but not in this case — some champagne 
trickles down to the bottom tier. In this metaphor the bottom tier 
corresponds to the filmmaker, separated by a long, contingent sequence 
from the inflow of money, obliged to wait patiently for payment until 
every other participant has been paid in full. 
Viewed from the bottom, a long way from the red carpet and the popping 
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champagne corks, the movie business looks very different. There is no 
media buzz down here. It is a dark place, barely known to the public. 
What happens here is a trade secret, kept secret by everyone in the 
business, for their different but compelling reasons. This is where the 
money trail ends and how it ends reveals a great deal about the business. 
We are in the accounting catacombs of the movie business, where the 
reckoning is done.  
 
THE DATA PRESENTED in Figure 1 below comes from the Film 
Finance Corporation, the 20-year veteran of the Australian film industry 
described in the previous chapter. With investments in a 20-year total of 
1,165 projects with a combined production value of $2.9 billion, the 
Corporation knew more about the industry than anyone. But it kept the 
knowledge to itself, citing the need to keep confidential the commercial 
interests of the filmmakers it supported and of the distributors and sales 
agents it did business with.24 Very little meaningful data got past this 
prohibition and the little that did was carefully masked and presented in 
ways that shut off analysis. Once, when as publisher of a business 
newsletter I pressed the Corporation’s chief executive to be freer with its 
data, he told me the data could not be published because publication 
would damage the industry. Later, speaking to a different executive, with 
a more modest request, a chink opened up in this wall of confidential 
silence. Through that chink has come the data in Figure 2 (below). 
What the data shows is the returns to the FFC from its investments in the 
158 feature films it backed between 1988 and 2002. The films are not 
individually identified but include such hits as Baz Luhrmann’s Strictly 
Ballroom, P J Harvey’s Muriel’s Wedding, Stephan Elliott’s The 
Adventures Of Priscilla, Queen Of The Desert, Scott Hicks’ Shine, Phillip 
Noyce’s Rabbit Proof Fence and Peter Weir’s Green Card. The results 
are shown in descending order, with the return expressed as the 
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percentage of the FFC’s investment that it had recouped up until 2007.  
In the best case, the FFC recouped 285 percent of its investment, in the 
worst case zero. Although some of the better performing films will have 
long lives in release, most of the films were economically exhausted by 
2007 and even the better performers had peaked by that time. The data 
therefore is near-complete. The story it tells will not change with the 
passage of time. So what story does the data tell?  
Figure 2 FFC Recoupment — Australian Films — 1988/2002 
 
 
The first thing to say is that the FFC was a risk-taking equity investor. It 
did not invest by way of loans, it charged no interest and it had no 
recourse to the other assets of the producers and distributors of the films it 
backed if the investments failed. It took the risks of the films on to its 
balance sheet. As an equity investor it ranked behind the films’ 
distributors, who sat at least one tier above the FFC in the recoupment 
hierarchy. In effect, the FFC was backing the producers of the films and 
investing in their copyrights. In fact, it stood directly in their place, 
investing on their behalf and absorbing their risks. The data therefore 
provides an extraordinary window into the copyright system, showing the 
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level of risk incurred in creating these 158 copyright works and the level 
of returns they generated. Other copyright investors recruited by the 
producers sat in the same place with the FFC and recouped alongside it 
pro rata and pari passu (that is, proportionally and simultaneously).  
The second thing to say is what ‘recoupment’ means. A film that recoups 
50 percent of its cost has not earned a 50 percent return. It has recovered 
half its cost, 50 cents in the dollar — or put another way has lost half the 
money invested in it. So in its best case, when it recouped 285 percent of 
its investment, the FFC made $2.85 for each $1 it invested, a profit of 
$1.85 and a rate of return (if we assumed a smooth five year life of the 
investment) of about 23 percent annually.  
Now we are ready to start making sense of the data. Visually what stands 
out is the asymmetry of the rankings, with just a handful of films in the 
profitable peak on the left hand side of the graph but a long, loss-making 
tail to the right. In fact just nine films show a profit to the FFC compared 
to 149 showing a loss, including 16 where the FFC recouped nothing at 
all. This kind of ‘skewness’ is characteristic of the movie business. 
Economist Arthur De Vany (2004) writes: ‘Work, revenue and money are 
distributed like the movies are a third world country — the princes get 
almost everything and the paupers almost nothing.’ Although he’s 
describing the American industry the description holds good for the 
Australian industry and for the FFC’s investments too.25  
But skewness is the least of it. The fundamental message of the data is 
that the FFC was almost completely underwater on its investments. You 
can see this if you think of the 100 percent recoupment mark as the 
waterline — bare recovery of costs. There should be much more dark ink 
on the page. By volume the area under the 100 percent mark measures 
15,800 percent (158 films by 100 percent) but the area of recoupment, 
from head to tail, measures just 4,310 percent, or just over a quarter of the 
level that would be required just to lap the waterline and get back the 
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money the FFC invested. If the FFC were a stock market, this would be a 
Great Crash; if it were your pension fund, it would be a scandal.  
Of course just lapping the waterline is hardly enough to whet the interest 
of investors. Nobody invests just to get their money back; they invest to 
make a return on their money. So to see how far short the FFC fell in the 
investments it made, we need to consider the kinds of return that were 
available elsewhere to investors. Figure 3 below provides a comparison, 
mapping the FFC’s returns from its investments in Australian films 
against the returns available from the Australian share market. It’s a 
telling comparison. 
Figure 3 Australian Stock Exchange* v Film Finance Corporation 
 
*The ASX 200 is Australia’s primary share market index. The figure shows 
ranked returns for companies in the index in the indicated periods. Returns are 
based on share price movements and dividends paid across the period. FFC 
returns are as for Figure 1. See endnote 26.  
 
The returns to the FFC are a creek in drought compared to the river of 
returns to investors in the Australian share market. The figure shows two 
sets of ranked share market returns, one for the period 1998-2002 (the 
blue line) and the other for 2002-2006 (the green line), comparing them to 
the ranked returns to the FFC (the red line, familiar from Figure 1).26 The 
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earlier period covers the dotcom boom and bust and the turmoil following 
9/11. The later period shows the share market in recovery. Plainly the 
share market outperforms the FFC even when it is tanking; in recovery it 
swamps it. Not only did the market deliver higher returns across the board 
in both periods, it was more transparent, more informed and more liquid. 
Investors could trade in and out of ASX companies at will relying on 
multiple sources of information, public and private; the FFC by 
comparison had little liquidity and few sources of information beyond 
what its own investigations revealed. Furthermore the best performing 
shares easily outperformed the few hit films in the FFC’s portfolio.  
There is really no comparison. Investors in the share market put their 
capital at risk (and sometimes lost money) but earned dividends and 
capital gains that compensated for the risks they took, often handsomely. 
The FFC, by contrast, lost nearly all its capital yet earned no premium for 
its risks. Its handful of hits did not compensate for the many misses; they 
did not come close. There was no truth for it in the common assumption 
that ‘it is the few big winners that pay for the many losers’ (Vogel 2004, 
p142). Rather, its mandated support for Australian films led it ever further 
into the red.  
 
HOW DOES IT LOOK for the other participants in these films, the 
distributors and the filmmakers themselves? The data doesn’t answer 
directly but we can infer the different outcomes from what we know of 
the FFC’s investment practices.  
For the film distributors, recouping ahead of the FFC, the risks were 
fewer and the returns quicker, surer, better. Broadly, the flow of any 
funds at all to the FFC implies that the distributor has fully recovered its 
costs and pocketed its commissions, since what flows to the FFC is the 
remainder. On this assumption the distributors would have been in profit 
on 142 of 158 films, roughly 90 percent of cases, although the profits may 
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have been thin in many of those cases.27 For the best performing films the 
profits would have been substantial. Table 3 below shows the Australian 
and US box office results for the FFC’s top 10 films (with an estimate of 
production costs as a way of benchmarking these results).  
Table 3 Top 10 FFC Films — Australian and US Box Office 
Film Production Cost 
(AUD) 
Australian Box 
Office (AUD) 
US Box Office 
(US$) 
Adventures of 
Priscilla 
3,000,000 16,459,245 11,220,670 
Crackerjack 7,800,000 8,618,107 n/a 
Green Card 13,000,000 10,585,960 29,888,235 
Muriel’s Wedding 8,900,000 15,765,571 15,119,639 
Napoleon 4,500,000 2,051,855 193,720 
Rabbit Proof 
Fence 
8,700,000 7,562,439 6,177,030 
Shine 5,200,000 10,167,416 35,892,330 
Sirens 5,800,000 2,780,639 7,770,731 
Strictly Ballroom 3,400,000 21,760,400 11,738,022 
Wog Boy 7,000,000 11,449,799 n/a 
Australian box office data from IMDB. US box office data from Screen 
Australia. Production costs are estimates only. 
 
Without knowing exactly what deals were done for these 10 films it is 
hard to guess the distributors’ profits but they are likely to have been 
many multiples of the money the distributors had at risk and much greater 
than the FFC’s profits in relative terms. These films were happy events 
for the distributors, showering profits and awards (including two Oscars 
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and four Best Film awards from the Australian Film Institute). For the 
executives concerned they must have boosted career prospects; for the 
companies, they boosted not just profits and balance sheet but also market 
charisma, so essential to staring down the competition for the next hot 
prospect. Success is often cumulative in the movie business, a winning 
streak, a hot hand.28 That said, considering the whole 158 films — the hits 
with the misses — the results were certainly not spectacular. There was 
no gold rush. But for the distributors there was enough success to entice 
new entrants and to keep hope alive among the veterans through periods 
of drought.  
What about the filmmakers? How did they fare relative to the FFC and 
the distributors? Here the story takes a twist. Although it was the 
filmmakers who brought the films into being, they did not have much say 
in the deals that funded them. That was the FFC’s prerogative as chief 
investor and it took a highly shaping role, deciding who had a seat at the 
table and on what terms. Its Production and Investment Agreement 
became the legal bedrock of every film it backed. It sometimes took over 
negotiations about financing and distribution, leaving filmmakers with 
not even a fig leaf of independence. There was, however, a core of 
softness in its deals. The softness was its willingness to stand almost 
literally in the shoes of the filmmaker. Just as the industry uses stunt 
doubles to stand in for actors, so the FFC became the economic double of 
the filmmaker. It supplied the capital and assumed the risks of the 
filmmaking role. Thus it took upon itself the poor returns and the big 
losses tallied in Figure 1. These outcomes would otherwise have been the 
lot of the filmmakers. Instead the FFC took a bullet for them. 
The filmmakers, displaced (or perhaps rescued) in this way by the FFC, 
became economic bystanders at their own event. Since few if any of them 
had anything like the capital required to make their films without outside 
assistance, they had little choice. What they got instead of the equity 
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position taken up by the FFC was wages and a share of profits, should 
any eventuate. The wages were paid from the funds contributed to the 
financing of the films and in effect were determined by the FFC, which 
approved them. For writers, director and producers, the rate was usually a 
set percentage of the film’s budget; for actors and crew, a market rate. 
Being paid in this way was essential for most of the recipients. They 
could not have worked on the films or continued working on them 
without money coming in to pay their bills and to live on.29  
Most filmmakers accepted the situation without demur. They may have 
viewed it as personally beneficial or in any event benign. But in accepting 
the FFC’s shilling they placed themselves on a different, dependent 
footing. Their livelihood depended now on the grace and favour of the 
FFC, their patron. This is a topic to which we will return.  
 
THE STORY THE DATA TELLS is of a no-go zone for ordinary 
investors. This is a class of assets, the copyrights of Australian films, in 
which no prudent investor should consider investing unless 1. they have 
privileged access to the revenues of the films, like a film distributor, or 2. 
they are prepared to accept money losses in pursuit of some non-money 
aim, like the FFC. For the filmmakers themselves, present and future, the 
story is salutary. The reward for their investment of work, time and 
creativity will almost always be zero (149 times out of 158) unless they 
can find an economic double, like the FFC, prepared to stand in their 
shoes. In that fortunate case they may earn a wage but lose control of 
their work. And for that opportunity they must dance a supplicant’s jig, in 
a bruising competition with their peers, all likewise dancing. For there is 
no prospect that they can recruit investors in the ordinary way, with a 
tempting reward for risk, because for this class of asset risk and reward 
are permanently and fundamentally out of whack.  
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4. What is going on here? 
 
The Australian industry as a whole, with its present structure, could not 
be profitable. 
— Susan Dermody & Elizabeth Jacka (1987) 
A person can drown in a river of an average depth of six inches. 
— Harold L Vogel  (2004) 
How are we to interpret the dismal performance of the film copyrights in 
which the Film Finance Corporation invested? Was it a purely local 
failure, something to do with the FFC and the way it chose its 
investments, or does it point to something larger, more systemic? 
Questions like these get a lot of attention in the film industry; people 
know there’s a problem. They may be asked in a slightly different way, 
for example, as a question about Australian films’ share of the box office. 
‘It’s only 3 percent,’ a report might say, ‘It should be 10 percent!’30 And 
so will begin an analysis of why the films fall short, especially when 
benchmarked against Hollywood.  
In this chapter I will explore three kinds of answer commonly offered. 
The first pins the problem squarely on the agency (the FFC or its 
predecessor, the Australian Film Commission, or its successor, Screen 
Australia). Failure is seen as a consequence of the agency’s funding 
policy, or its performance of the policy, or both. The second kind of 
answer takes a wider view: it’s a problem of just making Australian films, 
or put another way, of specializing in films with too small a market. One 
version of this argument holds that filmmakers should make films that are 
more ‘international’ in their subject matter and casting; another holds that 
only India and the US have domestic markets big enough to sustain a film 
industry. The third kind of answer rejects the argument from size, holding 
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instead that financial failure is a problem for filmmakers everywhere, 
regardless of market size — that it’s in the nature of the film business.  
The evidence for one answer over another is not open-and-shut. As we 
will see, there is some truth in all three. Getting to the bottom of things 
will take a little sleuthing.  
 
A GOVERNMENT-OWNED INVESTMENT AGENCY is a magnet 
for criticism. The FFC attracted its fair share, although filmmakers 
themselves were sometimes reluctant to bite the hand that fed them. The 
criticisms that concern us here are ones that relate to the FFC’s decision-
making process rather than criticisms of particular decisions. We are 
looking for sources of systematic error, biases that might have pointed it 
away from good investments, or led its executives towards bad ones. 
There are several candidates. A common claim was that the FFC was not 
sufficiently market-oriented in its decision-making. There is some 
intuitive force to this claim. The FFC clearly was not as closely connected 
to the market as a film distributor, the most common commercial source 
of funds for filmmaking. Nor was it subject to the same market discipline 
as a distributor. It could — and did — wear losses that would destroy a 
conventional business, since its source of funds was government, which 
was more or less indifferent to the losses. However, the FFC did regard 
itself as market-focused. It talked regularly to film distributors and often 
required producers to secure ‘marketplace attachments’ as a step towards 
financing. These attachments were essentially pre-commitments by a film 
distributor, usually part-paid on signature of contract with the balance on 
delivery of the film. For the FFC a marketplace attachment was not just a 
contribution to financing but a signal from the market that there was 
actual demand for a film.  
A review of the 158 films in our sample shows that 116 had marketplace 
attachments used in the financing of the films. These ranged from 1 to 57 
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percent of the films’ production costs. The average attachment 
contributed 14 percent of production costs. Interestingly, there was no 
correlation between marketplace attachment and eventual success of a 
film. In fact, the correlation runs the other way, as Table 4 shows.  
Table 4 Who else backed the FFC’s film investments? 
FFC slate Films backed by 
distributors 
Films backed by 
private equity investors 
Top 20 films 6 18 
Bottom 20 films 19 13 
 
Of the top 20 films backed by the FFC, only six had marketplace 
attachments, compared to 19 of the bottom 20 films. Put another way, the 
market contributed an average of just 4 percent of the production costs of 
the top 20 films, but gave 18 percent to the bottom 20. These figures tell a 
rather different story from the one the FFC was telling. They imply that a 
pre-commitment from a film distributor was not a reliable signal of 
market demand (as measured by returns to the FFC and other copyright 
owners). In fact, a better strategy for the FFC would have been to pay 
closer attention to private equity investors.31  This class of financial 
participant contributed rather more than film distributors, investing an 
average 18 percent of the production costs of our 158 films, compared 
with film distributors’ 14 percent. More importantly, their investments 
were a better predictor of success. Private equity investors backed 18 of 
the top 20 films, contributing an average 30 percent of their costs, but 
backed only 13 of the bottom 20 films, contributing just 9 percent of their 
costs.  
So if anything the FFC was perhaps too market-oriented — or should 
have sought some other proxy for market interest than the willingness of a 
film distributor to put up an advance or minimum guarantee.  
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Another claim about the FFC was that its decision-making was too 
cautious and rule-bound. On this view it may have missed opportunities 
to invest in successful films. Indeed there were at least five or six 
successful Australian films made in the period we are considering in 
which the FFC was not an investor. They include Rob Sitch’s The Castle 
and The Dish, Chris Noonan’s Babe, Baz Luhrman’s Moulin Rouge and 
Jane Campion’s The Piano.32 For the last three, there may have been 
issues about their qualification as Australian films (a precondition of 
investment by the FFC) but at least in principle such issues could have 
been resolved by changes to the proposed cast or other elements of the 
production. It is possible that the films were offered to the FFC and 
declined. A more likely scenario is that they were never offered, or 
discussions did not proceed very far, perhaps because the producers did 
not wish to conform to the FFC’s rules or process. Whatever the case, it 
does seem likely that a more flexible, opportunistic FFC could have 
secured some or all of these films — and perhaps others too, that 
somehow slipped through the net of possibility and were not made.  
A third claim about the FFC was that its policy goals as a government 
agency sometimes clouded its investment decisions. This was difficult 
territory for the FFC. On the one hand, it wanted to invest in a 
commercially focused way. On the other, it was burdened with 
expectations about the level of film production it should support and also 
about the kinds of film it should support, with a bias towards the ‘quality’ 
films that justify public funding. Certainly these were dimensions of its 
performance about which the FFC regularly reported.33 Pressures such as 
these probably led the FFC to invest in films that would not have survived 
a more purely commercial selection process.  
Taking these claims together — that the FFC was too distant from the 
market, too cautious, and too clouded by policy expectations — we may 
safely conclude that its performance as an investor was compromised. 
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Specifically, it may have missed the opportunity to invest in a half dozen 
or more successful films and, in other cases, may have relaxed its 
commercial guard and backed films that did not really merit investment.  
Now imagine that we could wave a magic wand and retrospectively repair 
these deficiencies in the FFC’s performance. How would things have 
come out? To picture this scenario, let’s suppose the FFC could have 
doubled its hit rate, so that instead of nine profitable investments (the thin 
peak of the graph in Figure 1) it made 18 successful investments.34 Next, 
let’s suppose that the FFC was able to avoid the worst performing 
investments it made — the lower half of its portfolio — leaving it with 
just the best performing 79 films in Figure 1. The result would be Figure 
4 below.  
Figure 4 FFC with enhanced performance 
 
 
This is generous magic. A marvelously wise agency has replaced the 
harried executives of the former FFC. There are now no zero-returning 
films. No hit film has been turned down or overlooked — they have all 
been scooped up. The median recoupment has climbed from 10 percent 
(10 cents in the dollar) to 40 percent, while the average rate of 
recoupment has climbed to 65 percent, from 27 percent. Yet we are still a 
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long way short of success in the normal commercial sense of profitability. 
$100 invested equally in the 88 films in this much-improved portfolio of 
films — hit-enriched and miss-depleted — would still return just $65. 
This remains a loss-making business, all risk and no reward.  
Now we can answer those who believe the FFC’s poor performance was 
all its own doing: they are wrong. Even on the generous assumptions we 
have used here, it is not possible to boost the money outcomes to anything 
approaching commercial normality. We must turn our attention instead to 
the second, wider possibility, that the FFC’s poor performance simply 
reflects its policy mandate to invest (only) in Australian films.  
 
THE IDEA OF AN AUSTRALIAN FILM INDUSTRY has always 
struck some as policy quixotism. Not because Australians shouldn’t be 
making films. Rather, they shouldn’t be making ‘Australian films’. On 
this view, with a population of 22 million, Australia is just too small to 
sustain a film industry focused on domestic audiences. Instead it should 
be making films addressed to international audiences — films that 
‘travel’.  
The issue is not black-and-white. Although films backed by the FFC had 
to pass a test of ‘significant Australian content’, the test was about the 
nationality of the people in key creative roles not the subject matter of the 
film. It was mainly designed to keep out foreign films masquerading as 
Australian films in order to seek FFC investment. It was thus a defensive 
policy rather than a culturally prescriptive one. Of course beyond the 
fence line of policy, there was the FFC’s interpretation, which was a little 
more highbrow than popular and perhaps more inward looking than 
outward. But none of this added up to a veto of films that sought an 
international audience.  
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If we look again at the FFC’s top 10 investments and how they played at 
the box office, this time adding data for the UK and Germany, we can see 
that overseas markets contributed significantly to their success.  
Table 5 The FFC’s top 10 films — Australian, UK, German and US 
box office 
Film 
 
Australia 
(AUD) 
UK (£) Germany 
(Euro) 
US (US$) 
Adventures of 
Priscilla 
16,459,245 1,544,183 705,871 11,220,670 
Crackerjack 8,618,107 - - - 
Green Card 10,585,960 5,030,887 12,271,505 29,888,235 
Muriel’s 
Wedding 
15,765,571 8,005,616 2,784,175 15,199,639 
Napoleon 2,051,855  1,667,302 193,720 
Rabbit Proof 
Fence 
7,562,439 1,745,070 1,291,950 6,177,030 
Shine 10,167,416 4,415,599 2,943,406 35,892,330 
Sirens 
 
2,780,639 2,640,396 - 7,770,731 
Strictly 
Ballroom 
21,760,400 3,028,000 1,880,295 11,738,022 
Wog Boy 11,449,799 - - - 
Australian box office data from IMDB. UK, German and US box office data 
from Screen Australia. 
 
Only two films, Crackerjack and Wog Boy, failed to do significant 
business overseas, having cracked the Australian box office. The other 
eight films did as much or more business overseas than they did 
domestically.35 One, Green Card, was a co-production with France, set in 
the US, directed by Australian Peter Weir and starring French actor 
Gerard Depardieu. The others were clearly Australian in content but no 
less international for that. Indeed it could be argued that one of the things 
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international audiences have responded to in Australian films is their 
Australian-ness.  
Still, for most films and most film industries, the domestic market is key, 
not just for its revenues but also for the signal it sends foreign buyers. A 
domestic hit will be swarmed at international marketplaces like the 
Toronto International Film Festival, whereas a film ignored in its home 
market generally makes few foreign sales. The question therefore remains 
whether there is such a thing as a too-small domestic market — too small 
a revenue base, too weak a signal. To resolve this question let’s consider 
a bigger market, one big enough to leapfrog Australian concerns about 
size: the UK. With a domestic population of 62 million, nearly three times 
the size of Australia’s, the UK film industry presumably would be much 
nearer viability even though its films, like Australia’s, depend on 
government backing.  
As it happens a window on this question was opened in the UK 
Parliament in July 2011. Penny Mordaunt, Conservative member for 
Portsmouth North, asked the Secretary of State for Culture, Olympics, 
Media and Sport how much was invested in films by the UK Film 
Council (an agency similar to the FFC) in the previous five years and how 
much received in revenue. The answer recorded in Hansard (UK House of 
Commons 2011) gave data for 33 films backed by the Council over the 
period. They included Tom Hooper’s The King’s Speech (a co-production 
between UK producer Iain Canning and Australian producer Emile 
Sherman), Sam Taylor-Wood’s Nowhere Boy and Jane Campion’s Bright 
Star. Figure 5 below summarises the results.  
First a caveat. Some of the films had not completed their release cycle at 
the time these results were reported. The most notable on that count was 
The King’s Speech, released in 2010, which became a worldwide hit and 
won four Oscars including Best Picture at the 2011 Academy Awards. 
According to the report in Hansard, the UK Film Council’s £1m 
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investment in The King’s Speech was 95 percent recouped as at March 
2011; clearly it will go into profit as the film works its way through the 
cycle. The same may be true, though to a lesser extent, for Nowhere Boy 
(87 percent recouped) and Bright Star (81 percent recouped), both 
released in 2009, and possibly for James Marsh’s Man On Wire, released 
in 2008, and Oliver Parker and Barnaby Thompson’s St Trinian’s, 
released in 2007. These last two films were the Council’s best performing 
investments, each recouping 101 percent. Excluded from the list were 
films that had not received any income as at March 2011; if we 
extrapolate from the example of the FFC, there were probably several 
films in this category.36 
Figure 5 UK Film Council investments 2006-2011 
 
Source: Hansard, UK House of Commons 2011 
 
Plainly, the UK Film Council is bogged in the same muddy field as the 
Film Finance Corporation. Its results are marginally better, with an 
average rate of recoupment of 31 percent versus the FFC’s 27 percent and 
median recoupment of 20 percent, compared to the FFC’s 10 percent 
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(though if we included a few non-returning films, the Council’s median 
would drop to 11 or 12 percent). But looking at Figure 5 we see the same 
sagging recoupment line, a little thicker through the tail but unmistakably 
loss-making. A domestic population three times greater has made no 
difference. 31 of 33 films are underwater. The Council has lost its shirt.  
Interestingly, if we now take the example of a smaller domestic market 
— New Zealand’s — we find much the same result. The New Zealand 
Film Commission was formed in 1978 with a brief very similar to the 
FFC’s and the UK Film Council’s: ‘to encourage and also to participate 
and assist in the making, promotion, distribution and exhibition of [NZ] 
films’. Between 1993 and 2006 it invested $66 million in 58 films, from 
which it recouped just under $13 million, a recoupment rate of 19 percent 
(Jackson & Court 2010). This falls short of the FFC’s and the Film 
Council’s performance but not by much.37 
It begins to seem that this kind of performance is an industrial benchmark 
for unprivileged equity investment in films: the loss of somewhere 
between two-thirds and four-fifths of the capital deployed.  
 
WHAT ABOUT HOLLYWOOD then? With a domestic population 
nearly five times the size of the UK’s, 14 times Australia’s and 70 times 
New Zealand’s, surely Hollywood turns a profit on its movie assets?  
Answering this question is surprisingly difficult. On the one hand, 
Hollywood is practically a synonym for wealth — for fast, heady money 
and ostentatious excess. On the other, there are the swirling rumours of 
losses. We have seen what happened with Harry Potter And The Order 
Of The Phoenix. Despite worldwide ticket sales of US$940 million the 
film was US$167 million in the red two years after release. Such stories 
come to light periodically, often as a result of litigation or the threat of it. 
One such case was Robert Zemeckis’ Forrest Gump. Released in 1994, 
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the film was a huge hit for Paramount, grossing more than US$660 
million worldwide, making it the third highest-grossing release to that 
time, behind Steven Spielberg’s E.T. The Extra-Terrestrial and Jurassic 
Park.38 But when Winston Groom — who wrote the novel on which the 
film was based and had a three percent share of net profits — received a 
year-end statement from Paramount, he discovered the film was still 
US$62 million in the red. Only the threat of legal action won him a 
US$250,000 payment described as an ‘advance against future profits’. 
Paramount expressed itself surprised by all the fuss: ‘Forrest Gump is an 
extremely successful film by any measure and we are trying to do the 
right thing for everyone involved, including Winston Groom.’ (Weintraub 
1995) Another, earlier example is Ridley Scott’s Alien. Released in May 
1979 with the memorable tagline ‘In space no one can hear you scream’, 
the film grossed more than US$100 million. By the end of the year 
distributor Twentieth-Century Fox had collected gross rentals (ie 
wholesale revenues) of more than US$48 million. From this it paid itself 
distribution fees of US$15 million and expenses of US$21 million, 
leaving net receipts of US$12 million. Deducting the film’s production 
cost (US$11 million), plus interest (US$2 million), the result was a loss of 
US$2 million. (Pirie 1981)  
How credible are these reports of losses from films that were clearly hits? 
Here, as elsewhere, we need to pay close attention to the money flow. A 
film that loses money for investors can still make a lot of money for its 
distributor. To see how, let’s look more closely at Harry Potter And The 
Order Of The Phoenix. The breakdown in Table 2 showed multiple 
payments from the film’s proceeds to the film’s distributor, Warner Bros. 
First was a distribution fee of US$212 million. Next the recovery of 
Warner Bros’ distribution expenditure on prints and advertising, US$160 
million (including a 10 percent ‘override’ paid to Warner Bros), plus its 
other distribution expenses, another US$32 million. Then it pocketed the 
net receipts, US$206 million, in partial repayment of its production costs. 
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Thus, while the film was showing a loss of US$167 million, Warner Bros 
had received revenues of US$610 million, booked earnings of at least 
US$237 million (its distribution fee plus its 10 percent override on prints 
and advertising) and had a carried interest of US$167 million (the 
unrecovered production costs), plus the unknown future value of the 
copyright assets (not just the movie itself but also the soundtrack and 
merchandising).  
Of course we are talking here of the privileged position of Warner Bros as 
distributor of the film, not the position of a simple owner of copyright. 
We need to turn our attention once again to that simple owner, with an 
unprivileged equity share in the proceeds of the film — our focus in this 
investigation. And on that point Warner Bros’ own evidence is that the 
film was down US$167 million on its reported US$316 million cost. Or 
in the terms we are familiar with from the examples of the FFC, the UK 
Film Council and the New Zealand Film Commission: the film had 
recouped just 47 percent of its cost. Ditto for Twentieth-Century Fox’s 
Alien, with a US$2 million loss on a US$13 million cost: 85 percent 
recouped. And for Paramount’s Forrest Gump, with a US$62 million loss 
on a US$55 million cost: a zero return. It seems we are back once more at 
that same muddy field.  
It may be objected that these are artificial losses, the result of creative 
accounting, dummied up to deprive profit ‘participants’ of their fair share 
of the bonanza. And so they may be.39 But true or false they are the actual 
losses reported to those participants. They are the money truth even if 
they are not a true accounting.  
Hollywood is notoriously opaque in its financial reporting. The results for 
individual movies are buried inside studio accounts which in turn are 
buried inside the accounts of the much larger businesses that own the 
studios (Warner Bros inside Time-Warner, Paramount inside Viacom, 
Twentieth-Century Fox inside News Corporation). So it is not possible to 
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derive a picture of the studios’ movie investments and their results like 
the picture we have for the FFC, the UK Film Council and the New 
Zealand Film Commission. Instead we are thrown back on heuristic 
methods, such as the rule-of-thumb that 1-in-10 movies makes money, 
widely cited by people in the movie business.40 There are several variants 
of this rule, offering more or less favourable odds but all telling 
essentially the same story, that most films lose money (though who is 
losing money is left unspoken; nor does the rubric acknowledge the unfair 
distribution of losses). Entertainment industry analyst Harold Vogel, who 
has analyzed the Hollywood data as closely as anyone41, concludes 
(2004):  
‘There emerges a profile suggesting that, in a statistical sense, most 
major-distributed films do no better than to financially break-even — 
with deviations from this mean extreme in both directions… The 
existence of profitable studio enterprises in the face of apparent losses for 
the “average” picture can be reconciled only when it is realised that the 
heart of a studio’s business is distribution and financing and that, 
therefore, the brunt of marketing and production-cost risk is often 
deflected and/or transferred to… outside investors and producers.’ 
Exactly so.  
 
WE HAVE THREADED A PATHWAY through the data and it has 
brought us out into the open. It is not the FFC’s fault that it lost so much 
money investing in Australian films. It may have made some bad 
decisions but not making those decisions wouldn’t have fixed the 
problem. It would not have done better even in a much bigger market. 
The truth is, whatever it did, short of actually becoming a movie 
distributor, it was always going to lose money.  
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This fact was not lost on the FFC’s founder, the Australian government. It 
knew there would be losses. In modeling undertaken by the Australian 
Film Commission before the FFC was established, it was assumed that it 
would recoup just 60 cents in the dollar from its film investments — a 
too-sunny assumption as it turned out. In its discussion paper arguing the 
case for establishing the FFC, the Commission reasoned (1986, p.xi):  
‘The probability of economic loss is uniformly high at the production 
level. In this sense, making films is... on balance, an uneconomic activity. 
The reason is not lack of demand. Rather it has to do with the high cost of 
taking the product to market, the market power of retailers and the 
bargaining power of distributors. The reason films are made at all is the 
reinforcement of demand by hidden or direct forms of subsidy. Retailers 
and distributors are obliged to finance and, in effect, cross-subsidise 
production in order to guarantee supply. In a few cases, the subsidy lies in 
filmmakers’ acceptance of deferrals, or in arrangements involving third 
parties obtaining indirect benefits. In other cases the subsidy is paid, 
directly or indirectly, by governments.’ 
The FFC’s failure was neither a local anomaly nor unexpected. It was the 
unsurprising fate of the ordinary copyright investor and it was business as 
usual in the movie industry.   
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5. The Hollywood model 
 
If you look around Hollywood, there's no end of white smiles and six-
packs. Long lines of beautiful people lining up to be incredible on film. 
Lots of people who want this part. 
— Actor Tom Hardy (Fisher 2010) 
There are so many ways to screw this up. You start out with a great 
script, the director screws it up, an actor gives a bad performance, the 
editor screws up, the music sucks, the release date sucks, the ad 
campaign sucks. There’s a million ways to fuck this up. So to me, when it 
works, it’s a miracle… It is controlled luck. 
— Actor, producer, director George Clooney (Couturié 2006) 
If I were in this business only for the business, I wouldn’t be in this 
business. 
— Attributed to Hollywood producer Samuel Goldwyn (1879-1975) 
One way to think about Hollywood is as a machine for solving the 
difficult equations of a business based on art and talent and intractable 
uncertainty. The machine has been solving these equations for a century 
and its business ingenuity has been extraordinary. It invented the studio 
system and the movie star. It re-invented glamour. It has been a canny 
innovator in project financing and the commercialization of intellectual 
property. It is a master of the art of marketing. To its international 
competitors, it is at once a marvel and a monster. Even as it lures away 
another generation of their homegrown talent, they take pride in its 
predation.  
Hollywood insider F Scott Fitzgerald (1941) said there were not half a 
dozen men who had been able to keep ‘the whole equation’ of Hollywood 
in their heads; we will settle here for trying to understand the business 
! 66 
model. We will see that what lies at its heart is a deep, operational 
understanding of the creative process and its practitioners.  
 
PERHAPS THE HARDEST PROBLEM filmmakers have to solve is 
how to go forward in the face of uncertainty. Every decision to develop 
an idea, commission a writer, cast an actor, greenlight a film, is haunted 
by doubt. Luck, intuition and Monte Carlo forecasting models are all 
embraced to try and still the doubt. But uncertainty only increases as a 
project clears the hurdles of development, financing and production and 
heads towards release. How will audiences respond? So extreme is the 
problem that it has given rise to a mythology of unknowability. 
‘NOBODY KNOWS ANYTHING’, wrote celebrated screenwriter 
William Goldman (1983), describing this as the single most important 
fact of the entire movie industry: ‘Because nobody, nobody — not now, 
not ever — knows the least goddam thing about what is or isn’t going to 
work at the box office.’ Goldman’s insight has become a Hollywood 
mantra, ritually invoked by filmmakers puzzling over the audience’s 
rebuff.  
More formally, economist Arthur De Vany (2004) has confirmed: 
‘Motion pictures are among the most risky of products… There is no 
natural scale or average to which movie revenues converge… Revenue 
forecasts have zero precision, which is just a formal way of saying 
“anything can happen”.’ (p71) De Vany takes this idea and runs with it, 
developing the ‘outside view’ he offers as a counter-weight to the ‘inside 
thinking’ typical of the movie business. Inside thinking, he says, is 
characterised by a ‘pervasive optimistic bias…based on (1) unrealistically 
positive self-evaluations; (2) unrealistic optimism about future events and 
plans; (3) an illusion of control’. (p269) In contrast, the outside view is 
heavily statistical and much less optimistic. In this view the broad 
features of the business are defined by ‘self-similarity, infinite variance, 
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volatility, skew, non-linear dynamics, kurtosis and inequality’, features 
that resist management and cast a pall of uncertainty over the business 
that never lifts. (p267) In perhaps its strongest form De Vany claims:  
‘Anyone who claims to forecast anything about a movie before it is 
released is a fraud or doesn’t know what he is doing. The margin of error 
is infinite. That does not mean that he won’t ever get it right, only that he 
seldom will and only because of sheer luck.’ (p275)  
This is hard core unknowability. It denies the agency of studio executive 
and film producer or at best radically limits the scope of their 
effectiveness. Yet interestingly, it is a view embraced by the film 
community — not just by those at the periphery but those at the very 
centre. Here is veteran producer and studio executive Peter Guber (Rain 
Man, Batman, The Color Purple, Midnight Express): ‘Flickering images, 
held together in the magic of filmmaking. At the end of the day, nobody 
knows.’ (Couturié 2006). And here is Guber’s contemporary Sherry 
Lansing, who as head of Paramount presided over such hits as Forrest 
Gump, Braveheart and Titanic: ‘No matter what you do, you need luck. 
And sometimes the Movie God shines on you and sometimes it doesn’t.’ 
(Couturié 2006). This is a strange kind of ‘aw shucks’ modesty, coming 
from people of formidable skills and uncommon achievement.  
Even those who want to qualify Goldman’s insight concede its essential 
truth. Thus filmmaker Sydney Pollack (Tootsie, Out Of Africa, Cold 
Mountain): 
‘Nobody knows anything in a definitive way, that could teach you. You 
learn over a lifetime certain things — you always learn — and people do 
know certain things. But there is no such thing as an expert in motion 
pictures, just doesn’t exist. There’s no such thing as a formula, no such 
thing as a rule that always works, unless it’s a rule that there is no rule.’ 
(Couturié 2006) 
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To understand what is happening here, we need to take a step closer. 
When Goldman says NOBODY KNOWS ANYTHING he is conjuring a 
darker fear than just not knowing. He is talking, obliquely, about failure. 
For failure is the most frequent outcome of the decision to develop or 
make a movie — the most probable result. According to De Vany’s 
estimate (p247), based on a study of 2,015 films released in North 
America in the 13 years to 1996, just 6.3 percent of films earned 80 
percent of Hollywood’s total profits in that period. That means 93.7 
percent of films struggled over the remaining 20 percent. Failure is 
pervasive. Goldman was invoking the secret fear that dogs the business at 
every turn, tormenting even its most successful practitioners. Failure is 
the weight in the cosh of the words ‘nobody knows anything’.  
We have seen that only about one in 18 Australian films goes into profit. 
That’s a 94 percent failure rate, similar to De Vany’s estimate for the 
proportion of films struggling over the last 20 percent of Hollywood’s 
profits. The industry rule-of-thumb is one in 10, a 90 percent failure rate. 
With rates like these, plainly failure is the expected result, statistically 
and managerially: it comes as no surprise. But emotionally and creatively, 
failure is always unexpected. People do not commit time, money and 
credibility to a creative project they believe will fail. Their confidence 
may falter, they may entertain doubts — they may hold their breath — 
but if they continue it is because they believe the difficulties can be 
overcome, the risks dealt with and, if there is some remaining rump of 
risk, that it is worth taking. Therefore failure when it arrives is a personal 
defeat. It is the end of an ambition, the snuffing out of the hope that lit the 
project.  
A film begins as an idea. It may be carried around for a long time before 
it is written down. Some writers go straight to a draft script; others write a 
treatment first. At some point the idea or treatment or script is pitched to a 
producer. If it’s a ‘spec’ script that point will come quite late in the 
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process. The producer once on board will push the script through multiple 
drafts — three is common, five or six well within the normal range. A 
script editor may be brought in, perhaps someone to work on the 
dialogue. Sometimes a director will be attached and take over 
development. If an impasse is reached, the writer may be replaced, or the 
producer may pass and let it go to another producer. Or the project may 
simply stall and sit waiting for some new pulse of interest. But if it keeps 
going then possibly it will begin to acquire momentum. Someone with the 
power to help may hear about it. An actor may express interest. There 
may be a buzz. Then a budget will get drawn up. Someone will be sent to 
scout locations. The producer will start work on a financing plan. There 
will be conversations with sales agents, distributors, people who might 
put up money. Everybody will be looking at everybody else. Is it 
happening?  
Anywhere along this path the project may come to an end, its possibilities 
exhausted. Very commonly the end is not sudden, it is a slow letting go. 
Producers talk of projects going onto the back burner or into a bottom 
drawer. The rate of failure — failure in the strict sense that the project did 
not make it into production — appears to lie somewhere between 95 and 
99 percent. The Writers Guild of America West reports that it registers 
more than 70,000 new ‘pieces of material’ each year42, while its sister 
organization, the Writers Guild of America East, registers ‘approximately 
10,000’.43 These are media works voluntarily entered into the Guild’s 
‘official script and screenplay registration service’ by writers willing to 
pay a small fee to confirm publicly their authorship of a work. Although 
no breakdown of the categories is provided by the Guild, industry 
guesstimates suggest that at least half the registered works are 
screenplays. That implies there are 40,000 new screenplays a year (not 
counting those writers who choose not to register their works, or don’t 
know about the service). Against that, we have the Motion Picture 
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Association of America’s estimate (MPAAb 2011) of 754 films made in 
2010 (734 in 2009, 759 in 2008).  
If we take this figure as a proxy for the production prospects of the 
screenplays registered by WGA West, then we can project that about 98 
out of 100 registered screenplays will fail to achieve production — a 98 
percent failure rate, or two percent chance of success.44 Put another way, 
only about one in 50 registered screenplays will become a produced film. 
But of course becoming a produced film is the only the first step to 
becoming a successful film. To calculate those odds, we have to multiply 
1-in-50 by the 1-in-10 rule-of-thumb for the proportion of films that are 
profitable. That gives us 1-in-500 odds of turning a registered screenplay 
into a successful film — implying a 99.8 percent failure rate, or 0.2 
percent chance of success. This is far beyond anything experienced in 
other industries.45  
 
WHAT IS EXTRAORDINARY about this rate of failure is not just the 
rate itself but the willingness of writers and producers to accept it. For a 
project to reach a ‘registerable’ stage requires weeks, months, even years 
of work, nearly all of it carried on speculatively, when almost any 
alternative work would have a higher expected value — that is, 
considering the odds, would pay more. Yet every weekday another 300 
projects are registered by the Guild — 300 new boats launched into the 
flood. What are we to make of this?  
There are four possible explanations: 
1. Reckless gamble: Writers and producers do not comprehend the odds 
they face. 
2. Confident gamble: They overestimate their individual prospects. 
3. Future payoff: They view their present work as an investment whose 
payoff will come somewhere in the future.  
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4. Different payoff: The payoff comes in some other form, beyond the 
framework of the gamble.  
As we will see, all four explanations figure in the mix.46 Writers can be 
forgiven for just not understanding how hard it is to get from script to 
film, especially if they are new to the business. It’s an easy mistake to 
make when success is so visible and failure so invisible in media 
coverage of the industry. There is also an element of simple human 
foible: people have a hard time getting to grips with statistics. Daniel 
Kahneman’s complaint (2011, p174) about the difficulty of teaching 
students about psychology rings true here too: ‘There is a deep gap 
between our thinking about statistics and our thinking about individual 
cases.’  
Even if they understand the odds, people may overestimate their own or 
other people’s prospects. In a 2008 survey by Bergent Research and the 
Australian Film Television & Radio School, film producers were asked 
about the probability that they would produce a ‘big hit’ in the next three 
years. They were also asked about the probability their peers would 
produce a big hit in the same period.47 The results, summarised below in 
Table 6, are instructive.  
Table 6 Chances of a big hit  
Australian film 
producers 
Very 
low 
Low Average High Very 
high 
Chance of big hit in 
next 3 years (%) 
15 24 31 24 7 
Chance of big hit from 
other producers in 
next 3 years (%) 
20 35 31 7 7 
Like estimating like* 
(%) 
50 46 47 15 50 
Very low=0-20% chance; low=21–40% chance; average=41–60% chance; 
high=61–80% chance; very high=81–100% chance. *Producers’ estimates of the 
proportion of other producers who have the same chance of producing a big hit 
as them. 
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The first thing to note is the optimism. Nearly a third of producers 
thought they had a high or very high chance of producing a hit in the next 
three years. Plainly many of them were mistaken, given the 1-in-18 (six 
percent) odds of producing a profitable film that we saw in the FFC data. 
Only 15 percent assessed the odds realistically — that is, gave themselves 
a very low chance. What also stands out is the way producers projected 
onto others their own expectations (the ‘like estimating like’ row). Thus 
the 15 percent who gave themselves a very low chance of a hit thought 
that 50 percent of other producers shared the same very low odds. 
Similarly, the 31 percent who gave themselves an average chance thought 
47 percent of their peers were in the same boat. At the other end of the 
scale, the seven percent who gave themselves a very high chance of a hit 
also thought that 50 percent of other producers would have a hit — an 
amazingly sunny and generous view!  
Kahneman, writing about optimists and entrepreneurial delusion, notes 
(2011, p256): 
‘An optimistic bias plays a role… whenever individuals or institutions 
voluntarily take on significant risks. More often than not, risk takers 
underestimate the odds they face… Because they misread the risks, 
optimistic entrepreneurs often believe they are prudent, even when they 
are not. Their confidence in their future success sustains a positive mood 
that helps them obtain resources from others, raise the morale of their 
employees and enhance their prospects of prevailing. When action is 
needed, optimism, even of the mildly delusional variety, may be a good 
thing.’ 
Kahneman goes on to discuss how decision-making can part company 
with rational weighing of probabilities, concluding (p312) ‘the decision 
weights that people assign to outcomes are not identical to the 
probabilities of these outcomes’. Citing a study he conducted with Amos 
Tversky, Kahneman shows how people give insufficient weight to high 
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probability events and undue weight to low probability events. Thus an 
event with a one percent probability received a decision weight of 5.5; an 
event with a two percent probability received a decision weight of 8.1; 
and a five percent probability received a decision weight of 13.2 (p315). 
Kahneman calls this the ‘possibility effect’ and it is clearly at work in the 
film industry.  
The third possibility on our list was that writers and producers might 
accept the poor odds they are offered because they view their present 
work as an investment whose payoff lies in the future. Thus a writer 
might commit to a project with no thought of it becoming a hit, just to 
gain the experience. Investing in this way probably appeals mostly to 
younger writers and producers, who have more to learn and less 
experience with the bruising arithmetic of hits. There may also be a 
lottery-like appeal in the otherwise daunting odds: the chance of winning 
big and decisively changing one’s life circumstances. Canadian 
economist Reuven Brenner (2008) has written about the logic of lotteries 
and their special appeal to those who are relatively old or poor. Following 
Brenner’s logic, it could be that older and wiser heads in the business 
persist in seeking a hit because they see having a big hit as their best 
chance of making good.  
So far then we have a story about human foible, about excessive though 
possibly useful optimism, with an element of investing in the future and 
perhaps of lottery-like gambling. How far does this carry us? It certainly 
doesn’t account for the 39 percent of producers who reported their odds 
of producing a hit as low or very low. And we have still to explain why 
any of these producers persist in a business where risk and reward are so 
fundamentally mismatched. We need something more. 
 
PSYCHIC INCOME is the term of art used by economists to describe 
the subjective value of non-monetary satisfaction gained from an 
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activity.48 It is a form of value that you carry around in your head rather 
than in your pocket. People in many different walks of life earn psychic 
income but filmmakers earn more than most. They get it from the art, the 
process, the other people they work with, the finished work itself. The 
love of the work lifts it above mere labour and creates a second stream of 
value, in parallel with and sometimes in place of the money stream. We 
can see this at work in Table 7 below. The data is drawn from a follow-up 
survey of Australian screen producers conducted in 2011.49 
‘Satisfying my creative vision’ dominates the agenda of these film 
producers, with 75 percent reporting that it ‘drives them a lot’. Next 
comes ‘contributing to the art form’, nominated by 56 percent of 
respondents, followed by ‘helping others achieve their creative vision’, 
with 48 percent. Other strong motivations reported by producers included 
‘winning respect of peers’ (31 percent), ‘influencing public opinion’ (21 
percent), ‘winning awards’ (13 percent) and ‘being well known to the 
public’ (10 percent). All of these constitute forms of non-monetary 
satisfaction, of psychic income. But what confirms most strikingly the 
reality and the importance of psychic income is the reported gap between 
‘having a big hit’ and ‘making a lot of money’. These two are strongly 
correlated in the real world — people who produce big hits tend to make 
a lot of money — yet in the minds of these producers the correlation is 
weak: 43 percent said they very driven by having a big hit but only 10 
percent said they were very driven by making a lot of money. There, in 
that gap, is the reason why film producers knowingly accept the poor 
odds they are offered and the basic financial mismatch between risk and 
reward. The gap is the hope of other rewards and of vindication on a 
different scale of achievement. 
The survey posed a further question of producers: ‘With your current 
qualifications, skills and experience, what is the highest annual income 
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Table 7 What drives film producers 
Motivation ‘Drives 
me a lot’ 
‘Drives 
me a bit’ 
‘Neutral’ ‘Doesn’t 
drive 
me’ 
‘Doesn’t 
drive me 
at all’ 
 
‘Satisfying my 
creative vision’ 
 
75 
 
17 
 
6 
 
0 
 
2 
 
‘Contributing to 
the art form’ 
 
56 
 
27 
 
10 
 
4 
 
4 
 
‘Helping others to 
realise their 
creative vision’ 
 
48 
 
27 
 
13 
 
12 
 
0 
 
‘Having a big hit’ 
 
43 
 
26 
 
24 
 
2 
 
3 
 
‘Winning respect 
of peers’ 
 
31 
 
37 
 
27 
 
4 
 
2 
 
‘Influencing public 
opinion’ 
 
21 
 
48 
 
21 
 
6 
 
4 
 
‘Winning awards’ 
 
13 
 
40 
 
27 
 
10 
 
10 
 
‘Being well known 
to the public’ 
 
10 
 
3 
 
36 
 
28 
 
22 
 
‘Making a lot of 
money’ 
 
10 
 
21 
 
34 
 
22 
 
12 
Source: Survey of Australian Screen Content Producers Wave 2 (2011) 
 
you would be likely to earn if you chose another occupation outside of 
being a producer?’ Overwhelmingly, producers said they could earn 
substantially more in an alternative occupation. 50  They projected a 
median average alternative income of $118,890, compared to median 
actual income of just $62,050. That’s a 92 percent pay jump — $56,840 
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— if they would just give up producing!51 Of course there is an element 
of exaggeration in these projections, perhaps of defensiveness too. But 
producers as a class are entrepreneurial, well educated and play a role that 
requires creative, business and interpersonal skills of a high order. This 
set of skills is much in demand in the wider business world. It therefore 
seems plausible that they could parlay those skills into the executive-level 
incomes they project.   
One way to think about this extra money producers believe they could 
make in a different job is as a proxy valuation for the psychic income 
they’re making in the job they do. In effect they are trading one kind of 
income for the other. On this view, the money income that producers 
forgo approximates the value of the psychic income they pick up. If that’s 
true, then it should be possible to quantify the role of psychic income in 
the film industry. I explored this possibility in a paper written with 
economist Simon Molloy (Molloy & Court 2012). Taking into account 
the number of people working in the sector and allowing for their 
different creative roles, we estimated the aggregate value of psychic 
income in the Australian screen content sector at $150–295 million 
annually. 52  However, only a portion of this figure relates to film 
production specifically; I estimate $25–67 million.53 Speculatively then, 
we might put the value of psychic income in Australian feature film 
production at somewhere between 11 and 30 percent of the average $225 
million spent annually on film production in the four years to 2010/11 
(Screen Australia 2011).  
Of course this was not an approved contribution to the films’ financing, 
nor did it give rise to a right to share in the films’ revenues. It was a set of 
transactions in the shadow world of creative engagement that sits just 
beyond the frame of the money world.  
Something similar may be happening with the 40,000 new screenplays 
the Writers Guild of America registers each year (our earlier estimate). 
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The WGA publishes a Schedule of Minimums (2011) governing 
payments to member writers. In 2012 these ranged from US$2,804 for a 
comedy sketch in non-prime time television to US$34,936 for a non-
original screenplay for a movie budgeted at less than US$5 million, and 
on up to US$122,054 for an original screenplay and treatment for a movie 
budgeted at US$5 million or more. If we adopt this schedule and apply 
the figure for a non-original screenplay as an approximation of average 
value, we arrive at an aggregate development investment of US$1,397 
million by independent writers and producers. Of course in many cases 
there is no money actually invested. Rather it is speculative investment of 
time and effort by hopeful writers and producers — nearly all of it 
unrewarded and much of it barely noticed by the studios at which it is 
aimed. Whether these suitors derive an equivalent amount of psychic 
income is unclear. Writers have only a small part in the collaborative 
process of filmmaking which so motivated the producers in our survey: 
they mostly work alone. So it may be they are more driven than producers 
by the possibility of a hit and the money a hit might bring. 
Returning to our question about why writers and producers accept the 
crazy odds they are offered, we have explored: 1. the possibility that they 
simply don’t understand the odds; or 2. that they overestimate their 
individual prospects; and 3. that in some cases they may be investing in 
the future or ‘buying tickets in a lottery’, knowing the odds are poor; and 
now 4. the possibility that they are driven by psychic factors that go 
beyond calculations of money and risk. We have seen that this last factor 
has particular explanatory power for producers and filmmakers. But for 
any individual, all four explanations may carry some weight. It is hard to 
make sense of very long odds and easy to talk up your chances, especially 
when you love the work.  
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THERE MUST HAVE BEEN A EUREKA MOMENT in the early 
days of Hollywood, when the properties of movie stardom first became 
apparent. It may have been the moment in 1910 when Carl Laemmle, 
soon-to-be co-founder of Universal Studios, revealed that ‘The Biograph 
Girl’ — a widely-recognised but unnamed actress who was believed to 
have been killed in a streetcar accident — was alive and well and signed 
up to his company and that her name was Florence Lawrence.54 If it was 
not then, it was surely not long after. For Hollywood had discovered the 
‘machinery of glory’ that ‘uncoupled fame from greatness and 
achievement’ (Flagg 1999) and simply conferred it on Hollywood’s 
chosen. 
The properties of movie stardom are remarkable. It is like a spotlight, 
playing slowly across the ranks of would-be stars: wherever the spotlight 
falls, a star is revealed.  The spotlight seeks out talent and beauty and by 
its falling confers the further qualities of stardom: fame, glamour, 
desirability. Not the least of its properties is its extraordinary appeal to 
actors themselves. It is hard to think of an incentive more exquisitely 
tuned to the anxieties of creative performance — the performer’s 
insecurity, fear of failure and unshedable awareness of the fickleness of 
success.55 Stardom is a balm for these anxieties. Yet its conferring in no 
way reduces the stock of movie stardom. If anything the stock is 
increased, since each new star adds lustre to the rest. In this respect 
stardom could be considered a form of capital that increases in value as it 
is invested. Or in the terms we are now familiar with, it is a form of 
psychic currency, denominated in units of fame and glamour and 
accepted throughout the movie economy. Hollywood has a licence to 
print this currency.56  
We can begin now to see how the Hollywood model works. Although the 
studios complain about the extravagant compensation they are forced to 
pay movie stars, the industrial truth is: movie stars are a bargain.57 They 
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are a bargain because movie stardom — just the possibility of it — is the 
motive force for every actor waiting tables in Los Angeles and for every 
hopeful trying out as an actor somewhere else in the world and nursing 
the dream of making it in Hollywood. There are not very many movie 
stars but there are a great many actors and a never-ending stream of 
movie hopefuls and it is from the stream of hopefuls that the next 
generation of actors and movie stars will be drawn. Furthermore it is not 
just actors who respond to stardom and the ‘magic’ of the movie business. 
Filmmakers and investors are equally susceptible. Stardom is a currency 
they all accept.  
The ability to call forth so much ambition and to induce such 
extraordinary risk-taking by people ‘wishing upon a star’ contributes 
directly to Hollywood’s financial success. Every ‘dollar’ of psychic 
income ‘earned’ by a filmmaker in lieu of a money dollar reduces the 
studios’ cost structure. And whereas a money dollar saved in this way 
might be regarded as a ‘deferral’ which the filmmaker was entitled to 
recover when the film was financed or made some money — a dollar of 
psychic income is never redeemed financially. It disappears out of the 
accounting. It is an unintended subsidy, which passes to the studio first as 
a reduction in costs, then as boost to profits (since it makes no claim on 
them). It is as though the studios were waving about the modern 
equivalent of Mark Twain’s ‘Million Pound Bank Note’. In Twain’s story 
the penniless protagonist (played by Gregory Peck in the 1954 film 
version) is given a £1,000,000 note by two elderly brothers betting 
whether he will starve or thrive, encumbered with such an enormous, 
untransactable sum. To cut a short story shorter, he makes his fortune and 
even marries the daughter of one of the brothers, all without ever cashing 
the note. At the end, with the note hanging framed on his wall, he boasts: 
‘Yes, it's a million-pounder, as you see; but it never made but one 
purchase in its life and then got the article (ie his wife) for only about a 
tenth part of its value.’  
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Hollywood could make a very similar boast: how the movie business has 
lured generations of filmmakers to Hollywood with the promise of 
stardom though it rarely pays out on the promise.  
 
THERE IS ONE MORE STEP in the Hollywood model: solving the 
problem of search. How do the studios choose which movies to make? 
This is a much harder problem than it might appear. To understand the 
scale of the problem, consider how many possible movies there are at any 
given time, that is, movies that could be assembled from the array of 
available movie-making talent. Even if you limit the search to known 
stars, directors, writers and producers — this director with that star in this 
screenplay under that producer — the number of combinatory options is 
staggeringly large. The number grows even larger when location and 
financing options are added to the mix of possibilities. We can think of 
this as a ‘possibility space’ that must be searched, systematically and 
efficiently, bearing in mind that search in this context means more than 
simply assembling a list: there must be a process of generating and 
thinking freshly about combinations that initially may seem far-fetched. 
‘Arnold Schwarzenegger, Danny De Vito: Twins’ is perhaps the 
paradigmatic example.  
In Hollywood the problem of search is distributed among hundreds, even 
thousands of industry participants, each of whom is powerfully motivated 
to seek solutions — possible movies — among the other participants they 
are able to influence, with the resources they control. Thus agents seek 
‘vehicles’ for the movie stars they represent; producers seek movies they 
can make ‘stand up’; studio executives seek to fill the studio’s ‘pipeline’; 
and all of them beat the bushes for possibilities unseen by others.  
The grid of seekers reaches around the world. Promising actors and 
directors are scouted at film festivals and on YouTube and wherever else 
they may turn up. Script ideas are pitched, weighed — and mostly 
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rejected. Projects that have one or two elements in place (this script with 
that producer) flash through other possible elements. This director? That 
actor? The permutations ramify. Adding one new element may mean 
rethinking another: we can’t cast him with her. Changes in the wider 
environment also ripple through the possibility space. Thus a low-cost 
new camera technology may make possible a slew of movies that were 
not feasible before. Equally, a credit squeeze may close the possibilities 
off again. Contingency randomly intervenes: a hole unexpectedly opens 
up in a wished-for actor’s schedule. The seekers comb the possibilities, 
then comb them again in case they fall out differently. What gives the 
search its reach are the many differences between the searchers. An 
independent producer moves in different circles to a studio executive. A 
budding actor has more appetite for risk than a proven star. A director 
aiming at the Cannes Film Festival searches differently to one seeking 
vindication at the box office. An outsider sees things that sit beyond the 
sightlines of an insider. All of this variation casts the net of the search 
wider. The financial rewards are structured differently too. For a 
filmmaker it’s a lottery with a big payout for a hit. For an agent it’s 10 
percent of what the client makes. For a studio executive it’s more like a 
game of snakes-and-ladders. Each therefore performs a different calculus 
even when they consider the same movies.  
Criss-crossing the possibility space, the army of searchers misses little. 
People like to tell stories about how Star Wars or Lord Of The Rings was 
turned down by studio after studio, but the point surely is that they did 
find backing — Star Wars by Twentieth Century Fox and Lord Of The 
Rings by New Line Cinema.58 
Of course locating a possible movie is only the beginning of the process 
that leads to the movie being ‘greenlit’. To get the process underway, the 
person who locates the possible movie must recommend it to the next 
person in a prospective chain of recommendations. The chain might run 
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something like this: writer ! producer ! director ! actor’s agent ! 
actor ! sales agent ! studio executive ! studio boss. There are many 
possible pathways but few shorter than the seven-link chain described 
here. Each link in the chain is a personal recommendation and thus an 
investment of reputation. Indeed the process of greenlighting can be 
thought of as the gathering of recommendations made out in the form of 
reputational chits. It is rarely quick. People may spend a long time 
weighing the possibilities before they reach a decision. They may demand 
more work on the script or make their commitment conditional on some 
other party also committing to the project. Or they may elect simply to 
keep their options open, neither passing nor committing. Producers call 
the process ‘development hell’.  
What makes it hellish is that producers are at cross purposes with 
greenlighters. Putting together a possible movie is essentially a 
constructive process, a coming together of people and possibilities. The 
greenlight process is exactly the opposite. It is the destruction of 
possibilities, the industrialization of saying no. Those involved in the 
process may be polite and solicitous in their engagement with producers 
but the process is a relentless search for the 1-in-100 combination. It is a 
great threshing machine that shakes and winnows the possibilities till the 
stalks and husks of half-formed movies fly out — rejected — leaving just 
the precious grain, greenlit. Thus do 40,000 screenplays become 750 
movies.  
 
WHEN HOLLYWOOD DISCOVERED that it could transfer most of 
its development risks to writers and producers it wasn’t innovating. 
London’s booksellers were doing much the same thing to English authors 
at least 200 years earlier. But Hollywood took it further — much further. 
Where the booksellers left it to authors to discover in themselves the 
reasons, beyond money, that they should write, Hollywood put a sign on a 
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hill, visible around the world. The sign said, in effect, here is the 
epicentre of the movie business. Fame, glamour, money, all are possible 
here. No surprise then that the world should beat a path to Hollywood’s 
door. Even those filmmakers who decide that Hollywood is not their 
destiny must first consider it — and many try it before deciding. There is 
no data to prove it but probably most movie ideas get a hearing in 
Hollywood, even if only as a possible ‘acquisition’. It is this capacity 
simultaneously to lure and reject so many movie ideas — to induce 100 
pitches while backing only one or two — that displays the power of the 
Hollywood model. It is a kind of business genius. But there is no genius 
inventor to whom we might give credit; the genius is in the system.  
We are left now with a question: how to reconcile Hollywood’s mastery 
of the possibility space with its ritual invocation of Goldman’s dictum, 
nobody knows anything? For if Goldman and his academic counterpart De 
Vany are right and correctly forecasting anything about a movie before it 
is released is a matter of ‘sheer luck’, then how can we have any 
confidence in the greenlight process? And how can Hollywood have built 
a viable, 100-year-old business based on picking movies that perform 
well at the box office?  
Discussions about the movie business often focus on how the studios are 
able to mitigate risk by casting big stars or spending more on special 
effects, or by making sequels and building big portfolios of movies. Yet 
these are all strategies which De Vany and his collaborator David Walls 
have shown do not meaningfully reduce the uncertainty of movie-making 
(De Vany 2004).59 We need to stay focused here on the greenlight process 
itself. Whatever Hollywood may do to manage the risks of making 
movies, there is no avoiding the necessity of choosing which movies to 
make. And if it is true that performance at the box office is irreducibly 
unpredictable, then the process of choosing which movies to make cannot 
be more than a kind of theatre of wishing and make-believe. We would 
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have to look elsewhere for an explanation of Hollywood’s century-long 
dominance of the movie business.  
One way to approach the problem is to reverse the arrow of inference. 
Empirically, Hollywood dominates the movie business. Although it 
produces its fair share of flops, it also produces most of the world’s movie 
hits. That it has done so in a sustained way for nearly a century argues 
against ‘sheer luck’ and in favour of some form of predictability. It is 
evidence that somebody knows something about which films will work at 
the box office. Notice that we do not need to suppose that any one 
individual knows what is going to happen at the box office. It may be, as 
Fitzgerald said, that very few people can keep ‘the whole equation’ in 
their heads. Rather, we are supposing that a group of decision-makers, 
acting independently but with knowledge of each other’s decisions, 
between them might know enough about the prospects of a movie to lift 
the veil of uncertainty. Earlier we saw that a typical greenlight sequence 
involved at least seven decision-makers — beginning, in our example, 
with a writer proposing a movie to a producer and ending with the studio 
boss deciding to fund the movie. We can see too that the process involves 
the aggregating of information. Each party knows something about the 
movie and its prospects and conveys that information, or the gist of it, by 
their decision to back the movie or not. The aggregated information yields 
the collective ‘yes’ or ‘no’.  
That a small number of people sharing information in this way can 
accurately predict box office performance has been demonstrated in an 
experiment called Box Office Prophecy. The experiment was designed by 
economist Charles Plott at the California Institute of Technology and 
carried out in association with the Australian Film Television & Radio 
School.60 In the experiment, students at the School and people from the 
film industry were invited to participate in a weekly online market where 
they could win money by accurately predicting how an unreleased film 
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would perform at the Australian box office. Predictions were made by 
placing ‘bets’ in ‘buckets’ corresponding to possible box office outcomes. 
The mechanism is similar to a pari-mutuel betting market. We also used a 
simple guessing game where participants were invited to guess what other 
participants would predict. Both mechanisms worked remarkably well. In 
a summary of the early results Plott (2007) wrote:  
‘The data show that amazingly accurate predictions can be made. Ten or 
so participants between them often have enough information to accurately 
assign probabilities to each box office 'bucket' or possible outcome. The 
results leave no doubt that while no single participant has generally 
reliable information, participants as a group possess solid information 
about potential box offices and that this information can be captured by a 
properly designed process. In part this accuracy is derived from the fact 
that the predictions are in the form of probabilities rather than a single 
number.’  
There is an echo here of the phenomenon known as the ‘wisdom of 
crowds’. James Surowiecki (2004, p10) summarised the conditions 
necessary for ‘wise crowds’ thus: 
‘Diversity of opinion (each person should have some private information, 
even if it’s just an eccentric interpretation of the known facts), 
independence (people’s opinions are not determined by the opinions of 
those around them), decentralization (people are able to specialise and 
draw on local knowledge) and aggregation (some mechanism exists for 
turning private judgments into a collective decision).’  
These conditions are met by the greenlight process. Diversity is achieved 
because the greenlight decision is distributed among parties who perform 
very different functions in the movie world. Independence flows from the 
fact that each party is empowered and motivated to say ‘no’ unless they 
privately believe the movie will succeed. Decentralization comes about 
because each party moves in different circles with access to specific 
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information about the elements of the movie they control. Aggregation is 
achieved by the greenlight process itself: the sequential gathering and 
disclosure of commitments leading to the funding decision. We can 
therefore say the greenlight process is ‘wise’. A small crowd, seven or 
eight people as a minimum, joined together in a wise process can know 
something useful about the prospects of a movie. They can know enough, 
on average, to achieve the ratio of hits to misses that has characterised 
Hollywood’s dominance of the movie business.  
But we are not yet out of the explanatory woods. If we have confidence 
now in the greenlight process, then what we are to make of Goldman’s 
insistence that nobody knows anything? Why would people who are 
themselves deeply involved in the greenlight process throw cold water on 
it? Why does Goldman’s dictum hold such sway in the movie business? 
We are back where we started. There is no simple answer. The thing to 
recognise is that we are right up close to the creative process. Here, in 
conclusion, are some possible explanations. 
1. It fits the alchemy model of creation. For many people involved in 
creative work, it is best not to say too much about it. Talking about it 
jinxes the process. Creativity is alchemy, in this way of thinking, with 
mystery at its heart. ‘Nobody knows’ is a way of saying this and turning 
away discussion.  
2. Ex ante it is permissive of failure. We have seen that failure is the 
expected case, the normal outcome of creative endeavor, especially in the 
movie business. ‘Nobody knows’ is an apology offered in advance. It 
wards off judgment. 
3. Ex post it justifies the failure. We did everything right but still it turned 
out wrong. ‘Nobody knows’.  
4. It’s a Keep Out sign. To ‘suits’ and other outsiders who come prying, 
‘nobody knows’ says you have no competence here. Keep out. 
! 87 
5. It cultivates the mystique. It is in the interests of Hollywood and 
creative people everywhere to close the curtain. You can’t go backstage.  
6. Some of the time, it’s true. Nobody knows.  
 
THE HOLLYWOOD MODEL is a very successful elaboration of the 
model pioneered by London’s booksellers three hundred years ago. 
Hollywood’s version itself is the product of a century of innovation and 
rests on a profound understanding of creative people. The spectacular rate 
of failure in the movie development process that we observed at the 
beginning of this chapter is not the industry blundering about, not 
knowing which pictures to make. It is Hollywood exploring the 
possibility space. It is Hollywood persuading talent everywhere to try out 
for the chance to make a movie, to be a star, to be the author of a hit. It is 
Hollywood outsourcing the risk and paying participants in the currency of 
glamour. And it is Hollywood pocketing the money and keeping the 
business to itself — a secret. It is an extraordinary model.  
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6. The view from the ground 
If independence exists, it exists partly because people have nerve, because 
they will not be swayed by rejection, nor by ill fortune or bad timing. 
They must stay unswerving and it’s a curious sensation to find oneself, 
however fearful of consequences, simply having to walk that road where 
the only catastrophe is stopping. 
— Al Clark (2010)61 
We are the 99%. 
— Political slogan used by the Occupy movement62 
We have been floating above the fray, looking down on the movie 
business, trying to see it as a whole. But now we must come closer. We 
need to see it as someone trying to make a film sees it — up close, 
without benefit of distance or dispassion. And we need to see it as an 
ordinary filmmaker sees it, who does not have the power of stardom. 
The difficulty of financing 
We saw in chapter three that risk and reward are fundamentally 
mismatched in the film industry. Investors who contribute equity funds to 
a film are unlikely to recover them unless the film is a hit and even then 
the reward will not be adequate to compensate for the risks of the 
investment. This fundamental mismatch is enough to turn most investors 
away. Unless they are able to negotiate a privileged position in the flow 
of funds or they expect to derive some further, non-financial benefit — 
such as helping a relative or getting to walk the red carpet — investing in 
films is a folly. No rational investor in possession of the facts would go 
ahead with it. For filmmakers, this translates on the ground to unusual 
difficulty in financing. Investors are hard to find and those who can be 
found are hard to bring to the table. There are many conversations but few 
closings.  
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The long wait for cash 
With very few exceptions the making of a film is funded as a one-off 
project rather than a continuing business. That means there is no working 
capital to fund early development or push the project through the cycle. 
Instead the funds are released in stages, conditionally, beginning with 
development, then pre-production, production, post-production and 
release. Profits, if any, lie at the very end of the cycle. For the filmmaker 
this means the money is always dangling somewhere in the future, just 
out of reach. For an equity investor deciding to back the filmmaker, it 
means their money will be ‘first in, last out’. Cash is always short.  
Capitulation on terms  
Film distributors are famous for writing contracts that purport to hold 
good not just in this world but in all media throughout the universe 
including media yet to be discovered. It is an imperious demand that 
shows very clearly where the power lies. Few filmmakers are able to 
influence the contracts they enter in any meaningful way. There is little 
room to negotiate. The distributors award themselves the rights they need 
in the film and priority over its revenues, while leaving the risks and 
obligations of production with the filmmakers and their investors. The 
filmmakers sign where they are told.  
The slide into dependency 
Because professional investors stay away from films, the search for 
backing must be conducted among the byways of the investor class. 
Filmmakers must locate the very small subset of investors willing to 
overlook the dismal economics of the film industry because they have 
more than money on their mind. We may think of these investors as 
contemporary exemplars of the patronage tradition. For the filmmakers 
we considered in chapter three the patronage investor was the FFC, a 
government-backed agency charged with investing in ‘qualifying 
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Australian films’. The filmmakers must engage with the mission of these 
unusual investors and accept the terms they are offered. Having few if 
any alternatives, they begin a slide into dependency from which they are 
unlikely to escape. Beggars can’t be choosers and they must be flatterers.  
Failure internalised 
We have seen that the development process is a high-cost, high-wastage 
search for possible movies. It is like a threshing machine churning 
through the possibilities. Hollywood’s particular genius has been to 
induce filmmakers to bear the costs of the process. Thus development has 
become a kind of personal tryout — as though filmmakers, no matter 
their seniority, were auditioning for the business and not already part of it. 
And because the outcome in 98 cases out of 100 is rejection, the normal 
experience of the process is of personal failure. Hope gives way to 
disappointment; the costs in time and cash and self-esteem must be 
privately absorbed; the failure is internalised.  
Low and uncertain incomes 
Unsurprisingly, producers earn low incomes from producing and 
therefore must seek supplementary incomes whether from other work, 
family sources, government subsidies, or welfare transfers. Table 8 below 
shows Australian film producers’ incomes from producing as well as their 
total incomes from all sources. More than half (52 percent) earned less 
than $25,000 from producing. The average was $43,090.63  Only 10 
percent reported incomes from producing greater than $100,000. Income 
from other sources raised the average to $76,190 (total personal income 
from all sources). To this pressure of low incomes, we must add the 
further tension of uncertainty. Producing is not normally a salaried job. 
Payments come, as we have seen, in fits and starts, without much 
predictability. 
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Table 8 Film producers’ incomes 
 
AUD 
 
Producing income 
(% of producers) 
 
All income 
(% of producers) 
 
0–24,999 
 
52 
 
12 
 
25,000–49,999 
 
17 
 
23 
 
50,000–74,999 
 
11 
 
26 
 
75,000–99,999 
 
4 
 
14 
 
100,000–149,999 
 
6 
 
10 
 
150,000–199,999 
 
3 
 
5 
 
200,000–249,999 
 
0 
 
3 
 
250,000+ 
 
1 
 
3 
 
Don’t know/not sure 
 
7 
 
6 
Source: Survey of Australian Screen Content Producers Wave 2 (2011) 
 
In our sample, the film industry delivers only about half the income of the 
average film producer. Table 9 below shows the breakdown. Forty-one 
percent comes from their main producing job, 6 percent from other 
production work and 3.5 percent in the form of royalties from past work. 
To make ends meet, most producers take another job (56 percent) or draw 
on private income (26 percent), family support (17 percent), or 
government transfers (10 percent).  
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Table 9 Film producers’ sources of income 
% 
total 
in-
come 
Prod-
uction 
(main) 
job 
Other 
prod-
uction  
Royal-
ties 
Other 
job 
Pri-
vate  
Fam-
ily  
Gov’t 
trans-
fer 
Other 
0 24 81 73 44 74 83 90 95 
1-20 25 11 23 14 15 10 9 2 
21-40 10 4 4 7 4 5 1 2 
41-60 7 3 1 12 5 1 0 0 
61-80 16 1 0 12 2 2 0 1 
81-
100 
21 1 0 15 2 2 1 0 
Mean 41.1 6 3.5 31.4 8.6 5.7 2.2 1.5 
Std 
Dev 
38 16 8.2 36.2 20.2 17.7 9.9 8.4 
Source: Survey of Australian Screen Content Producers Wave 2 (2011) 
 
Taken all together the picture that emerges is a daunting one. Difficulty in 
getting films off the ground is combined with personal financial 
difficulty. Problems of cashflow can be pressing and recurrent. Many 
projects are begun and carried forward but very few come to fruition. The 
losses must be absorbed. Over time these may come to be felt as a 
measure of personal failure. A low income may serve to confirm the 
sense of failure.  
Consolation for most filmmakers lies in the creative process. We saw in 
chapter five that ambitions like ‘satisfying my creative vision’ and 
‘helping others realise their creative vision’ ranked much higher than 
‘making a lot of money’ or ‘being well known to the public’. Table 10 
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below records how often film producers in the 2011 survey actually 
achieved these ambitions. The results show that many were successful in 
their creative goals. Two thirds (67 percent) were able to satisfy their 
creative vision all or most of the time, while slightly more (69 percent) 
were able to help others realise their vision all or most of the time. A 
majority (55 percent) believed they were able to contribute to the art form 
they practiced all or most of the time. But fame and fortune were elusive. 
A majority (59 percent) said they had never or not very often been ‘well 
known to the public’. Most (79 percent) reported that they had never or 
not very often been able to ‘make a lot of money’.  
Table 10 How often film producers achieve their ambitions 
Motivation All the 
time 
Most of 
the time 
Some-
times 
Not very 
often 
Never 
 
‘Satisfying my 
creative vision’ 
 
16 
 
51 
 
29 
 
2 
 
2 
 
‘Contributing to 
the art form’ 
 
16 
 
39 
 
37 
 
4 
 
4 
 
‘Helping others 
to realise their 
creative vision’ 
 
18 
 
51 
 
24 
 
2 
 
6 
 
‘Having a big 
hit’ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
36 
 
29 
 
34 
 
‘Winning 
awards’ 
 
4 
 
16 
 
57 
 
16 
 
8 
 
‘Being well 
known to the 
public’ 
 
0 
 
7 
 
34 
 
26 
 
33 
 
‘Making a lot of 
money’ 
 
0 
 
0 
 
21 
 
34 
 
45 
Source: Survey of Australian Screen Content Producers Wave 2 (2011) 
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We must keep our gaze fixed on the low horizon of the ordinary producer, 
working without privilege or recognition. With a median income of 
$27,720, the ordinary producer was living just above the poverty line, if 
single, and somewhat below the line if supporting a partner or family.64 
Since the resources to make films, both human and financial, are 
concentrated in the major cities, particularly the inner city, producers 
cannot withdraw to the outer suburbs or regions where living costs are 
lower — or must pay a steep professional price if they do. A fortunate 
minority was able to fall back on private means or family help, and a few 
qualified for welfare transfers. But for our ordinary producer, the choice 
becomes one of persisting in face of near or actual poverty, or else 
stepping back from the full-time pursuit of filmmaking, finding a ‘day 
job’ and eking out their ambition in their spare time. The already drawn-
out process of developing a film to the point of production becomes more 
attenuated, its fruition more distant, more improbable. Backers become 
harder to acquire as they perceive the reduced odds. Momentum flags.  
Of course there is always a further possibility: give up filmmaking. Some 
might view this as the only rational choice. Almost certainly it is a choice 
that many make. Our survey shed no light on those who leave the 
industry, since the population surveyed was of working producers 
exclusively. But we may draw a few tentative conclusions. First, the 
producers most likely to leave are those with the least financial means — 
those who have no private wealth or family support or access to welfare 
transfers. Second, there will be early departures among those producers 
who are unwilling or unable to find backing from the patronage investors 
described above. Third, the same economic conditions that induce some 
producers to leave the industry must discourage other, prospective 
producers from entering it in the first place. Their number is unknown.  
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IN THESE FIRST CHAPTERS I have described an industry that is 
very tough on those who work at the creative level, making films. The 
toughness is partly a sorting mechanism that helps the industry sift 
through the many competing film ideas and judge the merits of their 
proponents. It is easy to rationalise being tough in this way. But the 
toughness is also a persistent economic condition of the work itself. It is 
like a tax on creation levied by some unknown despot. People who want 
to make films have to pay this tax. There is no choice about it, except not 
to make films. The tax falls most heavily on those who need to make 
money from the work they do. For them the work becomes very hard. 
Sheer bloody-minded persistence begins to matter more than any other 
personal quality, while its absence becomes a marker for failure. And so 
we enter the realm of the obsessive and driven filmmaker. 
A story like this provokes the question: Are the conditions described here 
simply in the nature of creative work and its commercial exploitation? 
Are they somehow fundamental? Or can we imagine an industry and a 
market where the outcomes were more favourable to creators? These are 
questions about the copyright system — how it works and what it 
enables. It is to this system that we must now turn our attention.  
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7. Big, old, robust and bent — the 
copyright system 
The modern concept of copyright is difficult, complex, and on the whole, 
unsatisfactory. 
— Lyman Ray Patterson (1968) 
There seems (said he) to be in authors a stronger right of property than 
that by occupancy; a metaphysical right, a right, as it were, of creation, 
which should from its nature be perpetual; but the consent of nations is 
against it… 
— James Boswell (1791) 
There is a radical polarity around authorship. Authors believe they have a 
deep and unbreakable connection to their work. The rest of the world 
begs to differ. Authors think that a book they have written or a film they 
have made is theirs, in some fundamental sense. They believe they have 
the right to be recognised as author of the work and to stop others 
wrongfully claiming authorship. They believe they have an economic 
interest in any copies that are made, including versions made for a 
different medium. They consider they have the right to close down usages 
that are unauthorised. They expect others to defer to their wishes in how 
the work is presented. Essentially, they see themselves as owners of the 
work and believe others should recognise their rights as authors.65 
In Millar v. Taylor, one of the great English copyright cases dating from 
1769, Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, captured 
exactly the author’s perspective when he said: 
‘It is just, that an author should reap the pecuniary profits of his own 
ingenuity and labour. It is just, that another should not use his name, 
without his consent. It is fit, that he should judge when to publish, or 
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whether he ever will publish. It is fit he should not only choose the time, 
but the manner of publication; how many; what volume; what print. It is 
fit he should choose to whose care he will trust the accuracy and 
correctness of the impression; in whose honesty he will confide, not to 
foist in additions...’ (English Reports 98:252) 
This language of what is ‘fit’ and ‘just’ speaks directly to authors. The 
passage reads, in fact, almost like a cri de coeur. Nor was Mansfield 
alone in his support of authors.66 His fellow judge Justice Aston observed 
in the same case:  
‘I do not know, nor can I comprehend any property more emphatically a 
man’s own, nay, more incapable of being mistaken, than his literary 
works.’ (English Reports 98:224)  
Yet this conception of authoring, right as it seemed to Mansfield and 
Aston, has found no answering echo in the wider world. And while a 
body of law has grown up to protect the interests of authors, the idea of an 
author’s right based in justice has long since fallen away.67 Contemporary 
theories of authors’ rights make smaller claims. If authors have rights 
now it is because it is expedient for society to grant them — justice 
doesn’t come into it. Other interests must be weighed too and they may 
trump the author’s interest. In fact, the very idea of authorship has 
become controversial. James Boyle, one of the founders of Creative 
Commons, has observed: ‘The author vision blinds us to the importance 
of the commons — to the importance of the raw material from which 
information products are constructed’. (Boyle, pxiv) Others go further: 
‘Copyright is… an institution built on intellectual quicksand: the 
essentially religious idea of originality, the notion that certain 
extraordinary beings called authors conjure works out of thin air.’ (Rose, 
p142) On this view authorship itself is a kind of fiction ‘inseparable from 
the commodification of literature’ (Rose, p1).   
! 101 
More immediately, there is the threat of plagiarism. For flesh-and-blood 
authors, there is probably no more visceral challenge to their identity. The 
threat is magnified by the internet with its capacity to scour the world in 
an eye blink and assemble words and images out-of-context and de-
authored, ready for re-assembly. Choosing the time and the manner of 
publication are distant possibilities in this scenario, lost to view. There 
can be no thought of deciding ‘to whose care he will trust the accuracy 
and correctness of the impression; in whose honesty he will confide, not 
to foist in additions’. All such controls are permanently at risk in the 
online world. There is also the threat of unauthorised copying of authors’ 
works. Filmmakers watch with dismay the runaway file-sharing of their 
works, the scale of it sometimes dwarfing the legal uses. What flows 
away in the torrent is not just potential income but recognition of the 
filmmaker as someone who has a right to make a living from the work 
they do.  
There is, finally, the evidence of the money flow. As we have seen, what 
begins as a broad stream at the box office is reduced to a trickle by the 
time it reaches the filmmaker — and in this respect the filmmaker is no 
different to any other author. The trickle of money is confirmation, if such 
were needed, that the world takes a lesser view of authors’ rights than 
authors’ sense of them.  
 
THE STORY OF COPYRIGHT goes back about 500 years.68 There are 
several possible starting points. Copyright scholar Lyman Ray Patterson 
(1968, p28) cites the ‘focal point’ of May 4, 1557, when England’s Queen 
Mary granted the Company of Stationers a royal charter. The charter’s 
preamble sets the scene: 
‘Know ye that we, considering and manifestly perceiving that certain 
seditious and heretical books rhymes and treatises are daily published and 
printed by divers scandalous malicious schismatical and heretical 
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persons… moving our subjects and lieges to sedition and disobedience 
against us, our crown and dignity… and wishing to provide a suitable 
remedy in this behalf...’ (Arber 1875, 1:xxviii) 
The remedy was a newly empowered Stationers Company, granted by 
Mary a national monopoly of printing along with powers of enforcement 
that included the right to search: 
‘in any place, shop, house, chamber, or building of any printer, binder or 
bookseller whatever… for any books or things printed, or to be printed, 
and to seize, take, hold, burn… those books and things which are or shall 
be printed contrary to the form of any statute, act or proclamation…’ 
(Arber 1875, 1:xxxi) 
This was a deal, a quid pro quo, that gave the Company control of the 
book trade in return for its members’ help in suppressing political and 
religious dissent. Historian John Feather records that they did their job 
well: the stationers ‘so impressed the authorities with their orthodoxy and 
efficiency that they [were] officially accepted as an integral and essential 
element in the regulation of the output of the book trade’. (Feather 1988, 
p34)  
In this early precursor of the modern copyright system, there is nothing at 
all about authors’ rights. It is strictly a deal between the Crown and the 
Stationers Company (representing interests we would describe today as 
publishers’ interests.) 69  Authors appear only as potential sources of 
dissent and therefore targets for suppression. It would be another 150 
years before anyone thought to cast authorship in a positive light and join 
it to the aims of copyright. 
The circumstances of that recasting are worth retelling. In the years 
following England’s Glorious Revolution of 1688, a reform-minded 
Parliament allowed the Printing Act of 1662 to lapse. This Act had 
extended the publishers’ long-standing control of the book trade, limiting 
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the numbers of presses and requiring ‘copies’ (ie new works) to be 
entered in a register maintained by the Stationers Company. By allowing 
the Act to lapse, Parliament left the publishers twisting in the wind. Over 
the next six years the Stationers Company made repeated efforts to renew 
the Act, without success. Parliament had lost patience with both the 
Crown’s censorship and the Company’s monopoly and was in no mood to 
revive either of them. Forced to cast about for a new approach, the 
publishers hit upon the stratagem of proposing a ‘literary property’ arising 
from authorship. This new author’s right would supply the legal 
underpinning for their system of copyright registration.  
To advance their case, they drew on the advocacy of Daniel Defoe, author 
of Robinson Crusoe, who not long before had called on Parliament to 
give authors a ‘right of property’ in their works, arguing: 
‘Why have we Laws against House-breakers, High-way Robbers, Pick-
Pockets, Ravishers of Women, and all Kinds of open Violence [and yet 
no protection for the author]? When in this Case a Man has his Goods 
stolen, his Pocket pick’d, his Estate ruin’d, his Prospect of Advantage 
ravish’d from him, after infinite Labour, Study, and Expence.’ (Defoe, 
1709, quoted in Rose 2002, p37) 
In effect, the publishers sought to deflect Parliament’s attention from their 
own ambitions and focus it instead on authors and their campaign for 
literary property. It was the Author as Human Shield — with the 
publishers crouching behind hoping they might pass unnoticed. And the 
stratagem worked: a Bill was brought forward and quickly passed, with 
the title An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by vesting the copies 
of printed books in Authors, or Purchasers, of such Copies, during the 
Times therein mentioned. Called the Statute of Anne, the new Act was the 
first legislative instrument to expressly acknowledge the author’s interest.  
The publishers’ conscription of the Author was a clever gambit that 
disarmed their parliamentary critics. Parliament embraced the idea of an 
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author’s right with an enthusiasm it had never displayed for the old 
Stationers Company and the publisher interests it represented. The author 
became the acceptable face of the copyright system and later the 
justification for its expansion.70 But the move introduced a doubleness 
into the system. For behind the author stood the publisher. The author, 
pushed to the front, was the public face, while the publisher, standing 
behind, was the private force. It’s there in the very title of the Act, vesting 
copyright in ‘Authors, or Purchasers’. The purchasers are of course the 
publishers, named here in the act of acquiring the author’s ‘copies’ (ie 
copyright).  
The doubleness persisted in the years following the Statute of Anne, in 
the publishers’ long fight to make copyright perpetual. Called the Battle 
of the Booksellers, the fight was carried on mainly in the courts, where 
the publishers sought to prove the existence of a perpetual copyright in 
the common law. Once again they invoked the Author, grounding the 
supposed common law copyright in the ‘natural right’ of the author. 
Millar v. Taylor, described earlier in this chapter, was a test case brought 
by one bookseller against another with the aim of proving the existence of 
this supposed right. The case supplied a brief victory but was swept away 
in 1774 by Donaldson v. Beckett, another case carefully prepared by the 
booksellers, which went as far as the House of Lords. Attorney General 
Edward Thurlow as counsel for Donaldson noted that the booksellers ‘had 
not, till lately, ever concerned themselves about authors… nor would they 
[have] introduced the authors as parties in their claims to the common law 
right of exclusively multiplying copies, had not they found it necessary to 
give a colourable face to their monopoly’ (Cobbett’s Parliamentary 
History of England, Vol XVII, quoted in Tallmo, forthcoming). The 
Lords determined, finally, that there was no common law author’s right. 
That ended the Battle of the Booksellers but not the publishers’ campaign 
for a longer lasting copyright — it is still running.  
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The doubleness was there too in the copyright act passed by the First 
Congress of the United States in 1790. Echoing the Statute of Anne, it 
was called An act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the 
copies, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies, 
during the times therein mentioned. ‘Proprietors’ here meant publishers, 
once again twinned with authors. The pattern has been repeated whenever 
publishers have sought to extend the term or reach of copyright. As 
technology has enlarged the realm of media they have joined themselves, 
successively, to photographers, composers, filmmakers and software 
developers. Crouched behind the shield of the Author, they have brought 
about an enlargement of copyright beyond anything contemplated by its 
original legislators.71  
  
LONDON’S FRUSTRATED BOOKSELLERS turned out to be very 
successful policy innovators. Their invention of author’s copyright made 
possible the vast enterprise called the ‘creative industries’ in the form we 
know it. At the heart of the enterprise are the so-called ‘core copyright 
industries’. These are ‘press and literature’, ‘music, theatrical 
productions, operas’, ‘motion picture and video’, ‘radio and television’, 
‘photography’, ‘software and databases’, ‘visual and graphic arts’ and 
‘advertising services’ (PwC 2012, p17).72 According to Pricewaterhouse-
Coopers these industries contributed AUD67.6 billion to the Australian 
economy in 2011 and employed 612,664 people. Adding the ‘inter-
dependent’, ‘partial’ and ‘non-dedicated’ copyright industries73 gives a 
total economic contribution of AUD93.2 billion and employment of 
906,591 people. On these figures the ‘core’ copyright industries drove 4.8 
percent of Australia’s GDP while the ‘total’ copyright industries drove 
6.6 percent of GDP and 8 percent of employment (PwC 2012, p15-16, 
p23-24). In the UK, Professor Hargreaves has calculated that the creative 
sector ‘invests over £20 billion every year in creating intangible assets 
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protected by copyright…[and] accounts for 5.6 percent of UK gross value 
added’ (Hargreaves 2011, p27). In the US, using the same framework as 
PwC, Stephen Siwek reported that the core copyright industries 
contributed $931.8 billion to the economy in 2010, equal to 6.3 percent of 
American GDP, while the total copyright industries contributed $1,626.9 
billon, or 11.1 percent of GDP (Siwek 2011, p4).  
How much of this activity can truly be attributed to copyright is 
uncertain. The estimators may be drawing a long bow. William Patry 
(2012) has argued that attempts to quantify the creative industries have 
often been ‘an exercise in the manipulation of data’, while economist and 
former opera singer Ruth Towse (2001), slightly more generously, has 
described them as ‘data-as-advocacy’.74 Nevertheless they are enormous 
numbers, even if we shorten the bow. They speak of a set of industries 
that have grown old, established, wealthy, interconnected and highly 
concentrated. They are the Copyright Beltway, a fan of industries lineally 
descended from the Company of Stationers. 
We can see this looking just at the cinema industry. Australian cinemas 
came in at number 8 globally in 2011, with US$1.1 billion in box office 
revenues. The Asia Pacific region of which Australia is a part generated 
US$9 billion, behind North America at US$10.2 billion and ‘Europe, 
Middle East and Africa’ at US$10.8 billion. Worldwide there were box 
office revenues of US$32.6 billion (MPAA 2012). Characteristically, just 
six companies — the ‘big six’ US movie studios — accounted for two-
thirds of these revenues, including a record US$13.6 billion ‘foreign box 
office’ (Segers 2011).  
The six studios, big as they are, sit nestled inside six much bigger entities. 
Thus Paramount Pictures sits inside Viacom, Warner Bros Pictures inside 
Time Warner, Columbia Pictures inside Sony, Walt Disney Pictures 
inside The Walt Disney Company, Universal Pictures inside Comcast/ 
General Electric, and Twentieth Century Fox inside 21st Century Fox. 
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Cinema itself is just one platform in a much bigger media ‘universe’. The 
major companies have used it as a stepping stone, parlaying their vast 
movie libraries into shares in each new platform: TV, home video, the 
internet. Author and policy advocate Tim Wu has called this pattern of 
colonization ‘the Cycle’: 
‘History shows a typical progression of information technologies: from 
somebody’s hobby to somebody’s industry; from jury-rigged contraption 
to slick production marvel; from a freely accessible channel to one strictly 
controlled by a single corporation or cartel — from open to closed 
system.’ (Wu 2010, p6)  
Copyright plays a critical part in the Cycle though not in the way the 
legislators intended, as an incentive to creation. Instead it buttresses the 
bargaining power of the big companies. Their control of the supply of 
content deals them into any new system of distribution. It is control that 
matters. Copyright makes them a force that must be reckoned with.  
William St Clair, a British Treasury official turned copyright scholar, in 
his landmark study The Reading Nation in the Romantic Period described 
a group of early 19th century English publishers in the following terms:  
‘Constable, Robinson, Tegg, Lackington, Whittaker… were known for 
their ostentatious lifestyle which contrasted sharply with that of most of 
their authors… As owner/managers in a booming industry, they were 
media moguls, inclined to pay themselves large salaries, to borrow 
heavily, to understate their net profits, to distribute cash surpluses 
immediately to themselves, and to complain that trade was bad.’ (2004, 
p171) 
It is easy to imagine such modern-sounding figures surveying the present 
state of copyright and expressing themselves well satisfied — by the 
length of it (author’s life plus 70 years), the scope (from books to 
software), its expansion to every corner of the globe, the institutional heft 
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of it, its legislative weight, the case law, thick with dicta and precedent, 
the treaties and conventions, the depth of expertise surrounding it, the 
business practices, the firms and agencies and government departments 
specialised in its abstractions, the sheer inertia of it.  
The ghosts of Constable, Robinson, Tegg, Lackington and Whittaker 
might even allow that trade was good.  
 
SHOULD WE COME RIGHT OUT and say that copyright is really a 
publisher’s right? Patry comes close, arguing that ‘copyright is a 
commodity business in which authors’ interests are secondary’ (2012, 
p29) and that authors ‘are put forth as the basis for and beneficiaries of 
rights that are in truth owned by publishers and other corporations who 
regard authors as a negative item on balance sheets to be reduced as much 
as possible’ (2009, p76). Towse argues that ‘copyright inevitably distorts 
markets by strengthening publishers (firms) more than it protects authors 
(artists)’ (2001, p138). Patterson records the irony that ‘although 
copyright began as a publisher’s right, consideration of the publisher’s 
interest in copyright… disappeared altogether after copyright came to be 
considered an author’s right’. He argues copyright was concerned with 
‘three major interests, those of the author, the publisher, and the public’ 
and it was important that lawmakers did not ‘treat a three-dimensional 
problem in a two-dimensional context’ (p216-217).  
As we have seen, the publisher is a shadow participant in copyright law. 
He is the ‘purchaser’ or ‘proprietor’ standing behind the author in the 
early legislation. In later accounts of copyright he is sometimes given a 
more prominent role as the ‘distributor’ or ‘disseminator’ responsible for 
making sure creative works reach the hands of the public. In such 
accounts, copyright provides incentives not only for authors but for 
publishers too — they are its twin beneficiaries.75  
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Probably most people, if they think about copyright at all, imagine there 
is not much distance between author and publisher. The author receives 
the grant of copyright. He contracts with the publisher and thus transfers 
copyright to the publisher. They share the benefits. Probably most people 
envisage a partnership, working towards a common goal. The successful 
release of a new work raises both their boats, just as they fall together if it 
fails. Their economic destinies are tied. People may call to mind 
exemplars like celebrated publisher Robert Gottlieb, who has steered 
author Robert Caro though his monumental biography of Lyndon 
Johnson, still unfinished after 39 years but judged by Gottlieb to meet the 
test of ages: ‘These books will live forever. We all know that.’76 Or a 
showman like former Paramount boss Robert Evans, who backed Francis 
Ford Coppola’s The Godfather when nobody else would: ‘I’ve always 
had the same principle, always. Know what it is? Takin’ a chance. You 
don’t take a chance, stay still, you stay still, you only get older.’ (Couturié 
2006) 
Authors want to believe in the publisher-as-partner. It matters to them 
more than anyone else. The publisher-as-partner is their best bet in the 
shrill economy of possible books and possible movies. A Robert Gottlieb 
or Robert Evans prepared to back you is as good as it gets. It is part of the 
lore of writing and filmmaking, the heart of the Dream, to be discovered 
and backed by a Gentleman Publisher or a Legendary Showman, 
someone who can cut through all the layers of uncertainty and chance like 
Alexander through the Gordian Knot.  
Yet there is a gulf between author and publisher that defies the Dream. 
The gulf does not affect their emotional bonds — they can be tightly 
bound together in the making of a film or a book. It is an economic gulf 
and reflects the differences in the economic stakes they have in the 
copyright asset that is the fruit of their work together. The gulf is the long 
run consequence of the doubleness in copyright and the sustained effort 
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by publishers to bend copyright to their own purposes. It is the legacy of 
their duplicity.  
The size of the gulf is well understood by those working inside the 
business. It is so well understood that it has become part of the furniture, 
rarely remarked upon. There’s no point saying anything, the thinking 
goes, because nothing can be done about it.  
The gulf is imprinted in their legal personalities. The author is a flesh-
and-blood human being, a ‘natural person’; the publisher is a corporation, 
a ‘legal person’. When they come to the table it is a very unequal 
negotiation. Typically the author is focused on a single work with 
everything at stake — reputation, income, future — while the publisher 
has a portfolio of works to which the present work is merely an addition. 
They are like the fox chasing the hare: one is running for his life, the 
other for his dinner. Their understanding of what they are doing together 
is divergent. For the author the point of it all is creative; for the publisher 
it is in the end about business. They may be united by the work but they 
are doing it for different reasons. Australian scholars Peter Drahos and 
John Braithwaite, writing about Hollywood, labeled the publisher’s 
interest ‘financier’s copyright’ to distinguish it from ordinary author’s 
copyright (2002, p176). The characteristics of financier’s copyright — so 
financiers wish — are that it should last forever and belong from the 
beginning to the financier, without the messy entanglement of actual 
authors and the contingency of their lifecycles.77  
We should turn now to the general principles of copyright law in the 
English-speaking world and measure the gulf between authors and 
publishers they reveal.  
1. Exclusivity 
There is no more valuable part of copyright than the exclusivity it confers 
on owners. Armed with the copyright in a work, a publisher has no rival. 
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Copyright is the sole right to exploit the work. Uses must be licensed by 
the owner or they cannot lawfully proceed. The copyright in a work is 
thus a monopoly, or as economists Michele Boldrin and David Levine 
term it (2008), an ‘intellectual monopoly’.78 Patry describes this as the 
‘central element in copyright ideology’ (2012, p177).  
The copyright monopoly comes into being at the point of creation and 
belongs at that point to the author. The publisher acquires it by contract 
and then enjoys the monopoly in full. The process of publication does not 
dilute it. No matter how many copies the publisher makes and distributes, 
the monopoly continues undiminished until its statutory expiration 70 
years after the death of the author.79  
It is the monopoly character of copyright that has given most offence to 
copyright’s critics. Here for example is English historian and politician 
Thomas Babington Macaulay speaking against a bill to extend the term of 
copyright before the House of Commons in February 1841:  
‘It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least 
exceptionable way of remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet 
monopoly is an evil. For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; 
but the evil ought not to last a day longer than is necessary for the 
purpose of securing the good.’  
Macaulay believed that publishers, more than authors, were responsible 
for the ‘evil’ of copyright. He discussed the case of poet John Milton’s 
granddaughter, left destitute while his publisher prospered: 
‘Milton's works are the property of a single publisher. Everybody who 
wants them must buy them at Tonson's shop, and at Tonson's price. 
Whoever attempts to undersell Tonson is harassed with legal 
proceedings… And what, in the meantime, is the situation of the only 
person for whom we can suppose that the author, protected at such a cost 
to the public, was at all interested? She is reduced to utter destitution. 
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Milton's works are under a monopoly. Milton's granddaughter is starving. 
The reader is pillaged; but the writer's family is not enriched.’ (Macaulay 
1841) 
Macaulay, however, did not draw the conclusion that is there to be drawn: 
that monopoly may not be in authors’ best interests after all. Since this is 
a crucial point, let me repeat: the exclusivity conferred by copyright may 
not be in the best interests of authors.  
Here it is important to recognise that the benefit of copyright arises when 
a work is published — that is, when it reaches the hands of the publisher. 
There is no benefit while it remains unpublished. The question then is 
whether the publisher is likely to appropriate the benefit for himself or 
share it with the author. And the answer to that question must be that 
publishers, if they can, will exhaust the benefit in reducing their own risks 
and enhancing their returns. They will only share the benefit in the 
unusual circumstance that an author has sufficient bargaining power to set 
aside the standard contract (reluctant sharing) or if they overestimate the 
value of a work and pay an excessive advance (inadvertent sharing).  
In short, we should not expect that the benefit of the copyright monopoly 
will trickle down from publisher to author. On the contrary we should 
assume, as a matter of ordinary business logic, that it will not.80 
Not only does the benefit not trickle down — copyright actually 
magnifies the power imbalance between the two. Publishers over time 
acquire great libraries of copyright assets in the form of exclusive rights 
in tens, hundreds and eventually thousands of works. Copyright is an 
asset that really only makes economic sense when accumulated in this 
way. The resulting revenues help iron out publishers’ cashflows and give 
weight and stability to their companies. These in turn help them gain 
access to capital markets and thus capacity to fund their growth and 
corporate ambitions. In due course they win a seat at the table where 
copyright policy is made — and the circle is complete. Authors, by 
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contrast, have a backend share in the proceeds of their few works, poor 
cashflows, no balance sheet to speak of. There is little access to capital. 
Publishers speak for them in policy forums. They are the poor cousins of 
the copyright family.  
How publishers have bent copyright to their own purposes is nowhere 
better demonstrated than by the ongoing elongation of the copyright term. 
Macaulay was complaining of this in 1841. He argued that the extension 
then being sought, to 60 years beyond the author’s death, was for authors 
‘a mere nullity’, without practical effect.81 Noting that Dr Johnson had 
died 56 years earlier, Macaulay speculated whether the proposed 
extension would have made any difference to him:  
‘Now, would the knowledge that this copyright would exist in 1841 have 
been a source of gratification to Johnson? Would it have stimulated his 
exertions? Would it have once drawn him out of his bed before noon? …I 
firmly believe not. I firmly believe that a hundred years ago… he would 
very much rather have had twopence to buy a plate of shin of beef at a 
cook's shop underground. Considered as a reward to him, the difference 
between a twenty years' and sixty years' term of posthumous copyright 
would have been nothing or next to nothing.’ (Macaulay 1841) 
But for publishers with libraries of works by dead authors, the extension 
mattered a great deal. For them it offered real and immediate value by 
renewing their exclusive hold over works that would otherwise tumble 
into the public domain — where anyone might publish them. More than 
150 years later the same logic drove Disney and the Hollywood studios to 
lobby for the so-called Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 
which extended the term to author’s life plus 70 years. Critics called this 
the Mickey Mouse Protection Act (Lessig 2001b) because the famous 
cartoon character, about to go out of copyright, gained another 20 years’ 
protection. The Act was passed by the United States Congress in 1998.  
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We will return to the question of exclusivity in the following chapter, 
when we explore the idea of a copyright based not on exclusivity but on a 
right to compensation.  
2. Pricing 
The English economist Sir Arnold Plant nearly 80 years ago drew 
attention to the differing interests of authors and publishers in the pricing 
of books82: 
‘It is not to be supposed that both parties are necessarily best served by a 
price which restricts the supply of a book to the point of maximum net 
profit to the publisher. The author’s interest will depend rather on the 
terms of his contract with the publisher, and generally he will be better 
served by a larger edition and lower selling price than will pay the 
publisher best.’ (1934, p184-5) 
Plant went on to consider the various possible arrangements between 
author and publisher, from payment of a fixed sum per copy to the author, 
to a percentage of the published price, to more entrepreneurial 
arrangements involving the author taking some or all of the risk of the 
publishing venture.83 Plant concluded: 
‘The author is therefore usually interested in securing a price and output 
nearer to the competitive figures than those which pay the publisher best. 
Only when the author becomes a joint entrepreneur, and shares the net 
profits with the publisher after the deduction of costs, do their interests in 
monopoly restriction coincide; and only in the case in which the author 
takes the whole risk and pays the publisher a commission based on costs 
or gross receipts is the author concerned to issue a smaller edition at a 
higher price than the publisher would wish for.’ 
In other words, only if the author took the publisher’s position would he 
also take a publisher’s view of the pricing.84 
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This divergence of interest between author and publisher goes beyond 
pricing. It is deep-seated and goes to almost every aspect of the work they 
do together. Even within the question of optimal pricing there is a deeper 
divergence which has to do with the way the author’s economic interest is 
represented to the public. Probably very few people have an accurate 
sense of the author’s share of the final price — the retail value — of their 
work. They might be surprised to discover how small it is and how 
contingent. That it is buried deep inside the cost structure of the work and 
hard to calculate serves the publisher’s interest because it allows the 
public to imagine authors are better paid than they are. It allows 
prospective authors — those not yet in the know — to think the same 
thing.  
Lack of transparency is a bulwark in the publishers’ dominance of the 
business.  
3. Copying 
Who owns the words an author speaks? Copyright law answers this 
question in a very specific way: the author holds copyright in the 
expression — the particular assembly of words — but not the ideas they 
express. What rights then do other people have to use those same words? 
On this question, author and publisher part company.  
For authors, creative work takes place within a tradition: no one starts 
from scratch. The tradition provides context, objects, themes and 
continuities linking the generations. Even those who reject the tradition 
must begin with it. Copyright scholar Neil Weinstock Netanel captures 
this well in a discussion of free speech and its debt to earlier speech 
(2008, p43): 
‘Our speech does not arise from a tabula rasa. Rather, we are born into an 
expressive universe brimming with texts, songs, and images that others 
have created. We cannot make sense of our world, find our own voice, 
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communicate to others, or seek to affect others’ perceptions and 
understandings without appropriating, recoding, referring to, and 
imparting the expressive works that constitute our common language.’ 
One implication is that copyright can be a cost as well as a benefit to 
authors.85 To the extent that they wish to consume or license ‘texts, songs, 
and images that others have created’ — and that are in copyright — 
authors’ costs will be higher than they would otherwise be. The costs may 
be trivial (eg the few dollars’ difference between a book that is in 
copyright and one that is out of copyright) or they may be substantial (the 
many thousands of dollars it costs to license a song for use in a movie). 
Publishers generally do not contribute to these costs or contribute only 
fractionally. We saw in the case of films backed by the Film Finance 
Corporation that distributors left most of the costs of production 
(including the cost of licensing songs used in a soundtrack) with the FFC 
and other investors. So authors have a conflicted view of copyright, while 
publishers see little conflict or none at all. 
The difference begins here but goes further. In the end it is about the 
nature of the economy they inhabit. Publishers live unabashedly in a 
market economy where things are bought and sold. Authors live 
ambivalently, one foot in the market economy, the other in a ‘gift 
economy’ where things are shared. The element of the gift comes from 
belonging to a tradition, taking from it (the gift of those who go before) 
and giving back to it (the gift to those who come after). Author Lewis 
Hyde explored this idea in his classic work The Gift: Creativity and the 
Artist in the Modern World: 
‘The true commerce of art is a gift exchange, and where that commerce 
can proceed on its own terms we shall be heirs to the fruits of gift 
exchange: in this case to a creative spirit whose fertility is not exhausted 
in use, to the sense of plenitude which is the mark of all erotic exchange, 
to a storehouse of works that can serve as agents of transformation, and to 
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a sense of an inhabitable world — an awareness, that is, of our solidarity 
with whatever we take to be the source of our gifts, be it the community 
or the race, nature, or the gods. But none of these fruits will come to us 
where we have converted our arts to pure commercial enterprises.’ (2007, 
p205-6) 
This is not to say that authors are uncommercial or have no interest in 
selling their works for profit. It is to acknowledge the press of other 
concerns.86 Writers and filmmakers are highly conscious of the claims of 
tradition: they reference their predecessors, borrow from them, riff on 
them, sometimes pay homage to them — and locate themselves in the 
same tradition, recognizing that their successors will have the same right 
to reference, borrow, riff and perhaps pay homage to them.  
Authors’ awareness of tradition and their place in it tempers their 
perception of copyright. They know they should support it but still they 
hesitate. I see this in my teaching role at the Australian Film Television & 
Radio School. Each year I invite the new students to imagine that they 
hold a policy lever which when moved to the left makes copyright weaker 
and moved to the right makes it stronger. Where do they want to move it? 
The answer, almost uniformly, is to the left: weaker. These are people 
who make their living inside the copyright industries and most have at 
least five years’ experience in the business. Their ambivalence about 
copyright is a practitioner’s wariness, not a student’s uncertainty. 
Copyright makes them uneasy.  
Publishers see it differently and without ambivalence. They would move 
the lever to the right.  
There is an argument that copyright law rests on a Romantic notion of the 
author as an heroic figure who must break with tradition to create original 
works.87 Copyright scholars Martha Woodmansee and Peter Jaszi have 
argued that the legal profession itself subscribes to this Romantic 
perspective, noting that:  
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‘…the causes and consequences of the persistent, overdetermined power 
of the author construct — with their immediate significance for law — 
have gone largely unattended by theorists of copyright law, to say nothing 
of practitioners or, most critically, judges and legislators.’ (1994, p9) 
This may be true of the legal profession and may once have been true of 
the authoring profession. But it is unlikely to reflect the perspective of 
most working writers and filmmakers. For them the Romantic author is an 
historical figure, not a contemporary exemplar. There are certainly 
individuals who break with tradition — and there is such a thing as 
originality — but the break is typically an interruption rather than an 
abandonment. Tradition is the jumping off point and the place to which 
the author, often enough, returns. In this respect authors closely resemble 
academics. Just as scholars are expected to locate their work in the 
‘literature’ to which they are adding and also to make an original 
contribution, so too writers and filmmakers must understand their place in 
the tradition and then add to it by saying something new or saying things 
in a new way.   
Authors and academics thus share an interest in a model of copyright that 
is committed to originality but relaxed and open to copying (with the 
exception of plagiarism). Publishers by contrast prefer a model that is 
closed. For them, copying is leakage and a loss of potential revenues. The 
difference leaves an unresolved tension in the copyright system.  
4. Control 
Arguably copyright is best understood as a mechanism of control rather 
than as a class of asset or even system of incentives. Certainly it is 
evolving in this direction. In the US the passage of the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in 1998 made it illegal to circumvent 
technology used to control access to copyright works. This effectively 
created a right of controlling access to works (Netanel 2008, p68, Patry 
2009, p161). The proposed Stop Online Piracy Act, now postponed after a 
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vigorous protest campaign, would have gone further, extending the 
burden of enforcing copyright to internet service providers, search 
engines, online payment services and advertising networks.  
Netanel has called this a ‘paracopyright’ regime, noting that technological 
controls, the DMCA and mass-market adhesion contracts ‘unless 
tempered by further legal developments… will effectively give content 
providers perpetual, proprietary control over all access and use of 
expressive content they make available in digital form’ (2008, p71). Patry 
argues that the world view of copyright owners (and he means publishers) 
is ‘one of control: control over those who create works, control over the 
distribution of those works, and control over prices and consumption by 
the public. Any breach in this system of control is viewed as an existential 
threat to making money.’ (2012, p163)  
The mechanisms of control go beyond technology locks and adhesion 
contracts. Over time the copyright system has evolved an armoury of 
legal, commercial and procedural mechanisms. Real control comes from 
their strategic deployment. Copyright’s critics view this prospect with 
almost as much concern as the copyright monopoly itself — as a clear 
and present danger to free speech.88 Netanel once again: 
‘Copyright’s speech-chilling effect arises from a complex interplay of 
bloated copyright holder entitlements, forbidding litigation costs, 
copyright holder overclaiming, media’s clearance culture, speech 
intermediaries’ overdeterrence, and widespread uncertainty about just 
how expansive are copyright holder rights at the intersection of fair use, 
the idea/expression dichotomy, de minimis uses, substantial similarity, 
and a host of other nebulous doctrines that may or may not circumscribe 
copyright in any given instance.’ (2010, p115) 
It hardly needs saying that authors sit uncomfortably within a system 
straining towards control of speech. Control is a publisher’s business 
strategy that cuts across the grain of authors’ creative interests. 
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5. Money 
We have seen how poorly copyright rewards its creators and the equity 
investors who back them. The example of the few winners is not enough 
to cancel out the economic hard-truth, that copyright is a poverty trap for 
authors. It is a poverty trap in the literal sense that someone who invests 
repeatedly in creating copyright works should expect to become poorer 
and poorer over time.89 Only extravagant luck, a ‘day job’, or a generous 
patron can save them from descent into poverty.  
Poor returns are the wedge that divides authors from publishers. Because 
of the wedge their interests are not the same: their boats do not rise 
together. Copyright is a system designed by and for publishers, first and 
foremost, and authors only secondarily, partially and inadequately. They 
are two different tribes on opposite shores with little in common.  
In summary, there is a conflict of interest between authors and publishers 
that goes to the most fundamental aspects of the copyright system: the 
right to copy, the pricing of works, the exercise of control, the right of 
exclusivity and the way the money is shared.  
For 300 years, publishers have purported to speak for authors; they have 
aggressively advanced a set of interests which they invariably describe as 
authors’ interests; and they have led people to believe that the copyright 
system is carried on for the benefit of authors. On all of these counts they 
have misrepresented the truth: they do not speak for authors; the interests 
they have advanced are their own; and the system plainly is carried on for 
the benefit of publishers.  
 
PERHAPS THE MOST SURPRISING THING about copyright is the 
almost total lack of curiosity about its actual economic outcomes among 
the many people professionally concerned with it.  
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If copyright’s purpose is to encourage authorship, then it is important to 
know just how encouraging (or discouraging) it actually is. Yet the great 
majority of people working in or close to the copyright industries show 
very little interest in the question. Presumably some of them know the 
answer and are satisfied with it — or if they are unsatisfied, can see no 
purpose served in taking the question further. Others perhaps are willing 
to accept the simple evidence of books being published and films being 
made as proof of copyright’s efficacy. Still others are persuaded by the 
evidence of superstar profits that authors as a class must be doing well.  
The lack of curiosity extends even into the academic literature. It is a 
voluminous field pre-occupied with high theory — for example, with 
economic models of the copyright trade-off (monopoly grant for social 
benefit), competing theories of copyright’s policy status (property or 
privilege?), the economics of copying, policy alternatives to copyright 
and so on. The author is a bit player in these considerations, typically 
bundled with the publisher, or simply assumed away. The only close 
attention authors have received is the line of inquiry, begun by Foucault, 
that questions the possibility of originality and thus of authorship. Theory 
trumps the living author. 
There is not much about authors and not much evidence either. It is an 
analytical literature, rather short on data. Ian Hargreaves, in his review of 
the ‘intellectual property framework’ for the UK Government, noted:  
‘Much of the data needed to develop empirical evidence on copyright… 
is privately held. It enters the public domain chiefly in the form of 
“evidence” supporting the arguments of lobbyists (“lobbynomics”) rather 
than as independently verified research conclusions.’ (2011, p18) 
A survey of the economic literature on copyright by Ruth Towse, 
Christian Handke and Paul Stepan (2008) found that ‘empirical progress’ 
was lagging behind ‘theoretical progress’. Thus:  
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‘We know very little still about what motivates creativity, how much 
artists and other creators earn from copyright and other sources, how 
much they would need to earn to continue to be creative, how they 
respond to and use the copyright incentive, whether a shorter or a longer 
term of copyright protection would be in their interests, how important 
moral rights are to creators and many other points connected with the 
creative process as contrasted to the role of copyright in history.’ (p18-9) 
That said, the empirical work that has been done confirms the pattern of 
poor returns to authors. Australian economist David Throsby has led a 
series of five studies of professional artists stretching over nearly 30 
years. The titles signal the findings: The artist in Australia today (1983), 
When are you going to get a real job? An economic study of Australian 
artists (1989), But what do you do for a living? A new economic study of 
Australian artists (1994), Don’t give up your day job: an economic study 
of professional artists in Australia (2003) and Do you really expect to get 
paid? An economic study of professional artists in Australia (2010). In 
the latest study Throsby found the average income of Australian 
professional artists was ‘substantially less than managerial and 
professional earnings. Indeed their total incomes on average are lower 
than those of all occupational groups, including non-professional and 
blue-collar occupations’ (Throsby & Zednik 2010, p9).90 Looking at 
longer terms trends, Throsby reported that ‘artists have not shared in the 
rising trend in real (inflation-adjusted) incomes that have been 
experienced across the workforce at large’ since the mid 1980s (p12).  
Throsby’s artists include writers and composers but not filmmakers. 
Some earn copyright income but the numbers are not broken out — 
understanding copyright’s impact was not the primary objective of the 
study.  
For that we must look elsewhere. Martin Kretschmer, then Director of the 
Centre for Intellectual Property Policy & Management at Bournemouth 
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University, with economist Philip Hardwick published a survey of 25,000 
British and German writers in 2007. The study was the largest of its kind 
and one of the first to systematically compare authors’ earnings with 
earnings of other professions. Among the findings (p5-6): 
• Professional UK authors (devoting more than 50 percent of their time 
to writing) earned a median wage of £12,330, or 64 percent of the 
national gross median wage. German authors earned an average 
£8,280 (42 percent of national median wage).  
• The distribution of incomes was highly unequal. In the UK the top 10 
percent of authors earned 60 percent of total income, while the bottom 
50 percent earned just 8 percent of total income. This translates to a 
Gini Co-efficient (a measure of inequality) of 0.63, compared to a co-
efficient of 0.33 for all employees in the UK. For German authors the 
co-efficient was 0.52.91 
• ‘Only 20 percent of UK authors earned all their income from writing. 
60 percent of professional writers needed another job to survive, both 
in Germany and the UK.’ 
• The internet has not translated into increased earnings. Less than 15 
percent of UK writers and 10 percent of German writers had received 
payment for internet uses. ‘Typical earnings of authors have 
deteriorated since 2000.’ (The study data are for 2004/05.)  
Kretschmer and Hardwick offered no policy prescriptions. But they 
concluded, starkly enough: ‘After this study, copyright policy cannot 
remain the same.’ (p4)  
It is easy to understand their consternation. If a public policy designed to 
give encouragement to authors requires them to accept economic risks 
that no ordinary, rational person, informed of the risks, would accept, 
what are we to make of that policy? And if the industrial system built on 
that policy has routinely visited poverty upon its putative beneficiaries, 
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how should we judge the system’s performance of the policy? Surely both 
policy and performance must be viewed as failures. Yet their supporters 
continue, without curiosity, barely looking back, in blithe incumbency, 
unchallenged, proposing — if anything — to expand their domain.  
It is time now to consider the alternatives.  
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8. A copyright counterfactual: authorship 
without exclusivity 
Many of what are now called the creative industries developed with 
copyright protection from the very start. What we do not know is what 
historians call the counter-factual: what would they look like without 
copyright? 
— Ruth Towse, Christian Handke, Paul Stepan (2008) 
Intellectual property has existed for so long that it is difficult to imagine a 
world without it, but it is not intrinsic to authorship, books, or reading as 
such. 
— William St Clair (2004) 
We shall now proceed to state the outlines [of a copyright law], but 
without the forlornest hope of ever seeing it tried… Let an author be 
empowered to sell the copyright of his work to a particular publisher, for 
the space of five years only; a term, at the end of which, nine-tenths of the 
works now published are completely forgotten. Let it then become public 
property, in the same way that a play, on being published, becomes public 
property since Mr Bulwer's act. As a manager now has the right to act 
any play he chooses, on paying a certain sum to the author, for each night 
of representation, so let any printer have the right to print any work on 
paying a certain sum to the author, for each copy he issues… The great 
recommendation, of course, would be, that of every work of reputation we 
should have cheap and elegant editions; … and that the works of living 
authors would be much more extensively diffused than they are, while 
their interests would, it is hoped, be advanced in an equal proportion to 
their fame. 
— Thomas Watts (1837) 
Thomas Watts was 26 and held a minor post at the British Museum when 
he penned this note to the Mechanic’s Magazine proposing a new form of 
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copyright (Garnett 1899). He correctly perceived that the proposal had 
only the ‘forlornest’ hope of ever being tried.92 Watts’ idea was to 
transform copyright from a publisher’s right of exclusivity to an author’s 
right of compensation — a royalty scheme. His object was to bring down 
the prices of books for the benefit of readers; he hoped authors might also 
benefit. 
Watts’ idea made no splash at the time but the ripples travelled a long 
way. In 1875 British Prime Minister Benjamin D’Israeli appointed a 
Royal Commission to inquire into ‘Home, Colonial and International 
Copyright’. There were 15 Royal Commissioners, among them the 
celebrated novelist Anthony Trollope. During hearings that continued 
over three years, the commissioners heard evidence from a who’s who of 
the publishing world. Literary scholar Paul Saint-Amour has described 
the Commission as ‘a serious attempt from within the government to 
abolish copyright law or at the very least to rethink its immanent ideology 
and economics from a free trade perspective’ (2003, p55).  
The Commission actively explored the idea of a royalty system as an 
alternative to the prevailing copyright system.93 The idea was led in 
evidence by Robert Andrew Macfie, a Liverpool sugar trader and 
prominent free trade advocate. Macfie’s version of the idea shortened the 
exclusive term granted to the first publisher of a work from the five years 
proposed by Watts to just one year. He also stipulated a five percent 
royalty to the author. But beyond these changes it was just as Watts 
proposed: a radical reduction of the publisher’s monopoly. Macfie’s 
evidence was amplified by two key witnesses, Sir Charles Trevelyan, 
former Assistant Secretary to the Treasury, and Thomas Farrer, Secretary 
of the Board of Trade. Trevelyan viewed the publishing monopoly as a 
‘great public evil’ and the royalty system as a saving reform that would 
advance the interests of authors as well as readers: 
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‘The difference between the position of authors and that of publishers 
underlies the whole subject [of copyright], and it is better to have it out at 
once. It is for the interest of the author that his work should be sold 
anywhere and by anybody. It matters not to him who the publishers are, 
and whether there is one or are one hundred; in fact for him the more the 
better: the greater the competition among publishers, the better for the 
author.’ (Minutes of evidence, p98, 8 May 1876) 
Trevelyan believed that under a royalty system ‘authors would, in a 
manner, be in partnership with the public for the sale of their works, 
instead of holding a monopoly against them’ (p99). However, Trevelyan 
was a cautious reformer who believed the system should be tried out in 
the colonies before being ‘gradually brought about in England likewise’.  
Farrer was similarly supportive but cautious:  
‘The plan of a royalty to the author might possibly have avoided many of 
the difficulties which now beset this question, and might have given to 
the author a larger market, and to the public cheaper literature. It will be 
remembered that the charter of copyright, the Act of Anne, never 
contemplated unrestricted monopoly. But the present practice of mankind 
is different, and whatever advantages a system of royalty might have, it 
would require new machinery of an elaborate kind, and it would disturb 
existing arrangements, and be opposed by existing interests.’ (Minutes of 
evidence, p306, 31 January 1877) 
Pragmatism and existing interests won the day. The Commission in its 
final report considered and dismissed the royalty system in a single page 
— although there was a dissenting report by one of the commissioners, 
Sir Louis Mallet.94  
Still, the ripples of Watts’ idea kept spreading. In 1934, almost a century 
after Watts penned his piece to the Mechanic’s Magazine, the idea was 
taken up by Sir Arnold Plant. Plant was a practical economist who had 
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enrolled at the London School of Economics after a brief but successful 
stint in business. His paper on copyright in books (1934) followed one on 
patents for inventions. The two papers have been described by Nobel 
laureate Ronald Coase as having ‘opened up the subject and… raised 
questions which still have not been answered satisfactorily’ (Coase 1994, 
p155).  
Plant, like Watts, Macfie, Trevelyan, Farrer and Mallet, was disturbed by 
the copyright monopoly — the publisher’s monopoly in particular — and 
saw in the royalty system a practical solution. He reverted to Watts’ 
proposal of a five-year term of copyright for the first publisher of a work, 
with the field thereafter open to any publisher. The author’s royalty, he 
suggested, should be 10 percent. For Plant what made the system 
practical was that it fit the commercial practice of publishers, who 
generally issued a cheap edition of their successful books ‘very promptly’ 
after the first expensive edition. A five-year window of exclusivity would 
preserve their security against competition ‘until their first editions were 
either disposed of or “remaindered”… and the public would no longer 
have to wait more than five years for cheap copies of the books they wish 
to buy’ (Plant 1934, p193). 
Plant also had a precedent. Some 20 years earlier the British Parliament 
had passed a new Copyright Act (1911) to give effect to its obligations 
under the revised International Copyright Convention signed in Berlin in 
1908. The new Act lengthened the term of copyright to author’s life plus 
50 years, abolished the need for registration of works and extended 
protection to sound recordings. It also applied a royalty system to the last 
25 years of an author’s copyright (ie the period between 26 and 50 years 
after the author’s death). During that period anyone could republish a 
book subject only to payment of a 10 percent royalty to the author’s 
assignee. There was also provision for ‘compulsory licensing’ of musical 
works whereby any record company could make a new recording of any 
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previously recorded work on payment of a 5 percent royalty to the 
composer. While these measures fell a long way short of the system 
proposed by Watts, they were a precedent that Plant could hang his hat 
on.  
Plant published his paper in the London School of Economics journal 
Economica where, as Coase said, he opened up the subject to a new 
generation of economists. But in the policy sphere he got no further than 
Macfie or Watts before him. It seems the idea of a ‘royalty system’ has 
not yet encroached far enough in the public mind to match the power of 
the interests vested in the copyright system.95  
 
IN WHAT FOLLOWS I propose to strip Watts’ idea down to its chassis 
and rebuild it. It is a very simple idea at bottom: just break the circuit 
joining author and publisher so that the copyright monopoly can’t pass 
from one to the other (except, briefly, to the first publisher). Sir Louis 
Mallet put it this way: 
‘The profits of authorship are one thing, and the profits of publication 
another; and even if some form of monopoly is necessary to protect the 
first, it is equally desirable, in the interest of the author and in that of the 
public, that the profits of publication, which are purely of a commercial 
character, should be regulated and controlled by the ordinary laws of 
trade.’ (Royal Commissioners’ Report 1878, p50-1)  
Watt’s idea homes in on the weak link in the copyright system, the link 
between author and publisher. It throws into question the quintessential 
copyright transaction, the transfer of copyright from author to publisher. 
And it quarrels with the assumption — assumed in traditional copyright 
thinking — that what is good for the publisher must also be good for the 
author. This is a simple idea whose implications reach a long way.  
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We can rebuild Watts’ idea using the same categories we used to analyse 
copyright in the previous chapter: exclusivity, pricing, copying, control, 
money — plus one more, registration.  
1. Exclusivity in a royalty system 
Watts’ idea does not abolish exclusivity but drastically shrinks it. Most 
affected are publishers, whose period of exclusivity shrinks from author’s 
life plus 70 years — perhaps a century on average — to a short window 
available only to the first publisher of a work. Watts set the window at 
five years, reckoning that ‘nine tenths’ of works are ‘completely 
forgotten’ by the end of that time. Macfie set it at one year. Plant moved 
it back to five years, quoting philosopher David Hume, who wrote in a 
letter to his publisher: ‘I have heard you frequently say, that no bookseller 
would find profit in making an edition which would take more than three 
years in selling’.  
The purpose of the window is to reward the first publisher for the risk of 
being first — or put another way, to prevent subsequent publishers from 
free-riding on the risk-taking of the first publisher. Where it should be set 
is an empirical question: how long is required, on average, for a work to 
generate sufficient sales to reward the financial risk of first publication? 
Publishers will say a century but the truth is probably closer to Watts’ 
guess, five years, at least for books. For more capital-intensive works, 
notably films, it may be longer. For ‘nine tenths’ of films, probably 10 
years would suffice. But in calculating terms we should bear in mind that 
there are many ways to protect a product in the market beyond simple 
monopoly. The most important is probably branding (as a guarantee of 
quality or authenticity) but other strategies include retail positioning, 
pricing, customer engagement: the whole art and science of selling. 
Therefore we should lean towards a shorter rather than a longer 
window.96 Indeed there may be many works which, if offered without any 
window at all, would still be taken up by publishers prepared to rely for 
! 131 
their profits on the ordinary arts of business. This too is an empirical 
question.  
Looking more closely at the financial risks of first publication, we can 
define them as the costs incurred by the first publisher which are not also 
incurred by the second and subsequent publishers. These may be itemised 
as 1. the costs of authoring the work (to the extent these are borne by the 
publisher) and 2. the once-only costs of bringing it to publication (eg the 
costs of editing a book but not the ordinary costs of publishing also borne 
by the second and subsequent publishers). Note, however, that the costs 
of authoring are precisely those rewarded by the author’s royalty. If they 
are incurred by the publisher, by way of an advance to the author, then the 
normal practice is to recover the advance by diverting any royalty 
payments due to the author to the publisher instead, until the advance is 
recouped. So the authoring costs are met by the royalty and we are left 
with just the one-off costs of publishing. These may be zero (in the case 
of a work brought complete to the publisher) or they may be substantial 
(as for example have been the costs of Robert Gottlieb’s marathon editing 
of Caro’s biography of Lyndon Johnson).  
Ideally then we need an adjustable window of exclusivity that lasts long 
enough to reward the publisher for the actual costs incurred in bringing a 
work to publication, and no longer. However, for practical convenience 
we might to wish to determine a few fixed settings. For the sake of 
argument then, I propose three years for works that are substantially text 
or audio and seven years for works that are substantially audiovisual.  
Thus the publisher’s window of exclusivity is significantly shrunk by the 
royalty system. What is not shrunk is the author’s window, which remains 
at the statutory length. When Watts proposed the royalty system, it was 
14 years renewable for a further 14 years if the author still lived when the 
first 14 years expired. When Macfie took up the proposal, it was 42 years 
or author’s life plus 7 years, whichever was the longer. When Plant wrote, 
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it was author’s life plus 50 years. The length now is author’s life plus 70 
years. If this seems too long, one option would be to return to the original 
Queen Anne model and require renewal after 14 years, or perhaps at 
regular points such as the five-year renewable terms proposed by 
Professor Lessig (2001a). For many works, one or two five-year terms 
might well be enough to exhaust the commercial value of a work and it 
could then, at the author’s option, be released to the public domain.  
In considering the term allowed to the author, we should bear in mind that 
the author’s monopoly is a very poor one. Historically, it has commanded 
just 10 cents in the retail dollar and produced the sort of results we 
reviewed in chapters three and four. Separated from the publisher’s 
monopoly and with its controlling rights much reduced, an author’s 
ownership of his work arguably would be not much different to a 
worker’s ownership of her labour.  
2. Pricing the author’s royalty  
How to price the author’s royalty is an open question in Watts’ proposal 
— he says only that authors should be paid a ‘certain sum’ for each copy 
of a work that is published. Macfie thought it should be set at five 
percent. Plant said 10 percent but he was simply following the example of 
the royalty scheme in the 1911 Copyright Act.  
We should pause here to ask, why set a rate at all? Why not leave it 
instead to authors themselves to determine, case by case, just as sellers 
everywhere set a price for their goods and services? After all the market 
for creative works is deep and competition is strong. There are few works 
for which there are not many viable substitutes. And historically we have 
not found it necessary to regulate the prices set by publishers, who 
exercise a more complete monopoly than the one contemplated here.  
Very likely, prices would soon settle around a few fixed points — this 
much for a blockbuster movie, that much for a slim book of poetry — but 
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points more widely spaced than the narrow band around the prevailing 10 
percent royalty benchmark. The new points would reflect the demand for 
particular works and also, in some degree, the effort involved in creating 
them. For in a system where royalties were publicly quoted the market 
would work more effectively, not just to signal demand but also to call 
forth supply. By contrast, the present system of copyright obscures the 
prices paid to authors. They are a mystery to consumers and thus a very 
poor medium for transmitting market signals.  
3. Copying in a royalty system 
In this proposal, after the first three or seven years (the window granted to 
the first publisher), it is open to anyone to copy a work. There are no 
permissions involved. The whole idea of the royalty system is to throw 
open the copying of works. The only question is whether making a copy 
gives rise to an obligation to pay the author’s royalty. If the copy is made 
by a publisher, the answer is yes, the royalty must be paid. If it is made by 
a consumer, the answer depends on the purpose. If it is made in the 
ordinary course of the consumer’s enjoyment of the work, for personal 
consumption, then no royalty is due (beyond the royalty paid to buy the 
work in the first place). If however, the copy is made for another person, 
whether as a gift or for sale, then making the copy is an act of publishing 
and a royalty should be paid.  
Copying for purposes that qualify as ‘fair use’ or ‘fair dealing’ under 
present copyright rules would continue to qualify under the royalty 
system. Fair use purposes include teaching, reporting, research, 
commentary and criticism. If anything, Watts’ idea is consistent with an 
enlargement of such ‘exceptions’. It is pro-copying, pro-fair use, pro the 
diffusion of knowledge.  
4. Control in a royalty system 
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Control is the ethos of the traditional copyright system but not of the 
royalty system. With the shrinking of the publisher’s monopoly, control 
shrinks too. Once the first publisher’s monopoly ends, works would enter 
an open market where anyone may publish them. This shift would 
redefine the relationship between author and publisher. In the traditional 
system, the relationship is contractual, exclusive and continuing. In the 
royalty system, there would be a contract with the first publisher but not 
with the second and subsequent publishers and they would have no 
obligations except to pay the author and respect his moral rights.97 
Business would be brisker in this world.  
5. Dividing the money 
Watts’ idea reduces the power of the publisher, permanently and 
systematically. It brings the author out from behind the publisher. The 
change would be reflected in the economics of the business and the way 
the money is divided. It would be good for authors. We will explore this 
in more detail below but first we must take a further step in our rebuilding 
of Watts’ idea — reintroducing the system of copyright registration 
abandoned in Berlin just over a century ago.  
6. Registering copyright 
The system of copyright grew out of the register kept by London’s 
Company of Stationers since the 16th century. Ownership of a work was 
established by entering it in the register.98 Registration remained a feature 
of the copyright system until 1911 in the UK, 1912 in Australia and 1978 
in the US. In the language lawyers use, registration was a ‘formality’ that 
authors had to observe. It remains a legislated option in the US, where 
authors can choose to register their works as a way of making an official 
record of their authorship.99 The process involves lodging one or more 
copies of the work and paying a fee.  
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The decision to do away with ‘formalities’ was made by the members of 
the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works at 
a meeting in Berlin in 1908: ‘The enjoyment and the exercise of these 
[authors’] rights shall not be subject to any formality.’ According to 
Dutch scholar Stef van Gompel this was a pragmatic decision, reflecting 
‘a strong desire to relieve authors from the multitude of formalities with 
which they needed to comply in order to secure protection in different 
states’ (Gompel 2010, p158). Another factor was the increasing 
perception of copyright as something that arose automatically from an 
author’s act of creation and therefore did not require registration. 
Times have changed and the case for now restoring the ‘formality’ of 
registration is strong. Several commentators have proposed this in recent 
years.100 Copyright advocate and law professor Michael Fraser and I 
summarised the case like this in a recent paper: 
‘…the world’s economies have been transformed by digital 
communications. Authors’ and artists’ creative works are migrating to the 
digital domain. Consumers, intermediaries and creators are connecting 
online. Transaction costs are falling towards zero. Registering assets has 
become a routine step in the chain of commerce and consumption in 
many markets. In fact, not registering copyrights is now an active 
impediment to the work and livelihood of authors — a stick in the wheel 
of commerce. Works, unregistered, slide into orphanage. Licensing 
works, which ought to be easy, is made tricky, inconsistent and time-
consuming. Piracy thrives.’ (Fraser & Court 2013, p4)  
An online copyright register would help people locate works they want to 
view, read or reference. It would allow the serendipitous discovery of 
works not known to the searcher. By joining up authors and customers it 
would create a more efficient market with lower transaction costs. It 
would create for authors a space where they could display their works in 
exactly the form they wished them to be released. Registration would also 
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publicly confirm their authorship — an option whose value to authors is 
demonstrated by registers like the one maintained by the Writers Guild of 
America, East and West (which as we saw registered about 80,000 new 
screenplays and treatments in 2011).  
What’s more, registration would fit hand-in-glove with a royalty system. 
Authors would ‘post’ their works on the registry site; publishers could go 
searching there for publishable works; and customers could go window 
shopping.  
In summary then, Watts’ bold proposal, restored here, looks like this: 
• Authors have a right of compensation from any publication of their 
work payable in the form of a royalty set by the author. 
• The term of the author’s right is the author’s life plus 70 years but 
authors must renew the right at five yearly intervals or lose it. 
• Works must be registered in a copyright registry maintained as an 
online service by the government. 
• The first publisher of a work is granted a three year window of 
exclusivity if the work is substantially text or audio, seven years if the 
work is substantially audiovisual. 
• Any publisher may publish a work after the first publisher’s window 
of exclusivity has expired. 
• A customer may copy a work without payment of the author’s royalty 
if the copy is for personal use but must pay the royalty if the copy is 
for sale or given as a gift. 
Now, in a counterfactual scenario, we can explore what Watts’ proposal, 
if implemented, might cause.  
 
! 137 
THE CHALLENGE OF THE COUNTERFACTUAL is to look upon 
familiar conditions and not see them as the ordained state of affairs but 
make room instead for an alternative scenario to play out in the 
imagination. In this case we are trying to understand how copyright itself 
has shaped the industries it regulates and how those shapes can come to 
look like natural features of the landscape — immutable — though small 
changes in the original conditions of copyright might sweep them away.  
In the copyright industries, people have become accustomed to thinking 
of publishers as substantial enterprises — in their simplest incarnation as 
publishing houses or movie studios and often in much larger and more 
complex structures, as media groups or even empires. But of course they 
were much smaller to begin with. They started out as shops or little one-
man firms or maybe husband-and-wife teams — as micro businesses, just 
like authors. Among the questions we are exploring here is how 
publishers grew substantial and rich while authors stayed micro and poor 
and how copyright contributed to this divergence.  
If we go back far enough, we can actually see the process at work. 
London’s booksellers were still micro businesses in the 17th century: they 
were shops selling books to London’s wealthy elite. But behind the 
counter they were already trading copyright assets and collecting them in 
large portfolios. The most valuable of these portfolios was the ‘English 
stock’, which included the Bible (for which the stationers held a patent). 
There was also the ‘Latin stock’, an import monopoly over medical, 
scientific and scholarly books brought from Europe, and the ‘Irish stock’, 
an export monopoly over books sent to Ireland. Only members of the 
Stationers’ Company could share in these stocks. St Clair reports that the 
profits of the English stock were used to finance the collective activities 
of the stationers, including their political lobbying. The stock also paid 
dividends, which reached a very handsome 12.5 percent by the end of the 
century. As St Clair observes:  
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‘The industry had created, in effect, a high-yielding, fixed-price, and 
fixed-interest bond, available only to be bought by members of the 
Stationers’ Company in amounts calculated in accordance with their 
changing share of the industry and which could always be rapidly 
liquidated without loss. When a member of the industry died or went out 
of business, or if a widow wished to liquidate her shares, the company or 
its members bought the most valuable properties to be added to the 
various portfolios and partnerships as part of an ongoing process of ever 
more closely held ownership of texts.’ (p59-60) 
The booksellers thus assembled what amounted to a publisher’s backlist, 
collectively held, and used it to stabilise their cashflows, create liquidity 
and control entry and exit from the industry.101 Later they perfected the 
approach with the creation of so-called ‘congers’. (The term derives from 
a ‘conjure’ or sworn agreement.) These were partnerships between 
leading booksellers formed to acquire valuable texts and to publish new 
ones. The practice spread in the 1700s and congers swallowed up congers 
like ‘giant eels’ swallowing smaller eels.102 They would divide up the 
copyright in books, down to shares as small as 1/64th. Only members 
could participate and shares could only be disposed of to other members. 
The arrangements spread the risks of new works, bound the members 
closely together and deterred outsiders. St Clair makes the case that ‘the 
London book industry was as perfect a private monopoly as economic 
history can show’. The former Treasury official continues: 
‘Examples of every restrictive trade practice known to modern regulators 
can be found, including cartel, conspiracy, price-fixing, predatory pricing, 
rent seeking, repetitive and baseless litigation, entry barriers, market 
division, credit-fixing, collective refusal to deal, exclusionary joint 
ventures, resale price restrictions, tying, and vertical non-price 
constraints. Commercial practices aimed at restricting output and raising 
prices which nowadays attract heavy criminal penalties including prison, 
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were not only openly practiced but were built into the day-to-day 
operating structures of the industry. And all these practices rested upon 
the perfect monopoly of perpetual intellectual property.’ (p101)103 
Copyright then did not just help the booksellers secure their interest in 
particular works; it raised them up to a different level of business 
altogether, as precursors of the modern media corporation. 104  They 
acquired weight, cashflow and influence and began to move in different 
circles, closer to money and power. Authors, in comparison, fell behind, 
grew smaller, flimsier, weightless in negotiation.  
The power of the backlist, if anything, has increased over time. When 
modern media corporations are bought and sold, the copyright assets they 
own or control figure large in the valuations. They are valued not just for 
their future cashflows but for the new copyright assets to which they may 
give rise — the continuation of the ‘franchise’ (such as Star Wars and 
Indiana Jones in the 2012 acquisition of Lucasfilm by the Walt Disney 
Company), the movie spinoffs (the same company’s 2009 acquisition of 
Marvel Entertainment). They are valued also for their strategic utility.  
There is nothing about these transactions that would surprise a member of 
an 18th century conger, except the wondrous new media. 
It remains only to observe that the backlist is precisely the target of 
Watts’ bold reform. Shrinking the publishers’ exclusive window to three 
or seven years means that long-lived works will spend most of their active 
life in the public domain rather than on a publisher’s backlist. The royalty 
system thus brings an end to the idea of publishing as a business built on 
large holdings of copyright assets. Publishing in Watts’ world is a 
business of fast, competitive jostling in the marketplace. It is a 
commodified business. Profits turn on price and value, and exclusivity 
disappears from the equation.  
Publishers may not like it but authors might thrive.  
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A BACKLIST WASN’T THE ONLY ADVANTAGE publishers had 
over authors. Technology was another. Beginning with the printing press 
itself, technology has driven the business forward. The history of media is 
one of restless innovation, like a tide driving waves further and further up 
the beach. Innovations in printing brought speed and automation to the 
process and moved it from the workshop to the factory floor. Innovations 
in paper manufacturing turned paper from a high-priced gentleman’s 
luxury to an affordable middle-class good. Innovations in publishing led 
in turn to the first modern magazine, The Gentleman’s Magazine, in 1731, 
the first edition of Encyclopedia Britannica in 1771, the first American 
daily newspaper, the Pennsylvania Evening Post in 1793, the first 
paperback books circa 1845 and the first movie magazine, Photoplay in 
1912. 
We should not imagine that publishers were always in favour of 
innovation — far from it.105 But they were its beneficiaries in the long 
run. Speed gave them currency in the marketplace, new efficiencies 
brought lower prices and new formats drew new readers. The whole 
effect was not just to greatly enlarge the audience for printed works but to 
engage them more deeply in the experience of media. Technology 
strengthened the publisher’s business arm. 
By the early 20th century, the enlargement of audiences had a name: mass 
media. It was an accelerating process. After the long run of print 
innovations came a quick run of new recording media, beginning with the 
player piano (first demonstrated in 1876) and the gramophone disc 
(released commercially in 1889). Cinema developed soon after, with the 
first public projection of a motion picture in 1896, the first feature film 
(Charles Tait’s The Story of the Kelly Gang) in 1906 and the first feature 
length ‘talkie’ (Warner Bros’ The Jazz Singer) in 1927. Alongside cinema 
came the invention of ‘broadcasting’ — a term adapted from the farming 
practice of sowing seeds in all directions. Inventor Charles Herrold 
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claimed to have made the first radio broadcast in San Jose, California in 
1909; the first licensed radio broadcaster, KDKA, went to air in 
Pittsburgh in 1920, while in the UK the British Broadcasting Corporation 
went to air in 1922. Not far behind was television. The BBC began 
transmitting a regular television service in 1936. Regular commercial 
services commenced in the US in 1948 and began their long expansion: 
by 2007 the average US home received 118.6 TV channels, had 2.8 
television sets and 2.5 people (Nielsen 2008). Still to come were digital 
media: the first two nodes of the Arpanet, forerunner of the Internet, were 
connected in 1969; the first handheld mobile phone call was placed in 
1973; the World Wide Web debuted in 1991; the first Blackberry was 
sold in 1997; the first downloadable content — ringtones — in 1998; and 
the first iPad in 2010. In 2011 Apple CEO Tim Cook reported that 
consumers had downloaded more than 16 billion songs from its iTunes 
service, launched eight years earlier (Rao 2011).  
Yet if we think about media using the common metaphor of a pipe, down 
which the content travels, then the dominant characteristic of media is 
that the pipe, historically, has been thin and couldn’t carry much content. 
So instead of rivers of content there was a trickle and the passage of the 
trickle was controlled by the owners of media — the publishers. Thus, 
before Amazon, a typical bookstore with its limited shelf space might 
have carried 50-100,000 titles (whereas Amazon with no such limit 
carries 14,000,000106). Similarly, before pay television and the advent of 
superstations like Home Box Office (launched in 1972) and National 
Geographic (1997), television was dominated in the US by just three 
networks — ABC, CBS and NBC — or four if public broadcaster PBS is 
counted. In the UK, before BSkyB (1990), there were just two services, 
BBC and ITV. In Australia, before Foxtel (1995), there were Nine, Ten 
and Seven plus the ABC and later SBS. It was the same story everywhere: 
a handful of incumbents commanding a thin media pipeline tightly 
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controlled what people could watch, read and listen to. Mass media was a 
business of the very few broadcasting to the many.  
Technology thus delivered to the publishers a mechanism of control that 
supplemented the controls enabled by the copyright system. The two 
together, copyright plus technology, simultaneously defined the market 
and confirmed the publishers’ control of it. Within this twin framework, 
they were practically invincible.  
For authors, the loss of control was manifested in their growing distance 
from audiences. An 18th century author could expect to encounter his 
readers socially; he knew their tastes and expectations. But a writer or 
filmmaker of the 20th century had no such easy acquaintance. Their 
audiences were remote, almost abstract, and the connection to them 
thickly mediated. They had no way of knowing how people responded to 
a work except, in the case of a filmmaker, by standing at the back of the 
cinema and watching the audience file out at the end of the film, guessing 
at their emotions; or for someone working in television, trying to interpret 
the statistical ebb and flow of the viewing sampled in the ratings data 
delivered next morning to the station’s executives. This estrangement 
from audiences left authors uncertain of their effects — there was no roar 
of the crowd to guide them — and dependent instead on the judgments of 
publishers, the new arbiters of popular taste.  
In the past 20 years, however, technology has swung back towards the 
authors. In what amounts to a revolution, the thin pipes that defined the 
old media are being replaced by the ‘fat pipes’ of new media. Bandwidth, 
which used to be scarce, is becoming abundant.107 Control of the business 
based solely on command of the medium — whether shelf space or 
spectrum — is fast losing ground.  
Visions of the digital revolution have driven some observers to predict the 
death of the middlemen.108 If authors can reach right through to audiences 
and transact with them directly, why pay an intermediary? Of course, 
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such predictions underestimate the resilience of the middlemen and their 
capacity to redefine their role. It is a fluid situation. In an interview with 
The New York Times, Amazon executive Russell Grandinetti picked his 
way through it like this: ‘The only really necessary people in the 
publishing process now are the writer and the reader. Everyone who 
stands between those two has risk and opportunity.’ (Streitfeld 2011)  
There is no need here to spin an elaborate story about how things will pan 
out from here. We can see plainly enough that publishers are being 
pressed to find a new place in the value chain and that authors have a new 
place too. Their new place is much closer to audiences and more level 
with the publishers. The power imbalance is reduced. It is almost as 
though they had returned to the 18th century and the author-bookseller 
and author-reader relations of that time. It seems we have entered a period 
in the media’s evolution where it is more feasible than ever before — 
technically and commercially — for authors to carry out some part of the 
publisher’s role, even all of it, and build a direct connection with their 
audiences. In short, the trend of technology has passed by the publishers 
and now favours the authors.  
The times may yet suit Mr Watts’ proposal.  
 
THERE IS ONE MORE FACTOR we need to weigh and that is how 
authors themselves view the economic possibilities of the work they do. 
There is a long tradition in the arts that makes this a delicate question. In 
this tradition, the author/artist is disconnected from the crass, material 
world and has little or no interest in money or business. In strong versions 
of the tradition, the lack of interest is not just incidental to the author’s 
character but essential: the author cannot serve both Art and Mammon. 
The tradition of course is the Romantic tradition of the Artist as Genius. 
We have met it already in the claims made for originality as the signature 
quality of authorship — and in the attack on these claims by critics of 
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copyright, for whom the Romantic myth of original genius is just 
publishers’ boosterism.  
The Romantic tradition is closely associated with the English poets of the 
early 19th century, among them Keats, Shelley, Coleridge, Wordsworth 
and Blake. Here is Wordsworth describing the artist’s calling in a poem 
addressed to the painter William Haydon (quoted in Williams 1983, p43): 
‘High is our calling, Friend! — Creative Art 
(Whether the instrument of words she use 
Or pencil pregnant with ethereal hues) 
Demands the service of a mind and heart 
Though sensitive, yet in their weakest part 
Heroically fashioned — to infuse 
Faith in the whispers of the lonely Muse 
While the whole world seems adverse to desert.’ 
The tradition survived well into the 20th century as a kind of generalised 
understanding of the artistic temperament, absorbed by generations of 
undergraduates throughout the Western world as part of a liberal arts 
education. It turns up in various formulations in very diverse locations. 
Here for example is economist John Maynard Keynes speaking in a radio 
broadcast in 1945 (quoted in Skidelsky 2000, p294):  
‘…everyone, I fancy, recognises that the work of the artist in all its 
aspects is, of its nature, individual and free, undisciplined, unregimented, 
uncontrolled. The artist walks where the breath of the spirit blows him. 
He cannot be told his direction; he does not know it himself.’   
The consequences of this picture of the author as someone distracted by 
the Muse, undisciplined, unregimented and uncontrolled were not benign. 
In their formative years, authors were immersed in an expectation of their 
future business incompetence. If later they displayed any commercial 
ambition, they were automatically relegated to the second or third rank. 
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Indifference to considerations of profit was a badge of true artistry. 
Actual poverty was proof.  
It is not hard to see how this played to the interests of publishers. Authors, 
their essential suppliers, were conditioned to pay no attention to business 
matters. They did not form themselves into corporations, sought no 
leverage in negotiations beyond personal charm and rarely litigated. They 
took pride in their unworldliness. They were a pushover.  
How much truth is there in the caricature among contemporary authors? 
There is some, of course. We have seen that ‘making a lot of money’ was 
not much of a driver for film producers (roughly a third said it drove 
them, a third said it didn’t and a third were neutral). They were driven by 
other things — realizing their creative vision, helping others achieve their 
vision, having a big hit. But probably most entrepreneurs, asked the same 
question, would reply in much the same terms. Producers may be further 
along the scale in their preparedness to do things for reasons other than 
money but they are not off the scale.  
The further truth is, the Romantic vision has faded. Few writers or 
filmmakers would put their hands up now to attest a faith in ‘the whispers 
of the lonely Muse’, or would choose to characterise their work as 
‘undisciplined, unregimented, uncontrolled’. These are values — 
perceptions — from a different time. The idea of undisciplined work, in 
particular, seems wrong and out-of-date (and arguably has never 
characterised the practice of professional authors). Among the writers and 
filmmakers I have encountered during the past 30 years, I would say 
normal practice is almost the reverse of the Romantic vision. Discipline is 
a given, expected of all; failure of discipline is considered unprofessional 
and a reason not to work with someone again (a career limiting outcome 
in a freelance business). Collaboration is common and good collaborators 
are prized. Originality is highly valued but known to take place in the 
context of tradition, of what has gone before. Considerations of business 
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are tolerated and given due weight. These are the values of early 21st 
century content creators.  
 
WITH THESE THINGS SAID, what can we conclude about the 
probable outcomes if Watts’ proposal for a royalty system were 
implemented now? 
I project these four outcomes: 
1. Publishing would become more competitive. 
2. Authoring would become more profitable (off a low base). 
3. Piracy would be much reduced. 
4. Audiences would be more engaged.  
That publishing would become more competitive seems axiomatic, given 
Watts’ proposal to shrink the publishers’ monopoly. Yet the publishers, 
whenever their monopoly is challenged, say the industry will be ruined, 
using arguments they have been rehearsing since the 17th century.109 If 
that were true and publishers went bankrupt or left the business, then 
competition might be reduced, not increased. But how likely is that 
scenario? Or can we trust to the power of demand and the capacity of 
entrepreneurs to find new ways to serve it? 
I submit there are good reasons to trust in the capacities of entrepreneurs. 
Barriers to entry are being bulldozed by digital technologies. Costs of 
physically distributing works, in particular costs of retailing, are falling 
rapidly away. Underlying demand for works is multiplying — people are 
consuming more content than ever before and their absolute numbers are 
increasing as the new technologies diffuse around the world.110 What 
seems more likely than the demise of publishing is the demise of 
publishing as we know it now. What may emerge instead is a more 
fractured business, where many of the functions performed by traditional 
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publishers (sales, distribution, finance, accounting) are stripped out and 
performed by specialised service companies, while branding and editorial 
— the heart of the business — are contested by a throng of new entrants, 
drawn by the value-adding possibilities. Thus the conglomerate, 
vertically-organised model of publishing may break down over time. The 
names of the players may change and they may be smaller, nimbler and 
less padded. But the business will roll on undiminished.  
Publisher Jason Epstein, inventor of the trade paperback format and co-
founder of the New York Review of Books, has described the future of 
book publishing in very similar terms: 
‘The cost of entry for future publishers will be minimal, requiring only 
the upkeep of the editorial group and its immediate support services but 
without the expense of traditional distribution facilities and multilayered 
management. Small publishers already rely as needed upon such external 
services as business management, legal, accounting, design, copyediting, 
publicity and so on, while the Internet will supply viral publicity 
opportunities of which YouTube and Facebook are forerunners. Funding 
for authors’ advances may be provided by external investors hoping for a 
profit, as is done for films and plays. The devolution from complex, 
centralised management to semi-autonomous editorial units is already 
evident within the conglomerates… a tendency that will strengthen as the 
parent companies fade.’ (Epstein 2010) 
That authoring would become more profitable follows from the opening 
of publishing to a more competitive field. Watts’ system is a leveler that 
evens up the encounter between author and publisher. We should expect a 
corresponding improvement in average returns to authors. They could 
also take matters in their own hands. We might see them bring within the 
sphere of authoring parts of the value chain that currently belong to 
publishing. The process is already underway. Amazon reports that about a 
quarter of its top selling titles in 2012 were self-published by their 
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authors. There are also reports that literary agents are offering publishing 
services to their clients (Kaufmann 2013). Elements of design, editing and 
promotion are obvious candidates which authors or their associates could 
readily take on — and although they may not be highly profitable 
activities, we should bear in mind that every function now performed by 
publishers is more profitable than authoring and therefore would improve 
authors’ average profitability, if they performed it.  
The further possibility is that authors might engage directly with 
audiences, rather than indirectly, through intermediaries. Technology 
already grants them this choice. It is open to them to create businesses 
founded on direct transactions with ‘end users’ — the sale of their own 
works but also other works and other kinds of products that make sense to 
sell under the same banner. Some writers and filmmakers already are 
moving in this direction; Watts’ system would speed the move.111 As 
traditional publishers lose sway in the business, we can expect authors, 
among others, to step up in their place and earn ‘publishing’ profits.112  
To be clear, Watts’ scheme cannot make profitable what is inherently 
unprofitable, a book or film with a too-small audience. But it can help 
shift the boundary line, making viable what was marginal, more profitable 
what was barely profitable and nearly viable what was plainly not.  
There is also scope to improve the business itself, fundamentally. The 
copyright system has always been a leaky bucket, from which potential 
revenues have trickled away, uncollected. Enforcement is the big hole in 
the bucket — the simple difficulty of policing copyright laws and 
collecting the money. According to the copyright industries, the lost 
revenues are enormous. For example, the Texas-based Institute for Policy 
Innovation, in a report quoted approvingly by the Recording Industry 
Association of America, estimated the ‘true costs of sound recording 
piracy’ at US$12.5 billion in ‘total output’ annually (Siwek 2007). The 
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same author in an earlier study estimated the lost output from global 
piracy of motion pictures at US$20.5 billion (Siwek 2006).  
Watts’ system, though it cannot repair the hole, would slow the leak. It 
would do so by making it easy and relatively inexpensive for pirates (that 
is, unauthorised publishers) to comply with the law. After the brief 
window granted to the first publisher of a work, anyone — including any 
pirate — would be free to copy the work, in any quantity, without license 
or approval and subject only to payment of the author’s royalty. For the 
pirate the change yields a compelling equation: pay the royalty (typically 
a low fraction of the retail price) and avoid the potential costs of detection 
and prosecution. By paying the royalty, a pirate business becomes a 
lawful one and its owners, legitimate business people. Many would find 
that an attractive choice.  
Here we should take note that all of the royalties paid by all of the 
publishers of a work (and they may be many) would flow directly to the 
author, without passing through the first publisher’s accounting system, 
where, as we have seen, all manner of deductions are likely to thin the 
flow or even stop it. Watts’ system reduces the scope for publishers’ 
‘creative accounting’ — and this too should add to authors’ profitability.  
But getting some transparency into the system is just reversing a negative. 
The positive force of Watts’ proposal comes from its active recruitment 
of pirates to the cause of publishing. This involves a big shift in mindset. 
The very term pirate casts the unauthorised publisher as a criminal 
interloper on a par with ‘the enemy of all’, the predator of the sea.113 It is 
a gross miscasting, yet if wide acceptance is the measure then the casting 
has achieved its aim. Indeed the use of the term has spread so far that 
even unorganised copying by college students now counts as piracy and 
shares in the opprobrium.  
Watts’ proposal invites us to take a step back and consider what 
capacities the pirates might bring to the table. They are not simply 
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marauders. The long history of piracy is one of daring, innovation and 
discovery as well as theft and appropriation. Thus the American 
publishers who invented the transatlantic reprint business in the early 19th 
century were bareknuckle competitors whose contest helped drive the 
development of publishing in the US. The contest was the race to reprint 
British titles as copies came off the boats. They called it ‘the Game’ and 
seized on every advance in papermaking, printing and distribution to try 
and gain an edge over their competitors; they developed new formats 
(serializing Dickens on the back of railway timetables) and with them 
new audiences among readers who could never have afforded expensive 
British imports; and they achieved extraordinary efficiencies in the race to 
market — Adrian Johns gives the example of a publisher printing Byron’s 
Don Juan at 30 different presses in just 36 hours (2009, p298). Yet they 
were pirates who published the British works without license or royalty, 
consenting only to ‘ex gratia’ payments that were bare fractions of the 
payments they made to American authors. Charles Dickens, who received 
a paltry £50 from the American publishers of Pickwick Papers despite 
enormous sales, took up the issue and campaigned for transatlantic 
copyright protection; the issue was one of the factors that prompted 
Disraeli to call the 1876-78 Royal Commission.  
In our own time, Napster, the pioneering peer-to-peer file-sharing service 
and perhaps the most vilified ‘pirate’ of the past quarter-century, had an 
insight about how people wanted to consume music that had eluded the 
record companies as they tried to come to grips with the Internet. And it 
took another outsider, Apple, to build a legal distribution system around 
the insight and bring it to market, as iTunes.  
Watts’ system holds the door open to the pirates, inviting them in, with all 
their ideas and energies. It is an open system, receptive to innovation, 
where the copyright system is closed and defensive. This openness is in 
authors’ and audiences’ interests. 
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As things turned out, Napster’s insight was the tip of the iceberg. 
Audiences wanted more than just music downloads; they wanted a 
different kind of relationship with ‘content’ and the people who create it. 
This may well be the greatest insight yielded by the new media: people 
want engagement. It is in polar opposition to the passive consumption 
model perfected by the mass media of the 20th century. In that model, the 
consumer was pictured as someone coming home from work and 
slumping in front of the television, not wanting to make a lot of choices 
and not having much, if anything, to say about the programs offered up. It 
was the consumer as couch potato. And of course it’s true — sometimes 
people do want to slump in front of the television. But it’s not the whole 
truth: they also want to sit forward, ask questions, give their opinions and 
share with others at least some of the time. This was the revelation of the 
new media.  
One measure of audiences’ desire for engagement is the preparedness of 
some audience members to ‘crowd fund’ films, music, books and other 
content they want to see made. The phenomenon emerged on sites like 
IndieGoGo, Kickstarter and Pozible in the late 2000s.114 Backers pledge 
mainly small amounts to help fund works proposed by creators on the 
host site. For their contributions the backers are offered thanks, copies of 
works, merchandise and other rewards depending on the project and the 
amount of the contribution. They also receive the sense of being part of 
the process of creating a work and making a contribution. Kickstarter has 
reported that some three million people have pledged more than $450 
million to 35,000 projects since the site was launched in 2009 (Kickstarter 
2013). 13,726 were film or video projects, 8,822 were music projects, 
6,520 were publishing projects, 3,931 were art projects and 2,667 were 
games. Most had budgets in the $1,000-10,000 range.  
The practice of crowd funding recalls the subscription proposals used by 
some authors and publishers in the 17th and 18th centuries to pre-sell 
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literary works. But subscribers in those days were wealthy patrons, 
members of the elite; Kickstarter’s and Pozible’s backers are ordinary 
members of the audience, stepping up from passive consumption to active 
support of the authors and artists they like.  
The crowd funding phenomenon is evidence of a hidden well of support 
for authors among audiences. The traditional copyright system can’t tap 
the well because audiences know they are paying publishers first and 
authors last. But a system like Watts’, which pays authors directly, could 
tap the well. Direct payment closes the loop between author and audience, 
making a virtuous circle of work and payment, gift and receipt. This is the 
market at work without the signal distortion of intermediation. 
Counterfactually then, we have the prospect of a royalty system that 
meshes with the trend of technology to dethrone the publishers, elevate 
authors, enlist the pirates and reward audiences.  
Factually, we have a copyright system trying to strip the cogs off 
technology, perennially at war with the pirates and sometimes audiences 
too and with authors held hostage — and the whole contraption massively 
entrenched.  
How do we get from one to the other?  
 
FROM A DISTANCE copyright as an institution looks impregnable. It 
is hard to imagine, gazing upon it, how change might be brought about. 
Its critics have fired cannonballs that have kicked up little puffs of dust 
and pocked its walls but not much more. Its defenders scarcely trouble to 
return their fire.  
Yet there is a fault line running through the whole institution. We saw it 
in chapter seven. It is the doubleness we observed — the way the interests 
of authors were brought forward to mask the interests of publishers. The 
institution rests on this deception. For if the interests of authors and 
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publishers are not closely aligned — as any careful examination will 
show — then the founding of publishers’ rights on authors’ copyright was 
a false step. It was a legal maneuver dressed up as public policy.  
This is not to argue that publishers should not have rights. They should. 
There is a need, in particular, to protect the first publisher of a work from 
free-riding by other publishers taking advantage of the first publisher’s 
investment in bringing the work to the point of publication. That is why 
Watts proposed a specific right of first publishing, an exclusive right like 
copyright but of much shorter duration (three or seven years in our rebuilt 
version). But this is a different kind of need to an author’s need for 
compensation. It is a short term need for a period of exclusivity to allow 
recoupment of the publisher’s risk capital. It should never have been 
confused with the author’s need of compensation, which does not require 
exclusivity. It was only the political opportunism of the Stationers 
Company that ran the two together — for the stationers saw, with their 
usual acuity, that an author’s copyright would play better on the floor of 
Parliament than a publishers’ monopoly.  
Given the will to reform copyright, the way forward would be simply to 
split the rights: authors to one side, with a right of compensation; 
publishers to the other, with a right of exclusivity. Conceptually, legally 
and politically, this is the crucial first step. Split the rights, separate the 
parties and consider their needs in isolation. Then, over time, discover the 
length of time necessary to give authors incentive to create their works 
and publishers incentive to invest in them. I have proposed a three or 
seven year window to the first publisher of a work, which might prove too 
short. The law concedes life plus 70 years to the author which might 
prove too long. They are both empirical questions, open to solution. 
Splitting the rights would make the different rights clear and let them 
float free of each other to their proper durations. It would undo the old 
deception. Authors would be raised up and publishers brought down a peg 
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or two to a playing field more level than any they have played on in the 
past 300 years.  
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9. Copyright’s walking stick: the subsidy 
system  
…The role of copyright in providing incentives and rewards to creativity 
must be considered side by side with subsidy. 
— Ruth Towse (2001) 
The means of subsistence passes out of their hands and they face having 
to become more or less permanently dependent clients whose security is 
contingent on their relations with those who have the resources to help 
them. 
— James C Scott (1976) 
We’re tired of paying for the studios’ movies, our employers paying for 
the studios’ movies, and foreign taxpayers paying for the studios’ movies. 
It’s the greatest con of the entertainment industry. 
— Dave Rand (Yamato 2013) 
Publishers rally to defend the copyright system with the practiced drill of 
firemen called out to a fire. Faced with the prospect of reform of the 
system — a fire — they warn that authors will be put at risk. A common 
version of this defense warns that, if the reform goes ahead, the 
publishers’ profits will be reduced and they will no longer be able to 
support the less popular authors. This casts the publisher as patron of the 
author, using the profits of successful films or books to subsidise the 
unsuccessful ones. Publishers want to be seen this way; it seems 
genuinely to be part of their self-image. A recent example is the campaign 
run by Australian book publishers to head off a recommendation by the 
Productivity Commission for the abolition of parallel import restrictions. 
The move would have allowed Australian booksellers to import foreign 
editions of books already published in Australia by a local publisher. 
Proponents believed the move would lead to cheaper books; opponents 
thought it would undermine local publishing. Much of the argument was 
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framed around authors’ interests. Thus University of Queensland Press 
urged: 
‘Once cheap foreign editions of books are widely available in Australia, it 
may encourage readers to buy these books rather than support Australian 
titles. This will have an immediate and direct impact on the viability of 
publishing emerging Australian authors… [W]e would have to reduce the 
number of books we published each year or else shift our publishing 
philosophy to only publish more commercial and fewer literary books.’ 
(University of Queensland Press 2009, p1-2) 
Random House Australia put it this way: 
‘Reducing publishers’ profits by allowing bestselling international titles 
to be imported directly would significantly reduce our ability and 
incentive to bear the inherent risks involved in discovering, fostering and 
maintaining new Australian authors… Many new Australian authors may 
never be published in the first place.’  (Random House Australia 2009, 
p5) 
The Publishers Association argued that Australia would be culturally 
impoverished as a result: 
‘To unwind the current territorial copyright provisions would be to admit 
that Australia accepts a view of itself as a passive consumer of the 
leftovers of overseas cultural producers, rather than a vibrant creator of its 
own stories.’ (Australian Publishers Association 2009, p50) 
In short, unless granted the safe harbor of a protected market, the 
publishers would not be able to afford their patronage investment in 
Australian authors and Australia would have to lower its cultural 
sights.115  
This is a rather freighted message whose meaning we should pause to 
unpack a little. The first part of the message is that there is a class of 
authors whom publishers think they should publish but whose work is not 
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viable in the ordinary terms of the copyright system (broadly, ‘literary’ 
Australian authors). A second message is that publishers believe cross-
subsidizing these authors is part of the justification for the copyright 
system and their role in it. Put another way, they see a need for a system 
of subsidy running alongside the copyright system. A third message, 
implied but not expressed, is that publishers are the right people to 
allocate the subsidies.116  
In fact, there have been subsidies since the beginning of publishing. 
Before the invention of printing, a book could scarcely come into being 
without a wealthy reader prepared to fund its laborious production. As 
historian John Feather writes (1988, p26): 
‘The medieval author worked for himself, for God or for a patron, or 
indeed for all three. The role of the patron was to provide material support 
for the author as he might have done for any other servant. This might 
take the form of appointing him to an office in the patron’s gift, or direct 
financial reward, or some combination of the two. Whatever form 
patronage took, it was a means of paying the author for his book…’  
With the coming of the printing press, authors found a wider readership 
but did not escape the need of patronage. William Shakespeare sought the 
support of the Earl of Southampton, dedicating The Rape of Lucrece and 
Venus and Adonis to him. It is unclear whether he was successful.117 
Nearly 150 years later, Samuel Johnson famously sought the patronage of 
Lord Chesterfield, and was moved to remonstrate with him when it was 
too late coming.118 He had better luck with King George III, who granted 
him a life pension. Among later generations, William Wordsworth was 
appointed to the office of Distributor of Stamps in Westmorland, a 
sinecure worth about £200 a year after expenses, a very comfortable 
living.119 Even Karl Marx, through his long years’ labour in the Reading 
Room of the British Museum, depended on the capital of Friedrich 
Engels.  
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Though the incidence of patronage has receded, many authors still depend 
on grants and prizes, as well as private philanthropy.120 Consider, for 
example, the Royal Literary Fund formed in 1790 by the Rev David 
Williams to relieve ‘authors in distress’ and still operating today. A 
former President of the Fund, Janet Adam Smith, has described how ‘the 
Fund has enabled many in the full tide of their career to overcome a 
temporary set-back; and has given many others an easier old age, when 
royalties have dwindled and creative energies waned’.121 The mechanism 
of the Fund she describes as follows: 
‘The storm signal that an author is in distress is often run up by a fellow-
writer. The secretary then collects information from the applicant, and 
presents his or her case to the Committee whose members — authors, 
publishers, journalists, literary agents — represent a wide spectrum of 
literary life. At each of their monthly meetings they consider the 
applications; there were about 215 in the year 2003/04. The first hurdle 
applicants have to surmount is that of literary merit, which is assessed on 
the basis of reports by members who have studied samples of the writer’s 
work and considered their careers. The Committee then scrutinises a 
statement of the applicant’s financial position, backed by letters from 
friends and colleagues. In 2003/04, 211 applicants and dependents were 
given grants and pensions.’ (Smith 2005) 
Past beneficiaries of the Fund include Joseph Conrad, D H Lawrence, 
James Joyce, and Mervyn Peake.122 
In the world of filmmaking, subsidy is ubiquitous. The Australian Film 
Commission in its 1986 discussion paper proposing the Film Finance 
Corporation noted: ‘Governments so commonly intervene in the business 
of making, distributing and retailing motion pictures — and the 
instruments they employ are so various — that it is hard to find a 
common thread. A government’s dealings with film producers may 
involve a combination of regulations, concessions, subsidies, services, 
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facilities, exemptions, discounts, preferences, quotas, taxes, levies, 
credits, write-offs, loans or guarantees. The permutations defy exhaustive 
description.’ (AFC 1986, p24) 
Filmmakers themselves contribute a great deal. We saw in chapter five 
that filmmakers often forgo money income to work in the film industry 
and that income foregone in this way was equivalent to somewhere 
between 11 and 30 percent of the total value of Australian feature film 
production. While not a direct money contribution, this was clearly a 
form of subsidy. By foregoing income, filmmakers reduced the cost of the 
films they made and thus improved returns to the films’ investors, without 
any return to themselves beyond the ‘psychic income’ of the work itself. 
It is as though they were patrons of their own work. Since many 
filmmakers hold second jobs, we might also compare them to the book 
publishers, cross-subsidizing one book with the profits of another, or in 
this case, cross-subsidizing the work they do for ‘love’ with the wages of 
their ‘day’ jobs.  
In chapters three and four we had a close look at the investment program 
of the Film Finance Corporation in the period 1988-2002. We saw that it 
invested on behalf of filmmakers, taking high-risk equity positions and 
losing most of its capital as a result. We also looked briefly at the UK 
Film Council and the New Zealand Film Commission, both of which had 
similar mandates from their governments and got much the same result. 
We concluded, tentatively, that ‘soft’ equity investors in films lose 
somewhere between two-thirds and four-fifths of the capital they deploy. 
Losses of this order are subsidy on an industrial scale.  
We saw too that there were private investors in many of the films the FFC 
backed (102 of 158 films). Some of them may have invested in the wide-
eyed hope of profits but others no doubt made a realistic assessment of 
the prospects. If they went ahead, it was because they wanted to see the 
film made and, to that end, were prepared to accept levels of risk they 
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would find unacceptable in any other context, except perhaps a day at the 
races. Such investors became, in effect, providers of subsidy.  
So pervasive has it become that subsidy — ‘soft’ money, as the industry 
terms it — can decide even the location of a film. Thus Clint Eastwood’s 
Gran Torino, a story set among Minnesota’s Hmong community, was 
transplanted 500 miles to Michigan, where the state government offered a 
rebate of up to 42 percent of production costs. According to a report by 
The Economist magazine, 43 of America’s 50 states offered incentives 
designed to lure productions to those states (The Economist 2009). In 
Australia, the Federal Government intervened to secure the production in 
Sydney of James Mangold’s The Wolverine, offering a ‘one-off payment’ 
of AUD12.8 million to the film’s producers, Hugh Jackman and Marvel 
Entertainment. The payment was in addition to an existing ‘location 
offset’ worth 16.5 percent of the film’s local expenditure. It was widely 
viewed among producers as a precedent for future productions (Quinn 
2012).  
That writers and filmmakers should need to be enrolled with the 
disadvantaged and the needy as recipients of public funding and of 
private philanthropy speaks to the poor returns of the copyright system. 
Writers and filmmakers may be the engine of the system but the royalties 
it pays are too little, too late and too uncertain to sustain them. They are 
therefore compelled to rely on remedial sources of income: patronage, 
philanthropy, subsidy. This reliance is so common and so persistent that 
we may regard it as a fixed characteristic of the copyright system. 
Subsidy is the walking stick on which the copyright system leans.  
We might even regard them as twin systems, copyright on one side, 
subsidy on the other, yoked together in a long-running but 
unacknowledged policy experiment.  
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THE ISSUE OF SUBSIDY was spotlit at the 2013 Academy Awards 
ceremony, when some 500 visual effects artists staged a demonstration 
outside the Dolby Theatre, where the Awards were about to be presented. 
The protest was sparked by the just-announced bankruptcy of visual 
effects firm Rhythm & Hues. Inside the ceremony, things came to a head 
when the Rhythm & Hues team won Best Visual Effects Oscar for its 
work on Ang Lee’s Life Of Pi. Accepting the Award, effects supervisor 
Bill Westenhofer tried to speak out but was cut off by the Awards 
orchestra, which launched into the theme from Jaws. The protesters took 
to Twitter and Facebook to continue their campaign (Pulver 2013, Fera 
2013). Phillip Broste, a lead compositor at Zoic Studios, summed up the 
industry’s concerns in an open letter to Ang Lee:  
‘Mr Lee, I do believe that you are a thoughtful and brilliant man. And a 
gifted filmmaker. But I also believe that you and everyone in your tier of 
our business is fabulously ignorant to the pain and turmoil you are putting 
artists through. Our employers scramble to chase illegal film subsidies 
across the globe at the behest of the film studios. Those same subsidies 
raise overhead, distort the market and cause wage stagnation in what are 
already trying economic times. Your VFX are already cheaper than they 
should be. It is disheartening to see how blissfully unaware of this fact 
you truly are.’ (Quoted in Fera 2013)  
People who give subsidies give them with good intentions. They are 
given with the intention of assisting the beneficiaries in the work they are 
trying to do. From the giver’s perspective, there is a genuine sense of 
alignment with the beneficiaries.123 But Broste is drawing attention to the 
negative consequences for those outside the circle of the gift. He is 
pointing to a fundamental problem of subsidy to which we must now pay 
attention. The problem is that subsidies can give rise to a circular 
causality where they are not only the solution to a problem but also — 
bizarrely enough — the cause. Broste’s complaint about visual effects 
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subsidies is an example. Companies around the world compete for visual 
effects work, and governments in some of those countries have intervened 
to assist local companies.124 The intervention allows those companies to 
bid prices down. Unsubsidised companies, like the bankrupt Rhythm & 
Hues, must then match the lower prices or lose the business. To match 
prices, they must find their own sources of subsidy. Thus the problem is 
not just perpetuated but spreads like a contagion from one company to 
another. 
We can see a similar process at work in the history of the Division 10BA 
tax concession granted to Australian films in the 1980s, which we 
examined briefly in chapter two. Introduced by the Fraser government in 
1981, it was so successful that the incoming Hawke government took 
action to wind it back, first in 1983, and again in 1985. The winding-back 
reduced the effective subsidy rate from 90 percent (90 cents per dollar of 
investment) in 1981 to 80 percent in 1983 and 60 percent in 1985 
(Australian Film Commission 1986, p4). What was striking about the 
reduction was the way the market responded. It simply shifted the 
expected level of market ‘presales’ from 10 to 20 to 40 percent — 
directly compensating investors for the reduction in the subsidy rate.125 In 
other words, the rate of subsidy and the level of presales moved in inverse 
lockstep. As one fell, the other rose. We could say that the subsidy was 
‘crowding out’ the market — not crowding it out altogether but 
displacing it, proportionately. 
In the global market for Australian films, the effect was to crystallise a 
benchmark value that was a long way short of the actual costs of 
producing a film. In 1985, that value stabilised at 40 percent of 
production costs and signaled to buyers that they need pay, in aggregate, 
no more than 40 percent of a film’s budgeted cost to trigger its 
production. Thus the 10BA subsidy became embedded in the market price 
of Australian film copyrights — the gift became a given.  
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In the medical world, interventions that have adverse (usually 
inadvertent) consequences are termed ‘iatrogenic’. The noun, iatro-
genesis, derives from the Greek iatros, and means ‘brought forth by a 
healer’. Examples of iatrogenic effects are the hair loss and nausea 
induced by chemotherapy, antibiotic resistance in bacteria, side-effects 
caused by drug interactions and, in an historical example, puerperal or 
childbed fever in 19th maternity institutions — called ‘the doctors’ 
plague’ (Nuland 2003) and caused by doctors not washing their hands 
between procedures. In recent years, the concept has been extended to 
‘iatrogenic poverty’, meaning impoverishment resulting from medical 
care (Meessen et al 2003).  
As the film examples show, the iatrogenic consequences of subsidy 
schemes affect not just the immediate recipient but ripple out to the wider 
community of filmmakers, through the mechanism of price 
expectations.126 In the case of Australian film producers of the 1980s, 
buyers quickly came to expect that they would be able to purchase rights 
in a film for a fraction of its actual production cost. Even producers 
whose films were ineligible for the concession were affected — they too 
faced an expectation of fractional prices. Whether they sought the subsidy 
or not, every Australian film producer therefore came to need it. If they 
were ineligible for the concession or chose not to apply for it, they had to 
find another way to meet buyers’ price expectations and compete with 
their subsidised peers.127  
It is this destruction of the business viability of the ineligible or non-
conforming producer that most concerns us here. For them, the impact of 
the subsidy system is not merely neutral; it is actually destructive of their 
interests. They become worse-off than if there were no subsidies at all. 
For now the familiar low returns sink lower still as buyers drop their 
prices.  
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OUT OF THE FRYING PAN into the fire. In a subsidised market, 
filmmakers must make the decision whether to seek subsidy or not. If 
they choose not to, they face an uphill struggle to finance their films. For 
all but a few filmmakers, this is probably an unrealistic path, too difficult 
to attempt and too unlikely to succeed. The history of the Film Finance 
Corporation confirms this assessment; we saw in chapter four that very 
few films were financed without its support. Filmmakers therefore find 
themselves drawn or driven towards the subsidy institution. Whatever 
doubts they may have, it becomes something they must engage with.  
For the filmmaker, the engagement is like learning the steps of a 
complicated new dance. There are rules, standards and a process. Some of 
this may be explicit, embodied in formal guidelines and policy 
statements, but much will be unspoken. The filmmaker must draw closer 
and observe the institution. What kinds of films does it favour? What 
method of production?128 Learning the steps draws the filmmaker into 
alignment with the institution.  
Next the filmmaker begins an internal process of accommodation. This 
may involve rethinking particular plans and projects, dropping or 
deferring those that don’t fit the new scenario. Creatively, some degree of 
self-censorship may become necessary. The opacity of the institution 
invites second-guessing about its thinking. How will it react? How to get 
and hold its attention? 
Depending on the subsidy model, the relationship between filmmaker and 
institution may resemble a ‘beauty contest’, where the filmmaker is the 
contestant and the institution the judging panel. 129  Elements of 
subjectivity in the judging process may make it difficult to predict. Even 
when an application is successful, the grounds for success may be 
difficult to determine and therefore to repeat. Over time, the filmmaker 
may cease to meet the judging criteria, for example, if they favour 
‘emerging’ filmmakers. The key determinant of the filmmaker’s future — 
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access to capital — may then enter a realm of unpredictability that vitiates 
business planning. Luck, in the form of ‘beauty’, may turn against the 
filmmaker.  
At all stages in the relationship, the filmmaker must tread gingerly around 
the institution. Criticism, if it cannot be avoided, must be carefully 
worded and not made public. No offence should be given. On occasion, it 
may be necessary to defend the institution without believing in the 
defence.  
A recent review of the New Zealand Film Commission shed light on the 
difficult relationship between filmmaker and institution (Jackson & Court 
2010). Filmmakers viewed the Commission as distant, unapproachable 
and hostile to its (filmmaker) critics. As one producer put it: ‘Most 
organisations have natural predators — the Film Commission doesn’t. 
People are afraid to voice criticism.’ (pp15-16) There was an ‘us-and-
them’ attitude that made filmmakers feel almost ‘as though we were in 
the way’ (p9). The Commission wanted to ‘put things in boxes, but every 
film is different, there are no boxes’ (p13). Filmmakers also reported a 
lack of trust, complicated by ‘Byzantine’ politics and ‘incomprehensible’ 
decision-making (p11). The report noted that there was ‘a well of pent-up 
anger and frustration’ (p16).  
Former BBC executive Tom Archer has described the power imbalance 
between BBC commissioners and independent producers in similar terms: 
‘Producers just have to put up with it. Protest? You’re difficult. Argue 
about the program? You don’t get it. Complain? Do you want another 
commission?’ Archer continues: 
‘When you have commissioning power, or the appearance of 
commissioning power, life can feel good. Meetings don’t start until you 
turn up. You’re the centre of attention. Earnest note-taking accompanies 
your every half-arsed comment. People bring you cups of tea. They’re 
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nice to you. And best of all they laugh at all — and I mean all — of your 
jokes.’ (Archer 2013)   
This is a description of dependency. Having chosen the subsidy path, the 
filmmaker is tied to an institution whose favour — granted or withheld — 
determines the filmmaker’s future. The filmmaker is now vulnerable to 
the shifts and swings of institutional policy and even of personal politics 
within the institution. There is a corresponding loss of autonomy and 
agency. Anthropologist James C Scott, writing about peasant farmers in 
southeast Asia in the mid twentieth century, noted that ‘we may learn 
more about the politics of peasants by asking not merely how poor they 
are but also how precarious their livelihood is’ (Scott 1976, p34). By 
analogy, the same may be said of filmmakers who choose the subsidy 
path.  
For most people, to be dependent on subsidy is a deeply unsatisfactory 
condition. Psychologically, it is akin to defeat. Whatever relief or 
validation there may be in being chosen to receive the subsidy, there is 
the deeper shame of needing it. If what is being subsidised is a profession, 
as in this case, then there is an unavoidable implication of failure — of 
personal inadequacy. It is at once disabling and demoralizing to carry on 
a profession under such a cloud.130  
But for authors the further and deeper consequence of subsidy is the loss 
of artistic independence. This is a value that lies close to the core of 
authors’ identity as authors. Documentary filmmaker Bob Connolly, who 
with Robin Anderson was nominated for an Academy Award for their 
film First Contact, has described independence as the most important 
element in the creation of a memorable documentary:  
‘I'm talking about the freedom of the individual filmmaker to follow his 
or her own star, make the film he or she wants to make. I'm talking about 
the absence of all those usual restrictions which impinge upon that 
freedom, whether editorial, creative, bureaucratic or methodological. It 
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can be as basic as the freedom to shoot and to edit for as long as 
necessary, regardless of what anyone else says; the freedom from 
constant and/or oppressive editorial interference; freedom from the 
burden of conflicting demands from multiple broadcaster investors… 
Independence is the ability to go your own way, to make the film you 
want to make, are driven to make, to the very best of your ability. It is the 
freedom that conveys with it the privilege of being able to say at the end 
of the whole tortuous, exhausting, exhilarating, debilitating business: that 
is as good as I can do, I have no excuses.’ (Connolly 2013)  
 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE? Some would argue that subsidies should 
simply be abolished, yet a unilateral decision to abolish subsidies in a 
particular jurisdiction would not solve the problem. It would merely 
intensify the difficulties faced by authors in that jurisdiction. Although 
they would be spared the problem of dependency, they would still face 
the full deflationary impact of the subsidies offered in other jurisdictions. 
Subsidies are a global phenomenon and therefore elude local counter-
measures. As with agricultural subsidies, the pathway to a solution is the 
long, slow one of international negotiations leading to coordinated action. 
There must be international consensus and remedies must be multilateral. 
Even then, it would not be possible to squeeze all of the subsidies out of 
the system. Self-subsidization by writers and filmmakers themselves can 
probably never be eradicated. Nor will their friends and families be 
deterred from backing them. Some level of subsidy will always be 
present, and so there will always be an underlying level of price deflation.  
We should not lose sight of the place we started from: the copyright 
system and its failure to properly reward the risks of authoring. If authors 
earned more money, they would have less need of subsidy. In this sense, 
it is the copyright system that has called the subsidy system into being. 
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The problem that subsidy institutions are trying to address is real and 
pressing, and it will not go away until copyright itself is reformed.  
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10. Some fault in our commonwealth: the case 
for reform  
To ask how things are going and whether they can be improved is a 
constant and inescapable part of the pursuit of justice. 
— Amartya Sen (2009) 
Works of genius will emerge from parts of the world where books have 
barely penetrated before, as such works after Gutenberg emerged 
unbidden from the dark and silent corners of Europe. 
— Jason Epstein (2010) 
The Constitution’s framers had it right. Soviet-style repression is not 
necessary to diminish authors’ output and influence. Just devalue their 
copyrights. 
— Scott Turow (2013) 
The argument of this thesis is that copyright is actually a disincentive to 
those writers and filmmakers who need to make money from their work. 
The argument of this chapter is that society pays a high price for turning 
these authors away. The reason the framers of the US Constitution 
championed copyright was ‘to promote the Sciences and useful Arts’. 
They also wanted to underwrite the political freedoms of the new 
Republic and to avoid the ‘corruptive, censorial influence of government 
and elite patronage’. The copyright system would provide ‘the financial 
wherewithal for authors and publishers to create and disseminate 
expression, information, and opinion without having to curry favor from 
ministers and nobles’ (Netanel, p89) — or so they hoped.  
In this chapter I want to make plain what is at stake, socially, politically, 
culturally, intellectually, in the difference between a copyright system 
that rewards authors fairly and one that does not. Although copyright 
serves some authors well, there are two classes of author whose work is 
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made either difficult or impossible by copyright’s poor returns. The first 
is the class of authors whose work by its nature requires to be carried on 
independently — without patronage, approval, or direction of others. 
Particularly at risk are authors whose work takes a long time or requires a 
lot of capital to produce. I will show that this is a large and important 
class. The second is the class of authors and would-be authors who really 
do need to make a living from their work, if they are to pursue it. These 
are people of the Third World for whom making a living is an immediate, 
pressing concern; they are also the non-elite of the First World. They are 
outsiders, having no access to the elite institutions that might patronise 
their work, no family wealth to fall back on and limited capacity to self-
subsidise. The size of this class can only be guessed at but plainly is very 
large.  
You may ask: why look to copyright for the solution to a problem caused 
by copyright in the first place? Why not look elsewhere? The answer is 
that copyright creates an asset and gives rise to a market in creative 
works. The asset may be impaired and the market imperfect but there is at 
least the possibility that a work, and its author, will have an active 
economic life, finding buyers and audiences without having first to enlist 
a patron, solicit the approval of a funding agency or create the work under 
external direction. Copyright is therefore the promising bedrock of a 
solution. 
 
THE WRITERS AND FILMMAKERS whose viability we are 
discussing here are not particularly focused on moneymaking. Their 
works are generally not hits or bestsellers. Although some have large 
followings, they are unlikely to reach a ‘mass audience’ unless their work 
is catapulted there by the zeitgeist or Oprah Winfrey. Of course, it doesn’t 
follow that they are indifferent to audiences — on the contrary they may 
be quite mindful of their reception. But having taken up a subject they 
! 173 
will continue to pursue it even though they can see perfectly well that a 
different subject or a different treatment of the same subject might win 
them a larger audience.131 This persistence with a subject for its own sake, 
sometimes through many years, is characteristic of the authors in focus 
here. They choose their subject matter primarily by reference to internal 
considerations — things they find compelling, to which they find 
themselves drawn. Some would say that the subject matter chooses them. 
They interpret their own interest as evidence that others will be interested 
too, or if the subject is obscure, they hope to engage an audience and win 
it over.  
Persistence is a necessary characteristic. Anthropologist Sherry Ortner, in 
a study of independent filmmaking in the US, observed Barbara Boyle, a 
senior academic at UCLA, asking a class what was the most important 
characteristic of a film producer. For answer Boyle, a former business 
partner of legendary independent producer Roger Corman, wrote on the 
blackboard in large capital letters, ‘PERSEVERANCE’ (Ortner 2013, 
p158).132 Perseverance because getting a film ‘up’ is very difficult, for all 
the reasons we have seen. But perseverance also because the ambition of 
any filmmaker — of any author — goes beyond the immediate project.133 
It is to create a body of work that explores, in a cumulative way, the 
subject matter they have chosen. For these authors, the economic 
challenge is not just to find the means to create the next work, but to build 
a platform on which they can continue to work indefinitely.  
They must also persevere long enough to win public acceptance of their 
work. For a film or book to enter the public sphere, it cannot be left on the 
doorstep, like a foundling, but must be championed. Having created the 
work, the author must take it up, speak for it, engage and hold an 
audience. The poet Robert Frost wrote his most famous poem, ‘Stopping 
by Woods on a Snowy Evening’, in a few minutes one morning in 1922. 
The poem ends — 
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‘The woods are lovely, dark and deep,  
But I have promises to keep, 
And miles to go before I sleep, 
And miles to go before I sleep.’134 
— And thus describes its author, for Frost himself went many miles, 
crisscrossing America, giving readings of his work at schools and 
colleges, for 40 years. His long persistence built a national audience and 
led him in January 1961 to the inauguration of President John Kennedy, 
where in the bright sunlight he recited another much-loved poem, ‘The 
Gift Outright’. The poet Alan Ginsberg said in tribute: 
‘A few poets may have travelled the country and read their poems aloud, 
but Frost was relentless, and professional. He created an audience for 
poetry readings, and a role for the poet, that hadn’t been there before. It 
was easier for those who came after him. He was the first voyager, a kind 
of pioneer, the original entrepreneur of poetry.’ (Parini 1999, p319)  
For poets, writers, and filmmakers, as for other entrepreneurs, recognition 
generally comes late in the cycle, if it comes at all.135 Awards, prizes — 
invitations to speak at the inauguration of presidents — are tokens of a 
success already achieved. Before they arrive the only tangible reward of 
the author is the money paid through the copyright system. Throughout 
the critical period when the author is struggling for recognition and to 
keep working, copyright, for better or worse, is all there is.  
 
AUTHORS PRIZE INDEPENDENCE with good reason. An author 
whose work offends or questions or simply fails to interest the powers-
that-be must seek safe ground on which to carry out the work. The safe 
ground, the essential ground, is independence and it must be financial as 
well as intellectual.136 The author must have the means to persist in the 
work without approval or patronage — must be able to connect with an 
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audience who will back the work by buying it — and must earn a viable 
share of the proceeds.  
We can distinguish four basic types of work that require the safe, 
essential ground of independence: 
• Dissenting: Works that directly criticise and offer resistance to an 
established group, policy or institution. 
• Breakaway: Works that propose departing from an established group, 
policy or institution and heading in a new direction.  
• Original: Works that start in a new place or from a new premise without 
debt or allegiance to an established group, policy or institution. 
• Truth-telling: Works that present evidence concerning the wrongful 
actions or damaging consequences of an established group, policy or 
institution. 
Below I explore these four cases, showing why independence matters 
profoundly to authors who produce works of these kinds.  
1. Dissenting works 
A legal system that is committed to free speech forbids government from 
silencing dissenters. This is an extraordinary accomplishment, but it is 
not nearly enough. 
— Cass Sunstein, Why societies need dissent, p110 
On a Friday night in December 1961 Alexander Tvardovsky, poet, 
Candidate Member of the Soviet Central Committee and chief editor of 
literary magazine Novy Mir, sat up all night reading a text just submitted 
to him, Shch-854. He was overcome with excitement and next morning 
rushed into the deserted offices of the magazine. He contacted friends: ‘A 
new genius is born! Viktor, go for a bottle!’. They spent the morning 
drinking. Tvardovsky committed himself to getting the story into print, 
though he had no idea how he could do so. He summoned the author to 
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Moscow. Alexandr Solzhenitsyn, working as a schoolteacher after eight 
years’ imprisonment in the Gulag, received the summons with great 
anxiety. Was this the right time? Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev had 
given a speech at the Party Congress in October calling for investigation 
of abuses of power in all their aspects. Solzhenitsyn later recalled: ‘I read 
and re-read those speeches, and the walls of my secret world swayed like 
curtains in the theatre, wavered, expanded, and carried me queasily with 
them: had it arrived then, the long-awaited moment of terrible joy, the 
moment when my head must break water?’137  
Solzhenitsyn met with Tvardovsky. They agreed to rename the story One 
Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich and that the story’s hero, Ivan 
Denisovich Shukhov, prisoner Shch-854, should still have hope of living 
one day in freedom. Tvardovsky made copies and began soliciting 
testimonials from Moscow’s literary elite. Armed with these, he 
submitted the story to Vladimir Lebedev, an assistant to Khrushchev. 
Lebedev, who possessed a private library of banned books, suggested 
various changes: the camp slang should be toned down, the camp officers 
should not be called ‘vermin’ — and the story should finger Stalin. 
Finally, an opportunity came. Khrushchev had just met with Robert Frost 
at Khrushchev’s dacha on the Black Sea coast; the American poet, then 
88 years old, was touring the Soviet Union. As Frost left the dacha, 
Lebedev began discussing Ivan Denisovich with another official. ‘What’s 
that?’, said Khrushchev, ‘What are you hiding from me?’ He demanded 
to see the manuscript and when Lebedev couldn’t produce it, dispatched 
him by plane to Moscow to fetch it. On his return, Lebedev read from a 
section where Shukhov is laying bricks in the Siberian winter. 
Khrushchev was moved by the careful way the prisoner husbanded his 
mortar. He wiped away tears and demanded to know why Tvardovsky 
hadn’t published the story.  
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Khrushchev’s interest was the spur to action. Overnight, 23 copies were 
printed for the members of the Central Committee. When they met, there 
were reservations and strategic silences. Khrushchev had to push them: 
‘There’s a Stalinist in each of you. There’s even some of the Stalinist in 
me. We must root out this evil.’ So it came about that Ivan Denisovich 
was published. One hundred thousand copies of Novy Mir sold out 
immediately and foreign translations appeared within a month. 
Solzhenitsyn was catapulted to world fame and the Gulag was made 
infamous.138 
What is extraordinary about this story is the apparatus of control it 
reveals. We see, in reverse, in a benign display, the moving parts of a 
machine built to crush dissent. The movement travels up the hierarchy to 
the very top, the Premier stoops to lift the frightened writer and former 
zek, to raise him up, and every part of the mechanism, without missing a 
beat, performs the very opposite of its normal function. It is like the 
popular European conceit of a ‘world turned upside down’, where mice 
eat cats, the cart pulls the horse, the poor man gives alms to the rich man, 
the king on foot leads a peasant on horseback, and fish fly in the air.139 In 
this case, the same system that delivered Solzhenitsyn to the Gulag now 
brushes him down and presents him to the world as a hero of the Soviet 
Union.  
Such mistakes are rare. Authors who criticise a system and offer 
resistance to it — who dissent — normally can expect a hostile response. 
It may be little things at first, the beginnings of being frozen out such as 
questioning of the dissenter’s motives, disparagement to peers and others, 
belittlement of the dissenter’s judgment, standards, evidence, associates. 
Access to benefits of compliance such as grants, awards, promotions, 
processes of decision-making, even simple information, may wither 
away. Soon the dissenter will begin to suffer real damage: reputational, 
economic, physical. Their employment may be jeopardised through loss 
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of opportunities, demotion, failure to renew a contract or actual sacking. 
There may be adverse reviews, public criticism, censorship or refusal to 
publish — and things may escalate beyond this, depending on the 
resources and powers of the system, to the level of active harm, beginning 
with accusation, investigation, prosecution, conviction, continuing, 
possibly, all the way to imprisonment, exile, beating — even execution.  
Along this continuum of consequences, prison and death are plainly the 
sanctions most to be feared but imposing them can have consequences too 
— their very harshness draws attention. For those wishing to deter dissent 
it may be better to put on the velvet gloves of economic sanction. And for 
most dissenters, while threats of prosecution may turn up the heat, it is the 
practical grind of running a campaign in face of daily economic hardship 
that is most telling. If we picture the author/dissenter, embroiled in 
dispute, being rapidly propelled to the outside of the system or institution 
or society to which they once belonged and beginning to experience the 
economic distress that will dog them now for as long as they persist — 
then we can see why viable independence matters and how this implicates 
the copyright system.  
For the dissenter, authoring is the process by which private doubt 
becomes public dissent. It is an act which sweeps away their past 
connection to the institutions (or state) from which they are dissenting 
and with it (quite possibly) their job, their prospects and their income. 
Authoring therefore is not only the means by which they express their 
dissent but, necessarily, their new job, their bridge to an audience and the 
source of their future income — perhaps the only source.  
Solzhenitsyn was lucky: the state lifted him up, praised him and published 
him (though it soon reversed itself). He remained very aware of his 
exceptionalism. In 1970, in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, he paid 
homage to the many unknown authors who did not have the luck to find a 
Tvardovsky: 
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‘Those who fell into that abyss already bearing a literary name are at least 
known, but how many were never recognised, never once mentioned in 
public? And virtually no one managed to return. A whole national 
literature remained there, cast into oblivion not only without a grave, but 
without even underclothes, naked, with a number tagged on to its toe.’ 
(Solzhenitsyn 1970) 
The managers of the Gulag missed their chance with Solzhenitsyn: they 
had him but they released him. Returned to the living, he launched a 
devastating campaign of dissent, which in time helped topple the Soviet 
regime. We do well to pay attention to the enabling conditions of dissent, 
not least its economic grounds. Freedom of speech is not nearly enough.  
2. Breakaway works 
Consider… the men who called Copernicus mad because he proclaimed 
that the earth moved. They were not either just wrong or quite wrong. 
Part of what they meant by ‘earth’ was fixed position. Their earth, at 
least, could not be moved. Correspondingly, Copernicus’ innovation was 
not simply to move the earth. Rather, it was a whole new way of 
regarding the problems of physics and astronomy, one that necessarily 
changed the meaning of both ‘earth’ and ‘motion’. Without those changes 
the concept of a moving earth was mad. 
— Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p149-50 
Copernicus published De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium at the very 
end of his life, in 1543, and with it overturned the Ptolemaic system, 
which had dominated astronomy for 1,300 years. Ptolemy had theorised 
that the earth was the centre of the universe and that the sun moved 
around it; Copernicus proposed that the earth and other planets revolved 
around the sun. Although the Ptolemaic system was useful — and 
according to Kuhn it remained in use as ‘an engineering approximation’ 
even in the 1960s — by Copernicus’ time, it had become a monster. With 
the efforts of astronomers to accommodate new data, there were many 
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discrepancies and the system’s ‘complexity was increasing far more 
rapidly than its accuracy’ (Kuhn, p68). In Kuhn’s terms, the system was a 
failed ‘paradigm’.  
Kuhn’s description of how science progresses was itself a minor 
revolution when published in 1962. Kuhn argued that science did not 
progress smoothly but in cycles of ‘normal science’ punctuated by 
revolutionary change — ‘paradigm shifts’. Copernicus putting the sun at 
the centre was one such shift; another was Einstein conceiving of space as 
curved. As the fame of these examples shows, such shifts are rare. What 
most scientists do most of the time is work within a paradigm, typically 
the one they encountered in their training. ‘Normal-scientific research is 
directed to the articulation of those phenomena and theories that the 
paradigm already supplies,’ Kuhn writes (p24). Normal scientists are thus 
invested in the paradigm they know. Their careers, hopes and reputations 
all rest on its continuance. But over time anomalies show up — things 
that don’t fit the paradigm. When these anomalies prove stubborn, a sense 
of crisis begins to form, signaling a breakdown in the discipline. Such 
was the state of astronomy before Copernicus and of theoretical physics 
before Einstein (Kuhn, p83-4). Faced with crisis, the defenders of the 
status quo ‘devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of 
their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict’ (p78). Such 
defences, however, merely postpone the reckoning.  
When it comes, the paradigm shift is a sudden and unstructured event 
‘like the gestalt switch’140:  
‘Scientists then often speak of the “scales falling from the eyes” or of the 
“lightning flash” that “inundates” a previously obscure puzzle, enabling 
its components to be seen in a new way that for the first time permits its 
solution. On other occasions the relevant illumination comes in sleep.’ 
(Kuhn, p122-23)  
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Although it arrives in a flash the shift is permanent, involving a profound 
change in the scientist’s world view that in turn precipitates a thousand 
little shifts — in ‘theory, methods, and standards together’ (Kuhn, p109). 
Everything changes: ‘we may want to say that after a revolution scientists 
are responding to a different world’ (p111).  
For the revolutionary scientist who first achieves the gestalt switch, the 
challenge becomes one of persuasion. How can their peers be brought to 
the same change in worldview? Kuhn notes that very often they cannot. 
‘Copernicanism made few converts for almost a century after Copernicus’ 
death. Newton’s work was not generally accepted, particularly on the 
Continent, for more than half a century after the Principia appeared’ 
(p150-51). But Kuhn sees the process as inevitable: ‘scientific 
communities have again and again been converted to new paradigms… 
Conversions will occur a few at a time until, after the last holdouts have 
died, the whole profession will again be practicing under a single, but 
now a different, paradigm’ (p52). 
Kuhn’s confidence in the conversion process rests on a belief that 
scientists are all ‘reasonable men’ who ultimately will be persuaded by 
‘one or another argument’ (p158) to adopt the new paradigm. This is 
surely too rosy a view. A generation of scientists whose careers and 
reputations rest on the old paradigm will not readily accede to the new. 
On the contrary, they will oppose it with all the resources and authority 
they possess. Until quite late in the conversion process, they will far 
outnumber the revolutionary vanguard and they will have the force of 
incumbency. They will chair the committees that control the award of 
grants and promotions — the prestige of the profession. They will govern 
its institutions. There will be no incentive to give any of this up.  
Revolutionary scientists therefore meet with opposition every bit as 
determined as that encountered by dissidents (though without the threat of 
death or prison). For them too, independence may become their new and 
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necessary condition and authorship their necessary source of income, if 
they are to pursue the paradigm shift whose truth has appeared to them 
like a lightning bolt and thrown over their old way of working. 
Kuhn noted in a 1969 postscript to The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 
that the idea of paradigm shifts was long familiar in other fields — 
literature, music, the arts and politics — and what was original in his 
work was applying the idea to the sciences, ‘which had been widely 
thought to develop in a different way’ (p208). The revolutionary scientist 
thus shares the fate of breakaway authors everywhere: under-resourced, 
vigorously opposed and barely viable.  
3. Original works 
Cinema is a specificity of vision. It's an approach in which everything 
matters. It's the polar opposite of generic or arbitrary and the result is as 
unique as a signature or a fingerprint. It isn't made by a committee, and it 
isn't made by a company, and it isn't made by the audience. It means that 
if this filmmaker didn't do it, it either wouldn't exist at all, or it wouldn't 
exist in anything like this form. 
— Steven Soderbergh, speech at the opening of the 56th San Francisco 
Film Festival (2013) 
In this speech filmmaker Steven Soderbergh made a distinction between 
movies and cinema. The first was a product, he said, while the second 
was a process: ‘a movie is something you see, and cinema is something 
that’s made’. Thus a commercial or a film you saw on YouTube could 
qualify as cinema, though a ‘perfectly solid, successful and acclaimed 
movie’ might not. The speech was an indictment of the major US studios 
which, Soderbergh said, had no interest in making cinema — it was not 
on their radar — and increasingly were run by executives who didn’t 
know movies and didn’t watch them for pleasure.  
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The speech drew a lot of attention, coming from a filmmaker who has 
worked successfully within the studio system (Ocean’s Eleven) and 
outside it (sex, lies, and videotape). It tapped into a widely shared concern 
that the Hollywood industry has become too cautious, as evidenced by its 
focus on sequels, remakes and the creation of movie ‘franchises’. In 
Soderbergh’s account, the sheer scale of the business worked against 
creative risk-taking, with costs of producing and marketing a single film 
now running into hundreds of millions of dollars. Cinema was ‘not a 
word you would ever want to use in a meeting’ with studio executives. 
Specificity, the idea of a film being as unique as a fingerprint — these are 
terms that return us to the questions raised by Foucault (1984) and Rose 
(1993) about the nature of authorship and originality. Is there really such 
a thing as originality or does all authorship necessarily exist in a 
continuum of borrowings? Soderbergh is insisting on the possibility of 
originality, such that a film could only be the work of the author and no 
other. He is also insisting on the primacy of the director as author of the 
film, as against a committee or a company or the audience. These are 
strong claims, although he does not go as far as saying that there is no 
borrowing. What Soderbergh is describing is the subjective experience of 
authoring — the author’s sense of it. It is a long way removed from 
Foucault’s and Rose’s critique.141 Where Rose argues that authors ‘do not 
really create in any literal sense’ (p8), Soderbergh describes creating as an 
act which has within it the possibility of bringing into being ‘something 
ambitious, something beautiful, something memorable’, which didn’t 
exist before. Not only does he assert the reality of authorship, for him 
authoring at its best has nothing to do with ‘the commodification of 
literature’ — Rose’s view. On the contrary, for Soderbergh, as an author’s 
work becomes more personal, more like a fingerprint, it also becomes 
more marginal — ‘too special’ — and therefore less likely to attract the 
backing of a major studio. Originality is the enemy of commodification, 
not its enabler.  
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Soderbergh is not alone. It is the complaint of authors everywhere that 
they are rewarded and even feted for work that is conventional, but 
rejected or simply ignored when they venture down new paths. 
This should not surprise us. That creative work which is different, 
‘special’, strange, challenging — in a word original — should meet with 
resistance is entirely consistent with the response to innovation in other 
fields, with the frequency of failure where novelty is attempted, and with 
the slow S-curve of adoption even where it is eventually accepted. An 
original work by definition has no track record to guide potential backers, 
no proof of its maker’s claims. It is bathed in risk. For a filmmaker like 
Soderbergh, this probably means the work must be made independently, 
outside the studio system, with some small percentage (as little as two or 
three percent) of the resources available to a studio film. In the Australian 
context, it probably means making a film without the backing of a 
government funding agency (again with fewer resources). These are diffi-
cult pathways to production, where the dubious viability of the copyright 
asset comes sharply into focus.  
This is not to suggest that highly original works never gain the backing of 
the major studios or funding agencies. Of course they do. But the 
uncertainty and risks of originality put enormous pressure on the work. 
Very often, if it does not lead to outright rejection of the work, the 
pressure will lead instead to creative compromises and, possibly, the 
transfer of additional risk to the filmmakers, for example by requiring 
them to reduce or defer their fees or stand further back in the recoupment 
chain (or all of these).  
Like dissent and paradigm change, originality has few backers. In the 
crucial early days, the author must find an audience and build a following 
for their work. Copyright is the business model — and it is broken.  
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4. Truth-telling works 
Slowly the people will forget. There will only be this — books and films. 
And that’s it. 
— Branko Lustig in Topaz Adizes’ Branko: Return to Auschwitz (2013) 
Branko Lustig is a Croatian filmmaker who has won two Academy 
Awards (for Steven Spielberg’s Schindler’s List and Ridley Scott’s 
Gladiator) and made many films as a producer, production manager and 
actor. In 2011 he celebrated his bar mitzvah at Auschwitz, in front of 
barrack No. 24a, where he was a prisoner for three years during World 
War II. New York-based filmmaker Topaz Adizes made a film of this 
return which was published by The New York Times as an Op-Doc 
(Adizes 2013).142 Adizes’ film is less than 10 minutes long, in black and 
white, quite beautifully shot. Lustig speaks for himself; other voices are 
peripheral. In the opening sequence we see him accepting the Academy 
Award for Schindler’s List. He says to the Academy audience:  
‘People died in front of me in the camps. Their last words were, “Be a 
witness of my murder. Tell to the world how I died. Remember.” 
Together with Gerry [Gerald Molen, Lustig’s co-producer], by helping 
Steven to make this movie, I hope I fulfill my obligations to the innocent 
victims of the Holocaust.’  
Lustig is a reluctant witness. Later in the film, speaking to camera he 
says, ‘People [are] telling me to write a book. They want to know. But I 
don’t want to remember.’ Nor does he mention his involvement in the 
vast Shoah Foundation project, initiated by Spielberg in 1994 in the wake 
of Schindler’s List. Over a five-year period, the Foundation collected 
more than 50,000 video testimonies of survivors and witnesses of the 
Holocaust. Lustig and Molen were founding members of the Foundation’s 
advisory committee.143  
The Shoah Foundation is an extraordinary demonstration of the power of 
philanthropy. But projects of bearing witness and truth-telling rarely find 
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friends as galvanizing as Steven Spielberg. Two decades before 
Schindler’s List, French filmmaker Claude Lanzmann came away empty-
handed from a meeting with a group of American Jewish moguls whom 
he asked to back his film Shoah (Schatz 2012). They wanted to know 
what the message of the film was; Lanzmann said there was no message. 
The film took 12 years to complete, seven years of research and filming 
followed by five years of editing. Even the Israeli government, an early 
backer, lost patience. Lanzmann described it as an hallucinatory voyage 
and himself as ‘spellbound, in thrall to the truth being revealed to me’ 
(Lanzmann 2012, p475). When finally released in 1985, the nine-and-a-
half hour film was widely recognised as a masterpiece, though a 
controversial one.144 Critic Roger Ebert said:  
‘There is no proper response to this film. It is an enormous fact, a 550-
minute howl of pain and anger in the face of genocide. It is one of the 
noblest films ever made… It is not a documentary, not journalism, not 
propaganda, not political. It is an act of witness.‘ (Ebert 1985) 
Yet as Schatz notes, ‘Shoah is an austere, anti-spectacular film, without 
archival footage, newsreels or a single corpse. Lanzmann “showed 
nothing at all”, Godard complained’. Instead the film is based entirely on 
the testimony of survivors, bystanders and perpetrators — ‘often heard 
over slow, spectral tracking shots of trains and forests in the killing fields 
of Poland’ (Schatz 2012).  
In Lanzmann’s behaviour while making the film we see reflected both the 
difficulty of the task and the degree of bloody-mindedness required to 
bring it off. He cajoled, tricked, flattered and sometimes secretly filmed 
his subjects. He persuaded a former SS guard to perform for the camera 
the ‘eerily cheerful’ Treblinka anthem that Jews were forced to sing when 
entering the camp. In Tel Aviv he rented a barbershop and insisted a 
former inmate go through the motions he performed as a barber at 
Treblinka. ‘Don’t make me go on please,’ the man begged. ‘Please, we 
! 187 
must go on,’ Lanzmann insisted.145 With similar sangfroid, he accepted 
the demands of the Israeli government — which wanted the film to run no 
more than two hours and to be finished within 18 months — but then 
simply ignored them (Schatz 2102). The film would take as long it would 
take, both to make and to show. Lanzmann was uncompromising in his 
pursuit of the truth as he saw it, believing it was his duty ‘to obey the 
categorical imperative of the search for and the transmission of truth’ 
(2012, p435).  
Truth-telling, bearing witness, giving testimony: these are tasks that 
require standing to the side of history so as to observe its sweep. With the 
long duration of the work and the need to resist compromise, the money 
to do the work is hard to find. But the poverty of the copyright asset 
makes it doubly hard. A fairer, better copyright system would help, not 
hinder, the truth-teller.  
 
WHAT MATTERS ABOUT THESE AUTHORS is that they write 
from outside the charmed circle of the people in charge. They are 
outsiders, whether by choice or circumstance; theirs is an outsider 
literature. It is precisely this positioning which gives force and meaning to 
their work. If they were inside the circle, dependent on its money or say-
so, their value would be diminished, perhaps lost — they probably could 
not pursue the same work. Society gains from this outsider literature in 
the same way that markets benefit from competition. Outsiders bring 
alternatives and make new things possible. They are prepared to explore 
and to say things that insiders might prefer were left unexplored and 
unsaid. They make connections that no one previously has thought to 
make. They are entrepreneurs of the economy of ideas.  
By speaking up when others choose silence, dissident authors hold to 
account those who might otherwise escape an accounting. Speaking up 
legitimises the practice of criticism and returns it to the public as a tool 
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they can use for themselves. It gives courage to other voices. If sufficient 
voices join the criticism they can become a chorus that checks authority 
in its exercise of power. Just the possibility of public criticism can be a 
check on power. Speaking up is thus the moment of truth for political 
(and intellectual) freedom — and the speaker is the lightning rod. In 
threatened communities, people hold their breath when the speaker steps 
forward. American economist Cass Sunstein has noted ‘the countless 
number of people who benefit from the courage, or foolhardiness, of 
those who dissent. When someone blows the whistle on government fraud 
or deceit, the real winners are members of the public, not the 
whistleblower.’ (Sunstein 2005, p98)  
Breakaway authors perform a different service. When progress grinds to a 
halt in a discipline or institution they are the pathfinders who set it on a 
new path. Their contribution as authors is the set of insights that guide 
others to the new path; it is also their willingness to risk stepping off the 
old path and begin searching for the new. In Kuhn’s terms, they are 
revolutionaries who solve crises through paradigm change. While those 
invested in the status quo may condemn the revolution, for those who 
follow the revolutionary appears as founder — the visionary who found 
the new pathway. They are beneficiaries of the founder’s intellectual risk-
taking. Eventually the whole discipline or institution may accept the new 
pathway. The asymmetry of the risk-taking is characteristic of the know-
ledge economy: the downside risks are borne entirely by the breakaway 
founder but if the pathway proves viable, the benefits are shared by all.   
Originality, too, may be viewed as an offering to the author’s community 
or to society at large. If we lay aside postmodern doubts about the 
possibility of originality, we can see that much of art and some of science 
is a parade of novelties, departures, and transformations. Think of 
Shakespeare’s introduction of psychological complexity to Elizabethan 
drama or Orson Welles’ use of flashback and multiple narrators in Citizen 
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Kane. Society is invited to try out new ways of doing and seeing things. 
Similarly, in academic research the most highly valued outcome is to 
make an original contribution to a body of knowledge. Every single brick 
in the long wall of human knowledge was, in its time, original. What we 
expect of ‘true writing’, says author Silas House, is that it ‘show the 
unexpected, the secret, the profound in a way that it has never been 
shown before’ (House 2013).  
Truth-telling is another kind of offering. By a resolute adherence to the 
truth, the author hopes to secure justice in a cause. To bring about justice 
is inherently a social good — even the attempt is socially constructive, 
because to see justice pursued gives comfort to all who depend on it. If 
justice is not possible, then what matters is bearing witness: ‘Tell to the 
world how I died’, as Branko Lustig reports. The purpose in this case is to 
bring attention to the injustice with the goal of avoiding its repetition. It is 
a message to the future, a gift of knowledge to the unborn, freighted with 
terrible urgency from the present.  
All of these authors are reaching past the powers-that-be to a wider 
audience. Only that audience can sustain them and the work they do. 
Copyright is the mechanism but it is failing them and by failing them, 
failing us — all of us — authors and audiences alike.  
 
THERE IS ANOTHER CLASS OF AUTHORS we must now pay 
attention to. Like those we have just met, they have a pressing and 
continuing need to make money from the work they do. They are the 
writers and filmmakers of the third world and the margins of the first 
world. Since they are not wealthy, without tenure and have no patrons, 
the work they do must pay the bills or they will not be able to sustain it. If 
the scale or complexity of the work is such that it requires capital to 
complete, then the work must also pay enough to attract investors. The 
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size of this class of authors is unknown but surely very large. We will 
now investigate its membership. 
Nearly a century ago, in his inaugural lectures as the new King Edward 
VII Professor of English Literature at Cambridge University, the writer 
Sir Arthur Quiller-Couch must have startled his privileged students when 
he said — and I quote him here at length: 
‘What are the great poetical names of the last hundred years or so? 
Coleridge, Wordsworth, Byron, Shelley, Landor, Keats, Tennyson, 
Browning, Arnold, Morris, Rossetti, Swinburne — we may stop there. Of 
these all but Keats, Browning, Rossetti were University men; and of these 
three Keats, who died young, cut off in his prime, was the only one not 
fairly well-to-do. It may seem a brutal thing to say, and it is a sad thing to 
say: but, as a matter of hard fact, the theory that poetical genius bloweth 
where it listeth, and equally in poor and rich, holds little truth… It is — 
however dishonouring to us as a nation — certain that, by some fault in 
our commonwealth, the poor poet has not in these days, nor has had for 
two hundred years, a dog’s chance. Believe me — and I have spent a 
great part of the last ten years in watching some 320 Elementary Schools 
— we may prate of democracy, but actually a poor child in England has 
little more hope than had the son of an Athenian slave to be emancipated 
into that intellectual freedom of which great writings are born.’ (Quiller-
Couch 1916) 
A dozen years later the writer Virginia Woolf addressed another 
privileged Cambridge audience, of the young women of Newnham and 
Girton Colleges. She quoted the passage from Quiller-Couch and summed 
up: ‘That is it. Intellectual freedom depends upon material things. Poetry 
depends upon intellectual freedom.’ (Woolf 2009/1928, p106) Woolf’s 
concern, like Quiller-Couch’s and ours here, was with those voices 
excluded from the profession of writing by poverty. Her particular 
concern was the excluded voices of women. She continued: ‘And women 
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have always been poor, not for two hundred years merely, but from the 
beginning of time. Women have had less intellectual freedom than the 
sons of Athenian slaves. Women, then, have not had a dog’s chance of 
writing poetry.’  
To prosecute her case Woolf conjures an imaginary ‘Judith Shake-
speare’, a sixteenth century genius like her brother William but kept at 
home rather than being sent to school (as Woolf herself was kept at home 
while her brothers went to school). Uneducated, isolated and unable to 
present herself to the theatre world as a writer for fear of scandal, she 
might have ended up ‘in some lonely cottage outside the village, half 
witch, half wizard, feared and mocked at’ (p51). Indeed Woolf concludes 
of this imaginary bard that ‘she died young — alas she never wrote a 
word [and] lies buried where the omnibuses now stop, opposite the 
Elephant and Castle’ (p111).  
If we searched among the poor in contemporary Britain we would no 
doubt discover many ‘Judith Shakespeares’ — potential authors whose 
potential has come to nothing, who have something to say and the talent 
to say it but not the means to carry on the work in the absence of a viable 
income from it. And they would be just some small fraction of the 
excluded. If we fanned out from England, widening the search, the circle 
of the excluded would grow ever larger. We could search among the 
shantytowns of Buenos Aires, in Mumbai’s slums and Florida’s trailer 
parks, through Melbourne’s high rises and Boston’s projects, or among 
the people working the paddy fields of Guangxi or Tamil Nadu. The 
circle would keep growing until it dwarfed the charmed circle of authors 
whose potential is matched by their means — a Jupiter of talent circled by 
a tiny moon of means.     
Woolf’s famous solution to the problem, pitched to her audience of elite 
young women, was that ‘a woman must have money and a room of her 
own’. Specifically she must have £500 a year and the room must have a 
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lock on the door. And here Woolf relates the story of her own good 
fortune in having an aunt who, ‘for no other reason than that I share her 
name’, left her £500 a year.146 She describes how before the legacy she 
seemed ‘always to be doing work that one did not wish to do’ and how 
this became ‘like a rust eating away the bloom of the spring’:  
‘However, as I say, my aunt died; and whenever I change a ten-shilling 
note a little of that rust and corrosion is rubbed off; fear and bitterness go. 
Indeed, I thought, slipping the silver into my purse, it is remarkable, 
remembering the bitterness of those days, what a change of temper a 
fixed income will bring about.’ (p39) 
It is difficult now to compute the value of £500 a year in 1928. However, 
relying on the work of economists Lawrence Officer and Samuel 
Williamson, we can arrive at a range of estimates that convey a sense of 
its value in present day terms. The range is set out in Table 11 below.  
Table 11 Value of £500 a year in 1928 translated to 2011 
Value 1928 2011 
Historic standard of 
living  
 
£500 
 
£24,720 
Economic status  £500 £118,300 
Economic power  £500 £163,900 
Source: MeasuringWorth  
Historic standard of living is a measure of income against the cost of a 
fixed bundle of consumer goods and services. Economic status measures 
income relative to wage or other income, ‘such as the wage rate of 
workers in manufacturing or per-capita GDP’. Economic power measures 
income against the total output of the economy (Officer & Williamson 
2010, p3).147 By any of these measures, £500 a year was a sizeable 
endowment in 1928, an upper class income. Woolf herself thought there 
were ‘at this moment two thousand women capable of earning five 
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hundred a year in one way or another’ (p111) — probably many of them 
seated in front of her as she delivered her lectures at Newnham and 
Girton Colleges.  
Although Woolf is a little vague about how the prospective author is to 
come into £500 a year — whether it is to be earned or unearned income 
— she is clearly placing little or no reliance on copyright. She is saying 
authors must have another source of income and it must be large enough 
to avoid the ‘rust and corrosion’ of dependence.  
In 1928, within the hallowed halls of Cambridge, Woolf’s solution was 
bold, workable, even prescient. There probably were two thousand 
women capable of finding a way to become an author. In her own 
Bloomsbury circle the model most definitely worked: Bloomsbury, 
underpinned by inherited wealth, was prolific, extravagantly creative and 
highly influential. Yet viewed from a longer perspective — from Jupiter 
— the idea that authorship must remain the province of the wealthy is an 
astonishing exclusion. Who, seriously, would wish to advance a case for a 
model of knowledge creation that cut off four-fifths of humanity?148 In 
fairness to Woolf, she was making a case for women as authors and 
focusing on the nearest, most likely source: the educated English upper 
class. It was probably not her intention to exclude the lower classes or the 
women of other countries or even, necessarily, the men. But the 
Bloomsbury model does not solve the systemic problem identified by Sir 
Arthur Quiller-Couch — it merely raises up a second, privileged group of 
women to join the privileged men.  
A system of incentives that deters whole classes of potential authors 
leaves too many voices unheard. Since they are of different classes and 
places worlds away from the published elite, they are not interchangeable 
with them. The elite cannot speak for them. Their local knowledges 
therefore are unknown to us, their experiences uncaptured, their ways of 
seeing and thinking unshared, unlearned. The consequence is a loss of 
! 194 
arts and sciences of unknown dimensions. The further consequence is a 
disempowerment not only of those potential authors but of their potential 
audiences too. Legal scholar Madhavi Sunder has argued that ‘freedom to 
participate in cultural life stands at the very core of liberty’ and that there 
has been too much focus by intellectual property scholars on ‘efficiency’ 
at the expense of the plural values of critical thinking, creativity, sharing 
and sociability, economic development, mutual recognition and mutual 
understanding (Sunder 2012, pp11-12). She quotes author Salman 
Rushdie: 
‘Those who do not have power over the story that dominates their lives, 
power to retell it, rethink it, deconstruct it, joke about it, and change it as 
times change, truly are powerless, because they cannot think new 
thoughts.’ (Rushdie 1991)  
Quiller-Couch’s ‘poor poet’ and Woolf’s ‘Judith Shakespeare’ faced 
many barriers to authorship but arguably there is no more telling barrier 
than the inability to earn a money return equal to the risk of the work. 
This simple failure sets in train the whole scenario unfolded in this thesis 
of poor returns, self-subsidy, the need of patronage, the slide into 
dependency, the discouragements and the turning away. Although there is 
not one word anywhere in copyright policy to say so, the effect is to 
privilege the privileged — those with access to £500 a year and a room of 
their own — and discourage the poor. They may not be authors except by 
luck or patronage. They must join the voiceless, the Judiths that never 
writ. 
The fault in our commonwealth is unrepaired.  
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11. ‘Society knew what it was about’: the case 
for copyright as it is  
Writing is a sweet and wonderful reward, but for what? In the night it 
became clear to me, as clear as a child's visual instruction, that it is the 
reward for serving the devil. This descent to the dark powers, this 
unshackling of spirits bound by nature, these dubious embraces and 
whatever else may take place down below, which is unknown to those up 
above, writing their stories in the sunlight. Perhaps there are other forms 
of writing, but I know only this kind; at night, when fear prevents me from 
sleeping I know only this kind. 
— Franz Kafka (quoted in Jackson 2013) 
The reason Milton wrote in fetters when he wrote of Angels & God, and 
at liberty when of Devils & Hell, is because he was a true Poet, and of the 
Devil's party without knowing it. 
— William Blake (1793)  
In the unconscious recesses of its being Society knew what it was about. 
— John Maynard Keynes (1919) 
In the opening pages of his famous polemic, The Economic Consequences 
of the Peace, John Maynard Keynes paints an extraordinary picture of 
European life before the Great War. He describes how: 
‘The inhabitant of London could order by telephone, sipping his morning 
tea in bed, the various products of the whole earth, in such quantity as he 
might see fit, and reasonably expect their early delivery upon his 
doorstep… He could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and 
comfortable means of transport to any country or climate without passport 
or other formality, could dispatch his servant to the neighbouring office of 
a bank for such supply of the precious metals as might seem convenient, 
and then proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of their 
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religion, language, or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person, 
and would consider himself greatly aggrieved and much surprised at the 
least interference… Most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs 
as normal, certain, and permanent, except in the direction of further 
improvement…’ (Keynes 2009/1919, p20) 
Keynes goes on to describe the psychology of the times. There was, he 
says, a ‘double bluff or deception’ that enabled an immense accumulation 
of capital across Europe. On the one hand ‘the laboring classes’ somehow 
came to accept that they ‘could call their own very little of the cake that 
they and Nature and the capitalists were co-operating to produce’, while 
on the other, the capitalists were allowed to call the best part of the cake 
theirs ‘on the tacit underlying condition that they consumed very little of 
it in practice’. (p24) 
Of this long-lived arrangement of affairs Keynes observes that society 
knew what it was about. He means that the arrangement was wise policy 
that held the different interests in balance and was a triumph of native 
good sense over the raw politics of class. Keynes also suggests that 
society had a capacity to work its way toward wise policy without 
direction and despite surface conflicts — in the unconscious recesses of 
its being.149 Thus Europe before the War found a path to growth that 
could not have been openly stated but was all the more effective for 
remaining unsaid. The implication is that a society’s long run interests 
may assert themselves in the institutional arrangements it evolves, 
without ever being made explicit.  
The question I wish to pose in this chapter is whether we should view the 
copyright system in this light, as an institution that embodies our 
collective good sense, notwithstanding the poor outcomes for authors that 
we have observed. Are there unspoken explanations for these outcomes 
that, on examination, make good policy sense? And should the evidence 
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of the system’s longevity and its evolution over time count in its 
favour?150 
In short, can we say of the copyright system that society knows what it is 
about?  
 
THERE ARE THREE PLAUSIBLE REASONS why we might think 
that copyright is a wise policy institution and that society would do well 
to leave it alone. The first is an argument from incumbency. This is an 
argument that says, in effect, that an institution which has weathered 300 
years — or longer, if we count the operation of the Stationers Company 
before the Statute of Anne — must be doing something right. If the 
system were failing, surely we would have heard about it. There would be 
complaints; the people affected would have made a fuss. That there is no 
fuss is evidence of acceptance and there would not be acceptance unless 
the system was working and its outcomes were fair.151 Not only the 
longevity but the stability of the system offers evidence of its fitness as a 
policy institution. It has ridden out the waves of change in media 
technologies and continues to do so. In the vernacular: if it ain’t broke, 
don’t fix it.  
The force of this argument does not lie in asserting the perfection of the 
copyright system. Given the conflicting interests that copyright seeks to 
reconcile — of publishers, authors and readers — there may never be 
agreement about what perfection is. Rather, this is an argument for 
accepting long-standing practice as the nearest approach to perfection we 
may feasibly make. We could even accept, as Macaulay argued before the 
English House of Commons, that copyright is an ‘evil’ but that it is one to 
which we should submit for the sake of the ‘good’:  
‘It is desirable that we should have a supply of good books; we cannot 
have such a supply unless men of letters are liberally remunerated; and 
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the least objectionable way of remunerating them is by means of 
copyright.’  (Macaulay 1841)  
Yet before we give way to the force of incumbency, we should consider 
to what extent copyright’s outcomes have truly been contested, or even 
contestable. It is nearly 140 years since the British Royal Commission 
(described in chapter eight) briefly considered the system of author 
royalties proposed by Thomas Watts. Authors’ interests have rarely 
surfaced in subsequent discussion of copyright policy — it is the 
publishers whose voices have dominated the conventions and hearings 
and committee meetings where policy has been set. With their size and 
political heft, they have had the ear of policymakers for 300 years. 
Authors, by contrast, as though they were the children of publishers, have 
been seen but not heard.  
There are other reasons to doubt the merits of incumbency. The longevity 
of a system might be proof of fitness but it could also be, simply, 
evidence of institutional inertia. The copyright system is particularly rule-
bound and rigid, with national laws tied to international treaties that limit 
unilateral action. Reform is the work of decades and the thickets of the 
system are so arcane that only experts — lawyers — venture in. The lay 
public can have very little insight into how the system works or the 
outcomes for authors. They have to take it on trust.  
These conditions — a one-sided power structure, opacity of outcomes, 
institutional inertia — are not markers for wide social acceptance. They 
do not suggest a system made robust by contest and accommodation. 
Rather they suggest a system locked up and ringed around with defenses: 
a fortress not a city. On this evidence it would be unsafe to conclude that 
copyright’s longevity proves its fitness.   
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THE SECOND ARGUMENT for leaving copyright alone is that its 
outcomes are market outcomes, freely reached. This is an argument about 
industrial inevitability. If authors sign contracts that deliver poor money 
outcomes (the argument goes) then we should look to the other factors 
driving their decisions — the psychic income, the desire to push their 
work into the public sphere and the other sources of money income 
available to them. When we understand the calculations they are making 
we will view the market differently. Authors are not fools and we should 
not condescend to see them as victims of a system in which they are, in 
fact, competent participants.  
Furthermore the content industries — books, movies, music — are very 
competitive. While publishers may dwarf individual authors in terms of 
scale and turnover, they have to compete with other publishers for the 
right to publish an author. If authors find they lack bargaining power, they 
can retain an agent to bargain on their behalf (or secure their own finance 
in the case of movies). They are not helpless. And if, over time, 
publishers and movie studios have built large businesses it is because they 
are efficient competitors who deliver value to the authors and filmmakers 
they serve. Their scale in turn has made them the natural entry point for 
investors seeking exposure to the content industries and the profits they 
earn are necessary to attract and hold these investors.  
These are the arguments of history. They describe, accurately enough, 
how the relations between author and publisher, filmmaker and studio, 
have played out during the past century. As we saw in chapter seven, 
publishers have gained enormous scale in their operations while authors 
have stayed atomised — barely organised at all. The implication is that 
publishing by its nature scales up and authoring does not. One is 
industrial, the other artisanal. What we see in history is just the expression 
of their different economic destinies, with each side moving towards its 
natural place and scale through the undirected play of market forces.  
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The difficulty with these arguments is that they overreach. The long 
history of publishing does not run in a straight line to its present place. 
Market forces may have shaped the industry but other, larger forces have 
shaped the market itself. In chapter eight we saw how successive new 
media technologies have funneled content (movies, books, television) 
down narrow media channels (cinemas, retail shelf-space, the 
electromagnetic spectrum) to the audiences waiting at the other end. By 
controlling these channels the publishers have won control of the whole 
business, in much the same way that holding a mountain pass gives 
control of the valley beyond. Technology then has shifted the balance of 
power between author and publisher, increasing the asymmetry of the 
encounter. And it is not just technology. Copyright itself has been enlisted 
in the cause of the publishers. In particular, the construction of copyright 
as a long-lived monopoly right has given book publishers their ‘backlists’ 
and movie studios their ‘libraries’ — assets they have used to attract the 
investment capital that has funded their long run of growth. 
In short, we cannot say that the outcomes we observe in the market — the 
industrial publisher towering over the artisanal author — are the 
inevitable result of market forces, freely played out. Rather they are 
artifacts of 18th century copyright policy and of 19th and 20th century 
media technologies, with nothing free or inevitable about them. A 
different policy (Thomas Watts’ royalty system) and different technology 
(the Internet) might yield very different outcomes.  
 
THERE IS A THIRD REASON why we might think that, with 
copyright, society knows what it is about. It is an old reason, older than 
copyright, as old as writing itself — probably older. It is the fear that the 
pursuit of knowledge is dangerous.   
In a very early iteration, it is the story of the Fall, how the serpent enticed 
the first woman, Eve, to ignore God’s warning about eating the fruit of 
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the forbidden tree, soothing her fears: ‘You will not certainly die,’ the 
serpent said to the woman. ‘For God knows that when you eat from it 
your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and 
evil.’ (Genesis 3:4) The woman eats from the tree and shares the fruit 
with her husband, Adam. Their eyes are opened. They realise they are 
naked and sew fig leaves to cover their nakedness. God then discovers 
their transgression and banishes them from the Garden of Eden. They and 
their descendants are condemned to mortality and hard labour.  
There are many other versions of this story. In Greek mythology, the first 
woman on earth was Pandora. She was created in the forge of Hephaestus 
and given by Zeus to Epimetheus, along with a box (or jar) which the 
couple were instructed never to open. One day when Epimetheus was 
away Pandora, overcome by curiosity, opened the box and unwittingly 
released evil into the world. Curiosity brings us undone.  
In other stories, it is not just curiosity but the reckless disregard of limits 
that brings disaster. In the Faust legend, a rogue scholar makes a pact 
with the Devil who promises unlimited knowledge. Eternal damnation is 
the price. There have been many versions of this story. In some accounts, 
the Faust figure was identified with Johann Fust, who was Gutenberg’s 
financial backer in his development of the printing press.152 Christopher 
Marlowe wrote a play based on the story, The Tragical History of the Life 
and Death of Dr Faustus, based on the German tradition and first 
performed around 1594. Probably the most famous version of the story is 
Goethe’s Faust, published in 1808. In this account the Devil (as 
Mephistopheles) undertakes to serve the scholar until he reaches a 
pinnacle of happiness, at which moment his soul will be forfeit. The deal 
is set and the moment in due course arrives but Goethe rewrites the 
ending and Faust’s soul is saved by God’s grace, in recognition of his 
striving. Thomas Mann, by contrast, was less forgiving. In his version of 
the tale, published in 1947, Faustus is a German composer, Adrian 
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Leverkühn, who willfully contracts syphilis in order to intensify his 
genius. In a crucial passage, the Devil appears to Leverkühn and promises 
him 24 years — but he must renounce love. Leverkühn agrees and begins 
a period of extraordinary creativity. Later, however, he violates the 
contract by loving his young nephew, Nepomuk. The child dies and 
Leverkühn descends into a neuro-syphilitic madness reminiscent of 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche’s final years.153  
The Faust story pins the sins of curiosity and pride squarely on the 
scholar/author. Scholars want to know about the world and will accept no 
limit on the search; authors want to express what they know and will 
accept no limit on their expression. It is the demand for no limits that 
damns Faust and all his kind, and it damns them not just biblically but 
socially. By demanding no limits they place themselves beyond the pale.  
Perhaps the most resonant modern iteration of the story is Frankenstein, 
Mary Shelley’s 1818 novel about a scientist, Victor Frankenstein, who 
creates a living creature in an experiment that goes horribly wrong. The 
story quickly captured the popular imagination. Horror writer Stephen 
King (1981) has described it as a Shakespearean tragedy and its monster 
as the archetypal ‘Thing Without A Name’. Here is how Shelley herself 
described the origin of the story in the introduction to a new edition of the 
novel published in 1831: 
‘When I placed my head on my pillow I did not sleep, nor could I be said 
to think. My imagination, unbidden, possessed and guided me… I saw — 
with shut eyes, but acute mental vision — I saw the pale student of 
unhallowed arts kneeling beside the thing he had put together. I saw the 
hideous phantasm of a man stretched out, and then, on the working of 
some powerful engine, show signs of life and stir with an uneasy, half-
vital motion. Frightful must it be, for supremely frightful would be the 
effect of any human endeavour to mock the stupendous mechanism of the 
Creator of the world. His success would terrify the artist; he would rush 
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away from his odious handywork, horror-stricken. He would hope that, 
left to itself, the slight spark of life which he had communicated would 
fade; that this thing, which had received such imperfect animation, would 
subside into dead matter; and he might sleep in the belief that the silence 
of the grave would quench for ever the transient existence of the hideous 
corpse which he had looked upon as the cradle of life. He sleeps; but he is 
awakened; he opens his eyes; behold the horrid thing stands at his 
bedside, opening his curtains, and looking on him with yellow, watery, 
but speculative eyes.’ (Shelley 1999 [1831]) 
Beneath the lurid melodrama of the story is a substrate of disquiet. 
Shelley taps into fears about tampering with the unknown and mixing that 
which is alive with that which is dead. It is perhaps no accident that 
Frankenstein and his monster have been conflated in the public 
imagination, for the creator’s hubris turns him into a moral monster and 
social outcast, haunted and eventually hunted by his grotesque creation.  
The idea of open knowledge and inquiry is a modern one. Earlier cultures 
recognised the necessity of limits and marked off certain areas as taboo or 
sacred or not to be spoken of. American literary scholar Roger Shattuck 
noted that ‘proverbs in every language tell us that it is possible to know 
too much for our own good’ (Shattuck 1996, p1). But science and art 
have thrown off such constraints:  
‘Today, relying on principles of experiment, pure research, free speech, 
artistic license, and academic freedom, science and art can affirm a 
measure of independence from limitations on ordinary behavior. In 
extreme instances, each has claimed to be a no-fault activity occupying a 
morally tax-free zone… Our passwords today are experiment, originality, 
and even subversion as embodied in our two established — and 
sometimes rogue — institutions of science and art.’ (Shattuck, p310)  
Freed from the ‘limitations on ordinary behavior’ the author/scientist 
stumbles forward. But who grants this license? And how may it be 
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regulated? There is a conundrum here that society cannot solve but must 
carry forward as a permanently unresolved tension between caution and 
creation, stasis and innovation. They are warring principles: politically, 
intellectually, socially, emotionally. We want the new but we fear it too 
and the fear is deep and atavistic. It is the fear of the serpent, the opened 
box, the Thing Without A Name. We fear unleashing what we cannot 
control. And we fear the reckless creator.  
From fear it is a short step to anger and from anger to resentment. Thus 
we arrive at the curious ambivalence that society harbors towards 
creation, welcoming, even eager for the fruits but suspicious of their 
source and prepared to believe the worst.  
Perhaps the most ready expression of this ambivalence is the desire to 
censor. Society has long exercised the power to decide which works and 
which parts of works may enter the public domain. Works that are 
blasphemous, immoral, seditious or transgressive may be refused or 
redacted. The censoring hand may be heavy or light. In the extreme case 
books may be burned; book-burning has a long history going back at least 
as far as the destruction ordered by China’s grand councillor Li Szu in 
213 BC (Fishburn 2008, p2).154 A French publisher reportedly went so far 
as to produce a fireproof edition of the works of Voltaire (Fishburn, p13). 
Marlowe’s Doctor Faustus at the very end offers to burn his own books to 
fend off Lucifer. The offer is not accepted.  
An alternative is to restrict the circulation of works. Thus only certain 
kinds of audience are permitted: the cognoscenti, the initiates, those with 
special understanding or the ‘patience’ necessary in the ‘exercise of 
curiosity’ (Shattuck, p313). The ordinary reader is shut out.155 In the 
previous chapter we saw that Krushchev’s assistant Lebedev had a private 
library of banned books and gave Solzhenitsyn instructions on how to 
tone down One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovitch to an acceptable pitch; 
it was safe for Lebedev to collect and study works that ordinary citizens 
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could not be trusted with. But control of this sort is becoming difficult to 
sustain in face of the open diffusion enabled by the internet. Banned 
works bob up in accessible places. The machinery of censorship is 
breaking down.  
Censorship in any event arrives on the scene after the horse — the author 
— has bolted. A better alternative surely would be one that arrived earlier 
on the scene and interrupted the author in the act of authoring. Or better 
still one that arrived even before the act and interrupted not its 
performance but its feasibility. Imagine then an intervention that made 
authors pause before they had got very far in their work and wonder how 
they could continue; that eroded their creative confidence through 
continuous negative feedback about the economic value of their work156; 
that turned away potential backers by projecting an investment history of 
high risk and low returns; and then steered authors in search of support 
towards patronage institutions whose aims were aligned with or even 
decided by the state.  
This describes of course the copyright system.  
Here it is worth recalling that the state’s original interest in copyright lay 
in the scope it offered — ‘a suitable remedy’ — for the control of dissent. 
The Stationers Company got its monopoly but the quid pro quo was the 
enlistment of the stationers in the suppression of ‘divers scandalous 
malicious schismatical and heretical persons’, to quote from the 
Company’s original charter granted by Queen Mary in 1557. Of course 
this purpose has long since given way to one based in the construction of 
property rights and even the enabling of speech. But we do not need to 
imagine a sinister continuance of the old policy. All we need imagine is 
that society is comfortable with the system’s outcomes, including its 
slowing down of the author’s impulse, its check on investment and its 
corralling of authors around the patronage institutions. All we need 
imagine is that society knows what it is about.  
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In short, it is open to us to view the economic outcomes of the copyright 
system as serving an unstated but continuing public interest in 
constraining the work of authors. It is not a conspiracy, there is no cabal 
of ministers meeting to administer the policy, just a steady social 
acceptance of a set of economic outcomes that has this consequence.  
 
COPYRIGHT AS A BRAKE as well as an incentive is an idea that 
stretches the understanding yet fits the facts. Society holds out an 
incentive to authors but views with equanimity the failure of nearly all 
those who respond to it — like suitors in a fairy tale slain by the dragon. 
There is no contradiction once we register society’s ambivalence about 
the author/scholar/knowledge seeker. We want them to make the attempt 
but we don’t want to make it too easy. In fact we want to make it hard. 
Then having made it hard, we propose to reward, liberally, those few who 
succeed. They may kiss the princess and live happily ever after.  
And if the ambivalence starts from fear of what the author/scholar/seeker 
may unleash, it soon finds other grounds. Someone will complain that the 
author’s hands are too soft (they do no real work); that anyone could do 
that (the work is trivial); that the author is a liar, a fabulist (and cannot be 
trusted); the author is immoral (does not respect boundaries); a corrupter 
of youth (who will lead them away from the proper paths); or lives in an 
ivory tower (does not live among us). The grounds multiply as we 
discover our distance from the author. Even when we revere them, we 
soon uncover their difference — they are ‘mad, bad and dangerous to 
know’, as the disgraced Lady Caroline Lamb said of the poet Lord Byron, 
her lover.157  
Here we reach a line in the sand. If we fear the consequences of open 
inquiry and what Shattuck called its modern passwords — experiment, 
originality, subversion — then it makes sense to leave copyright as it is, 
not repair it. On this view copyright, whether intentionally or not, serves 
! 207 
the public interest by inducing creative effort but only rarely rewarding it. 
Authors are encouraged to ‘try out’ but not to continue unless their work 
meets with extraordinary success. In effect, they are induced to submit to 
a winnowing machine that strips their numbers down to some small 
fraction of those who started. A further unknown number are deterred 
from starting altogether. Socially the benefit is the opportunity to view the 
try-outs but reward only exceptional performance. Publishers of course 
are not subjected to the same winnowing; they are privileged by their 
early access to revenue streams.   
This is a viable line of argument. Just as society offers a particular system 
of incentives and rewards to teachers, doctors and plumbers, so too it 
offers authors the copyright system, which they are free to engage with or 
not. But there is a corollary — a necessary consequential adjustment in 
our understanding of the creative act. For if we choose to persist with 
copyright as it is, then we must understand what it means to treat the 
creative act in this way. We have to recognise just how cautious and 
ambivalent we are about experiment, originality and subversion. We need 
to let go of the idea that the creative act is central to our culture and 
accept the truth that we have pushed it to the margin. And we would have 
to reconcile our commitment to intellectual freedom with the fact of our 
subjection of authors to the necessity of patronage. Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt said, ‘Necessitous men are not free men,’ and the same is true 
of authorship.158  
The consequential truth is that authors and authorship inhabit a much 
darker place in social reckoning than society acknowledges; the facts of 
copyright are the proof.  
 
THERE IS A MORAL ANGLE to the argument. What are we to make 
of a public incentive that induces people to undertake a high-risk activity 
leading commonly to poverty? In Strings Attached: untangling the ethics 
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of incentives (2012), American philosopher and political scientist Ruth W 
Grant suggests that in contemporary usage the word incentive has come 
to mean ‘a factor involved in the rational calculation of one’s interests’ 
(p32). The implication is that the person responding to an incentive is 
informed and rational in their response and therefore the person offering 
the incentive is absolved of responsibility for the outcome. Grant notes 
‘the effect of this language of incentives is to render ethical problems less 
visible’ (p38).  
Yet in the case of copyright we have seen that authors may be quite 
mistaken about their prospects, either failing to understand the very poor 
odds of success (the ‘reckless gamble’ described in chapter five) or 
overestimating their personal prospects (‘confident gamble’). This is a 
particular risk for authors early in their careers, before experience has 
tempered their expectations. What makes these mistakes so easy to make 
is the opacity of the copyright system. There is very little public 
disclosure of outcomes. The little that is known is only rarely and 
unwillingly revealed — through threatened or actual court cases like 
writer Winston Groom’s suit against Paramount over the missing profits 
of Forrest Gump (discussed in chapter four) or outbursts like musician 
Courtney Love’s famous diatribe against the record companies, ‘Courtney 
Love does the math’ (2000).159 Meanwhile the movie studios and record 
companies pump the myths of stardom, of eye-popping wealth and 
overnight success. No wonder authors mistake the odds.  
Grant explores cases where people offered incentives are exposed to 
consequent risks. She cites the Belmont Report published in 1979 by the 
US National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of 
Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Report set a binding standard 
for medical research using human subjects, based on ‘beneficence, 
respect for persons, and justice’ (Grant, p89). These principles imply that 
risks to participants should be minimised and are only acceptable if the 
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benefits of the research are proportionate: ‘If the risks are unreasonable, it 
would be unethical to ask anyone to take them, regardless of whether they 
are asked to volunteer or offered wages or incentives’ (p91). Further, 
there must be informed consent: ‘individuals who are asked to participate 
in research are given relevant information about the research, in a manner 
they can understand, before they authorise their participation.’ (p89) 
Finally, the principle of justice requires that subjects be protected from 
exploitation: ‘Incentives are simply inappropriate if a person is unable to 
weigh and evaluate them,’ (p97). Plainly, the copyright system does not 
meet this standard.  
Of course there are authors who plunge ahead regardless of the odds, who 
write from an inner compulsion or pursue a subject obsessively. They are 
unlikely to be put off by disclosure of copyright’s outcomes. But others 
might be deterred. They might weigh the disclosed risks of authoring 
against other possibilities available to them and choose a different path. 
Still others might continue as authors but with a different strategy; they 
might leave after a time or join their authoring to another, supplementary 
profession. 160  Almost certainly, if the risks were disclosed, a large 
proportion would review their position and make changes that might 
reduce their exposure to the risks of authoring and copyright. They would 
become more like the informed and rational agents assumed by theories 
of incentives.  
The question is, what form of disclosure? We have seen just how difficult 
it can be to decipher the cashflows of copyright assets. What is needed is 
a simple measure that anyone can understand, without having to be 
coached in the accounting practices of the publishers. It should show the 
author’s share of the cashflows from their copyrights relative to the 
publisher’s share. And the disclosure should be public, not just for the 
benefit of the author concerned but for all authors, actual and prospective.  
! 210 
The specific form of the disclosure might be: 1. A money amount 
representing the author’s projected share of the sale price of the unit of 
consumption of a work — thus a book, cinema admission or download; 2. 
Posted or embedded with the sale information — the back cover of the 
book, the cinema ticket or the download transaction page; 3. Linked to an 
explanatory note on the publisher’s website or other accessible location 
giving details of the method of calculation of the projected share; and 4. 
Required by legislation. For example, the publisher of a book with a retail 
price of $20 and a wholesale price of $12 paying an author royalty of 15 
percent of wholesale would be required to post on the back cover of the 
book a statement that the author’s share of the sale price was $1.80. 
Where the amount to be paid to the author is contingent on overall sales 
or other contingent factors, the posted share should be a ‘best estimate’ 
based on the revenues projected at the time the project was approved by 
the publisher and should be updated in light of actual revenues as and 
when the opportunity arises.  
We may imagine that publishers would find this requirement onerous; 
however, the process of approving a book or movie project almost 
invariably involves the creation of a financial model that is used to 
generate projections of revenues, income, costs and profit, and it should 
be perfectly feasible to generate estimates of the author’s share using the 
same model.  
Disclosing the author’s share in this way over time would create a 
cumulative body of data about the performance of the copyright system 
and would be a step towards the splitting of authors’ and publishers’ 
rights proposed in chapter eight. Authors would be better informed, so 
would readers — and so would policymakers.  
 
IN CONCLUSION, the copyright system harbors a great division. Its 
poor returns pose a direct challenge to the great project of human 
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knowledge creation, but the fact that society has ignored those poor 
returns for so long poses an even deeper challenge. For it calls into 
question our actual commitment to the great project.  
We have seen data for films made in Australia, the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand and the United States. It is the same story in each place. Neither 
size nor ‘commerciality’ nor proximity to the centre (Hollywood) makes 
any difference. At the copyright level, where the filmmaker works, there 
can be no realistic expectation except of losses. Copyright is a poverty 
trap for filmmakers. Kretschmer and Hardwick (2007), who assembled 
data for 25,000 German and British authors, drew much the same 
conclusion. They wrote: ‘After this study, copyright policy cannot remain 
the same.’  
And yet it has. Nothing has changed in 300 years. An 18th century 
London bookseller miraculously transported to the 21st century would 
know exactly what to do.  
It is possible that the inaction of 300 years is an unacknowledged social 
choice that reflects the dark view of authors and authorship described in 
this chapter. In that case the reforms advanced in this thesis and before 
me by Plant, Macfie and Watts may be safely ignored — all except one, 
the need to better disclose copyright’s outcomes so that authors know 
what they are getting into. 
Alternatively, we may conclude that the reason why there has been no 
action is that copyright was long ago captured by the publishers and has 
been shaped ever since to serve their interests. In that case, reform is 
viable and should be attempted. For unquestionably, reform would serve 
the cause of open inquiry and free speech — causes the West has 
championed for even longer than it has championed copyright.  
There is more at stake here than authors’ incomes. Our commitment to 
the viability of authorship measures our support for the ‘progress of 
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science and useful arts’. It is a test of our belief in the great project of 
knowledge creation.  
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12: Conclusion 
[We must give up] the ideology of copyright = control = money. The new 
equation must be simply copyright = compensation. 
— William Patry (2012) 
The incentive mechanism on which we depend for the production of 
films, books and other creative works is broken. Fundamentally, the 
mechanism does not adequately reward authors for the risks they take — 
the risks are much greater than the rewards — and for most authors the 
rewards fall well short of viability. The mismatch means there is actually 
a disincentive for authors who need to make a living from their work. 
Publishers have bent the mechanism out of shape by leaning on it for their 
own benefit.  
Although many people assume that authors have the same interests as 
publishers, they do not: their interests lie in different directions. 
Publishers want exclusive monopoly rights in the works they publish and 
over many years have persuaded policymakers to shape copyright in this 
way. Authors want to be recognised for the work they do and many also 
need to make a living from it. Exclusivity for them is unnecessary, a 
sledgehammer to crack a nut. What they need is a right of remuneration. 
Policymakers seem not to have noticed the problem. 
The consequences of this policy failure go beyond questions of fairness to 
authors. They ripple across the whole sphere of intellectual endeavor — 
everywhere that people give expression to ideas and strive to do so in a 
coherent way over time, whether in words, film or music. For all of these 
people the failure of copyright introduces questions of viability and 
sustainability. For some — an unknown number — it presents an absolute 
barrier to expression. If they cannot earn a reasonable return from the 
work then they cannot keep going with it. For others it means the work 
must somehow be subsidised, whether by taking a ‘day job’, by transfers 
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from ‘Family, Friends and Fools’, by enlisting a private patron or by 
becoming eligible for public subsidy. All of these pathways involve delay 
and compromise: the prospect of the work recedes. 
Among those turned away by copyright’s poor returns, we may imagine, 
are many potential authors from the third world and the margins of the 
first world. But these are conjectural authors: an absence not a presence. 
It is no accident that so much of the world’s creative expression comes 
from the fortunate elite of the first world, with ‘a room of [their] own and 
500 a year’ (Woolf 1928). Also turned away are those authors whose 
work, because of its subject matter, requires some measure of 
independence. These are our truth-tellers, dissidents, breakaways and 
originals. Unable to make a living from the work, their capacity for 
independence is compromised by their need for financial assistance. Even 
without those pressures, the grind of poverty may wear away their 
resolve. It is a striking coincidence that copyright’s original purpose — a 
grant of monopoly to London’s booksellers in return for suppressing 
seditious authors — finds a modern echo in its de facto discouragement of 
independence.  
This turning away of whole classes of author means that copyright is not 
merely a piece of background machinery grinding away in the market for 
intellectual works — it is an active, shaping principle.  
Is this what policymakers intended? What saves us from that unhappy 
conclusion is the readier, more probable explanation: that copyright’s 
outcomes are a 300-year-old policy accident brought about by the 
inveigling of London’s booksellers and compounded over time by their 
successors. On this view the poor returns to authors are a reversible 
policy failure not a natural market outcome and it is open to us to reform 
the copyright system in such a way as to make authorship a viable 
venture, at least in principle — a venture capable of growth and profits 
through talent and ordinary exertion rather than extraordinary luck.  
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The benefit would be a society where dissent and open inquiry were 
feasible independent pursuits open to authors everywhere.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
! 216 
 
 
  
! 217 
Epilogue: Shakespeare’s fortune 
William Shakespeare was a practical man with a head for business. Not 
for him the drinking and dangerous living of Christopher Marlowe and 
his fellow ‘university wits’. At 30, unlettered, he became a ‘sharer’ in the 
Lord Chamberlain’s Men, a new company formed in 1594 under the 
patronage of Henry Carey, the Lord Chamberlain. During the next 10 
years the young playwright and actor helped build it into one of the great 
theatrical companies, with a permanent troupe of actors, a bookkeeper, 
wardrobe-keeper, musicians, carpenters, stagehands and ‘gatherers’ to 
collect the money. Shakespeare and his partners were tough-minded 
entrepreneurs who took their chances as they found them. In 1598 they 
responded to an impasse in their negotiations with the landlord of the 
Theatre, their main performing venue, by turning up one morning with a 
gang of armed men, dismantling the building, ferrying the timbers across 
the Thames and constructing a new theatre on the south side of the river. 
The new theatre was the Globe. It could hold 3,000 and Shakespeare 
became a ‘housekeeper’ in it, owner of a 10 percent share. It was a very 
successful venture that made the partners wealthy men. Ten years later 
they leased a second theatre, Blackfriars, within the walls of the city. It 
was a venture almost as bold as the Globe, since Blackfriars was a much 
smaller theatre and required much higher admission prices — sixpence 
for a seat in the gallery compared to a penny at the Globe. The King’s 
Men (as by then they had become) changed the whole idea of theatre, 
transforming it from a low-life entertainment to a high-brow one. In the 
process they lifted themselves from the status of vagabonds, ‘masterless 
men’, to gentlemen, entitled to wear the King’s red livery and to display a 
coat of arms. Shakespeare’s punning heraldry, a falcon ‘shaking’ its 
wings and holding a spear, bore the motto ‘Non sainz droict’ — not 
without right. 
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Throughout his London career Shakespeare invested his profits away 
from their source. Stratford real estate was the mainstay of his wealth. 
With his share of the profits from the Globe he bought New Place, a 10 
room dwelling called the ‘great house’ by the people of Stratford, where 
he set up his family while he continued to lodge and work in London. 
Over time he bought adjacent properties, demolished a cottage, and 
enlarged the gardens of the Stratford estate. He also bought farming land 
and invested a substantial sum in ‘tithes’ of corn, grain, wool and 
lamb.161  
From the moment we catch sight of him in the Tudor hurly-burly 
Shakespeare comes across as a shrewd, pragmatic player. He makes 
good choices about the people he works with. His investments, though 
Stratford-skewed, are all cannily made. Over a long career he avoids the 
many risks of the theatrical scene — risks that brought down many of his 
contemporaries, gaoling and impoverishing and even killing them. He 
navigates with equal ease the seething politics of Queen Elizabeth’s court 
and the cutthroat alleys of the south bank, where he lived. Shakespeare 
passes through it all unscathed.162  
William Shakespeare is an antidote to the poisonous myth of the 
incompetent author, head in a cloud, hopeless at business. We need an 
antidote because the myth is an obstacle to copyright reform, perhaps the 
major obstacle. For if it were true that authors were congenitally 
unbusinesslike — essentially children — then there would always be a 
need for publishers willing to conduct the business on their behalf. The 
publishers, being grown-up and businesslike, will naturally require the 
security of an exclusive interest… And so we are returned to the place we 
started from, a monopoly copyright that rewards publishers primarily and 
authors secondarily. 
The idea that authors are incompetent at business descends from the 
Romantic conception of the author as someone driven by inner passions 
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to pursue their work regardless of worldly concerns. It was reinforced by 
the tradition of the gentleman author, who wrote for fame or love of truth 
but certainly not for money. Business was dirty, mean, undignified, the 
very opposite of Art; to write for money was contemptible. We have seen 
how the idea flowered in modern estimation, for example in Keynes’ 
characterization of the artist as ‘free, undisciplined, unregimented, 
uncontrolled’ (Skidelsky 2000, p294). The description may seem a little 
quaint but such ideas are alive and well on the internet where 
‘information wants to be free’ and it is widely assumed that authors may 
be asked to work for nothing, without embarrassment to either side.163  
But not William Shakespeare.  
Together with George Bryan, Richard Burbage, John Heminges, Will 
Kempe, Augustine Phillips, Thomas Pope and Will Sly, Shakespeare 
founded a company that rewrote the meaning and the possibilities of 
theatre. In doing so the partners did not neglect to make money; they were 
disciplined, focused and hard-working. They built a profitable business 
that ran for nearly 50 years — and only came to an end, in 1642, when the 
Puritans closed down London’s theatres. The company was the 
entrepreneurial site of Shakespeare’s work; he wrote for it exclusively. Of 
the original founders, five including Shakespeare became owners of the 
Globe by funding its construction (along with Burbage’s brother Cuthbert 
and Henry Condell, who bought out George Bryan). The same tight group 
later became owners of the upmarket Blackfriars, an indoor theatre whose 
acquisition meant the company could perform year-round (the Globe was 
open to the weather). After Shakespeare’s death, it was Condell and 
Heminges who assembled the First Folio of his work, published in 1623.  
Andrew Gurr has called the company ‘the only effective democracy of its 
time in totalitarian England’ (Gurr 2004, pxiii). Certainly it was a 
company of equals in a time of radical inequality. Shakespeare and his 
partners adopted what was then a very unusual business model. Instead of 
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separate ownership of company and theatre, they brought the two 
together. Today we would say the company was ‘vertically integrated’. 
There was no corporate hierarchy — the founders were a partnership and 
held the Globe as a ‘tenancy in common’. The tenancy structure was 
designed to prevent dispersal of the shares in the theatre: the partners very 
deliberately set about constructing a stable, long-run vehicle for their 
common enterprise.164  
A telling point of reference is the Admiral’s Men, a rival theatre company 
active in the same period as the Chamberlain’s Men. The Admiral’s Men 
performed at the Rose and later the Fortune theatre but the players were 
never owners. Rather they entered into a business relationship with Philip 
Henslowe, an impresario who owned the Rose and had an interest in the 
Fortune. Henslowe became their banker as well as their landlord. His 
business dealings in the form of a diary have come down to posterity and 
the story they relate is instructive. Together with his son-in-law Edward 
Alleyn, Henslowe exerted considerable control over the company. Bart 
van Es reports that the two ‘made decisions about the acceptance of texts, 
took directly for themselves a half-share of performance revenue, had 
hired actors under contract, took effective possession of theatrical stock 
(meaning both apparel and playbooks), and even made decisions on the 
physical movement of [the company]’ (Van Es 2013, p46). Financially, 
these arrangements very much favoured the two impresarios over the 
players: Henslowe and Alleyn died immensely wealthy; the players did 
not and the company eventually collapsed.165  
Shakespeare had a very different experience to that of his peers among 
the Admiral’s Men. Not only did his stake in the Chamberlain’s Men 
enrich him — it also enabled his art. It brought him every day to a place 
where he could practice the craft of playwriting. It placed him in a circle 
of peers whose interactions shed a continuous critical light on his 
practice. It gave him an ensemble of actors to work and invent with, 
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including three of the most celebrated actors of the period, Richard 
Burbage, Will Kempe and later Robert Armin. And it delivered him an 
audience whose feedback measured both the errors and perfections of his 
work. Van Es writes (p111): 
‘The company — its sharers, its hired men, and its apprenticed boy 
players taking women’s and children’s parts — were the matrix though 
which he could structure his thinking. Having a literary playwright at the 
centre of commissioning, casting, rehearsing, and performing plays was 
transformative. The formation of the Chamberlain’s Men thus 
inaugurated a mode of production that was unprecedented and would 
rarely if ever be repeated on the English stage.’   
The company also made Shakespeare independent. In the period 
immediately before he joined the company, with the theatres closed 
because of plague, Shakespeare published two books of poetry, Venus 
and Adonis in 1593 and The Rape of Lucrece in 1594. According to 
Stephen Greenblatt, they were an attempt to find a patron, ‘probably for 
the first and only time in his career’ (p241). Writing for the company and 
becoming a sharer opened up a different path for Shakespeare, free of 
patronage and free of the conventions that went with writing for a patron. 
Shakespeare took and used this freedom. His exploration of psychological 
complexity in the characters he created — what Greenblatt (p323) calls 
his ‘intense representation of inwardness’ — was the fruit of this 
independence. Few other playwrights had the same scope for innovation 
or the opportunity to revise their work over as long a period as 
Shakespeare did with Hamlet and Lear. Van Es again: ‘Not only [as a 
sharer] did he now play a determining role in first performance, his plays 
would take a permanent and central place in the company’s repertory and 
would remain alive to him over the decades.’ (p110)   
It was this Shakespeare, renting a room in a house in Cripplegate, 
working at an outdoor theatre next door to a bear-baiting arena, helping 
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build a company that became home to three generations of English actors 
and writers166 — it was this man who ‘wrote Shakespeare’. To see him 
‘seated’, as the Romantic writer Samuel Taylor Coleridge described 
(1817), ‘on one of the two glory-smitten summits of the poetic mountain’, 
while it does him honour, does not do him justice. He was not separate 
from his time or circumstances but distinctly of them. He was the son of a 
glover who made good, a poet, a playwright and a businessman, brilliant 
at all three.  
Four hundred years later, there are lessons for writers and filmmakers and 
for policymakers. One is that there is no fundamental conflict between art 
and business: they are not oil and water; it is possible to pursue both at 
the same time without compromising either. The second lesson is that 
authors have much to gain through working with others, collaboratively. 
The idea that they should work alone denies them the creative 
possibilities of interaction and the breakthroughs that can sometimes be 
achieved within the dynamics of a group working together over time. The 
third lesson is that a creative enterprise in direct contact with its audience 
is a powerful economic force, a virtuous loop. Getting between author 
and audience is the business model of the middlemen; keeping them out 
was what made the King’s Men rich. 
Shakespeare is thus a vision of the possibilities of authorship. He shows 
us what an author was before authorship was atomised by copyright and 
infantilised by the Romantics. He is the beacon we should now steer 
towards.  
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1 American playwright Robert Anderson made a killing with his play Tea and Sympathy 
(1953) but found it a hard act to follow (Bergan 2009). 
2 The argument is carried on in many places. See for example Deazley, Kretschmer, & 
Bently (2010). 
3  For the policy view see for example the website of the US Copyright Office: 
‘Copyright is a form of protection grounded in the U.S. Constitution and granted by law 
for original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression.’ Or of the 
Australian Attorney General’s Department: ‘Copyright is a type of property that is 
founded on a person's creative skill and labour.’ For the origins of copyright as a 
publisher’s right see Patterson (1968, p8). 
4 Moral rights originated in France and Germany and remain more a European tradition 
than an English-speaking one. The Berne Convention provides: ‘Independent of the 
author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the said rights, the author shall 
have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation 
or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to the said work, which 
would be prejudicial to the author's honor or reputation.’  
5 Boldrin and Levine have argued (2002) that the ‘first sale’ of a creative work could be 
sufficient to compensate the creator without any ‘downstream protection’ ie without 
copyright. In a subsequent book (2008) they cite the 9-11 Commission Report as a 
natural experiment confirming their ‘first sale’ conjecture. They report that the publisher, 
W. W. Norton, was able to make a profit despite having only a two-week window ahead 
of a competing edition from St Martin’s and a competing, free-download edition. 
6 Pokorny and Sedgwick (2010) report that the profitability of Hollywood movies has 
been rising since the 1990s. However, media companies themselves may not be faring so 
well. Knee, Greenwald & Sieve (2009, p7) report: ‘The shocking, evident, persistent and 
oddly ignored fact is that the financial returns of media companies significantly and 
relentlessly fall below those of the stock market as a whole… For all the excitement, 
glamour, drama and publicity releases they produce, why can’t these companies manage 
to come close to delivering the kind of returns available from closing your eyes and 
throwing a dart?’ Their answer: ‘the curse of the mogul’. 
7 Mike Fleming, a reporter for Deadline.com, published a 2007 distribution report for 
Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix where the movie, despite grossing US$938 
million worldwide, was said to be still US$167 million in the red. Fleming quoted a 
dealmaker who said: ‘If this is the fair definition of net profits, why do we continue to 
pretend and go through this charade? Judging by this, no movie is ever, ever going to go 
to pay off on net participants. It’s an illusion to make writers and lower-level actors and 
filmmakers feel they have a stake in the game.’ (Fleming 2010) 
8 Johnson wrote to Chesterfield: ‘Is not a patron, my lord, one who looks with unconcern 
on a man struggling for life in the water, and when he has reached ground, encumbers 
him with help? The notice which you have been pleased to take of my labours, had it 
been early, had been kind: but it has been delayed till I am indifferent and cannot enjoy 
it; till I am solitary and cannot impart it; till I am known and do not want it.’ (quoted in 
Bate 1977) 
9 The Writers Guild of America West reports that it registered 70,000 new ‘items’ in 
2011, while the WGA East reports 10,000. I have assumed that half of these registered 
items are screenplays. (See discussion in chapter five.) The Motion Picture Association 
of America (a trade organization representing the major studios) estimates that 754 films 
were made by US production companies in 2010 (734 in 2009, 759 in 2008). This was 
made up of 98 films produced by MPAA members and their subsidiaries, 233 films 
! 238 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
made by non-members with budgets above US$1 million and 419 made by non-
members with budgets below US$1 million. (MPAAb 2011) 
10 Plant was not the first to propose this reform. He drew on Robert Macfie, who 
advocated just such a system before the British Royal Commission on Copyright of 
1876-78. Macfie himself cited Thomas Watts, Keeper of Printed Books at the British 
Museum, who proposed a similar royalty scheme in the Mechanics’ Magazine in 1837. 
Watts’ scheme is discussed at length in chapter eight.  
11 The story of the rebirth of the Australian industry has been told in several texts. I have 
relied particularly on Graham Shirley’s and Brian Adams’ Australian cinema: the first 
eighty years, Elizabeth Jacka’s and Susan Dermody’s The screening of Australia: 
anatomy of a film industry, Vol 1 and their later edited volume, The imaginary industry: 
Australian film in the late 80’s. Shirley and Adams date the rebirth from 1965. 
12 In 1962 an inquiry into the six-year-old television industry, led by Senator Victor 
Vincent, noted the ‘melancholy spectacle’ of the rise and fall of the Australian film 
industry and rejected the idea that filmmaking was ‘best left to those countries (meaning 
the United States) who can do it better than we can’. Vincent’s committee recommended 
government loans for film producers, tax concessions for investors, a climate of support. 
The Menzies government never responded. 
13 ‘The Report, together with the Minutes of Evidence, constitute the most thorough 
description and analysis of the structure of the Australian film and television industry 
ever undertaken.’ Dermody & Jacka (1987, p56). 
14 This was the so-called Division 10B incentive, legislated in 1979, an accelerated 
capital depreciation schedule that allowed investors in Australian films and certain other 
assets to write off their investments over two years instead of the 25 years that would 
otherwise have applied. 
15 For an investor in the top tax bracket, the effect of the concessions was to reduce their 
risk in a film investment to just 10 cents in the dollar. 
16 The best way to see the effect of these changes is in the investment market’s response. 
Market intermediaries quoted a ‘presale benchmark’ to producers; this was the level of 
income required to give investors accounting break-even. The idea was to presell the 
film rights to this level, so that investors had the comfort of break-even but still the 
possibility of ‘blue sky’. At 150/50, the presale benchmark was just 10 percent, that is, 
10 percent of the production cost of the film — a hurdle so low it was hardly worth 
jumping. At 133/33, the benchmark went to 20 percent. At 120/20, it went to 40 percent 
and then to 60 percent (because, in a separate move, the top marginal tax rate was 
reduced from 60 to 48 cents in the dollar). At 60 percent, the industry struggled. 
17  These fears had some foundation. Other tax schemes then being promoted to 
Australian investors were used to fund US-originated movies like Arthur and Superman 
III. These were highly leveraged schemes where investors were characterised as partners 
of the producers. 
18 The idea was floated in a lengthy discussion paper, Film Assistance: Future Options, 
published by Allen & Unwin in 1986. I was the author of the paper in my then capacity 
as policy adviser to the Australian Film Commission. 
19 In almost every case the offset is contributed to the financing of the films it rewards. 
The benefit to the producer arises from the equity interest thus created, which devolves 
upon the producer unless negotiated away. 
20 American economist Arthur De Vany (2004) calls this an uninformative information 
cascade: ‘It is a cascade because it is a sequential choice process in which early choices 
condition the subsequent choices… uninformative because the individuals do not 
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exchange their private information about the quality of the film; the only signals 
observed are the choices of the previous moviegoers.’ (p124) 
21 A O Scott says James Cameron’s Avatar has made the word ‘blockbuster’ sound 
quaint; he suggests ‘juggernaut’. The New York Times, 4 March 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/07/movies/awardsseason/07Scott.html 
22 Celluloid prints are being made obsolete by digital projection but there will still be a 
cost, as distributors are subsidising exhibitors’ switchover to digital through payment of 
‘virtual print fees’. Like celluloid prints, these will be charged to the owners and creators 
of the movies passing through the distribution system. 
23 Of course the order of recoupment is a matter for negotiation and so may vary from 
film to film. As we will see, the FFC required that fees deferred by producers or others 
be recouped in last position, after it had recouped its equity investment. 
24 These figures include television production. A summary of the FFC’s 20 year history 
is at http://www.ffc.gov.au/annual/FFC_20_Years.pdf. 
25 The skewness means the distribution of returns is not a ‘normal distribution’ — the 
familiar bell-shaped curve that describes the distribution of heights in a random sample 
of people and much else in nature. Instead we have a right-skewed distribution, where 
the mean (average) is greater than the median (the mid-point of the range). Thus the 
average rate of recoupment for the FFC was 27 percent (in the absence of the underlying 
recoupment figures it is not possible to calculate the average recoupment, only the 
average rate of recoupment) but the median was only 10 percent and the mode (the most 
frequently occurring value) was zero. These figures confirm De Vany’s prince-and-
pauper characterisation of the business. 
26 I thank George Raftopulos, who compiled and graphed the ASX data for this 
comparison from the ASX 200 index. Company returns have been calculated for a five-
year period and include share price movements and dividends paid across the period. 
The selection of a five-year period is consistent with the economic life of a film 
investment (including the period of production): most films exhaust their potential 
within a few years of release. 
27 There may have been cases where the FFC had a ‘corridor’ to the early returns from a 
film, giving it a share in the gross rentals from ‘first dollar’. In such cases the FFC 
would have been in receipt of funds before the distributor was fully recouped. In other 
cases, distribution rights may have been shared between two or more distributors, so that 
returns were not cross-collateralised. In those cases, returns may have flowed to the FFC 
from one territory despite distribution losses in another.  
28 Daniel Kahneman (2011) among others has critiqued the idea of the ‘hot hand’, 
arguing (in the case of  professional basketball) ‘there is no such thing as a hot hand… 
either in shooting from the field or scoring from the foul line. Of course, some players 
are more accurate than others, but the sequence of successes and missed shots satisfies 
all tests of randomness. The hot hand is entirely in the eye of the beholders, who are 
consistently too quick to perceive order and causality in randomness.’ (p116-117) But 
the very perception of success can be enough to heat up performance: success breeds 
success. Certainly the producer of this year’s box office champ can take her pick of next 
year’s screenplays. 
29 There were, however, cases where the FFC required or accepted ‘deferrals’ by the 
filmmakers. 24 of the 158 films were financed in part through deferrals (ranging from 1 
to 32 percent of the film’s budget). In such cases the filmmaker became in effect a low-
ranked investor, contributing not cash but their budgeted fee and recovering it only if 
and after the FFC itself recouped its investment. 
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30 See for example comments by Antony I Ginnane, then President of the Screen 
Producers Association of Australia: ‘We cannot simply expect $100 million worth of 
support a year to be handed over by government if our share of the theatrical box office 
remains at an appallingly low 2 to 3 percent.’ Sydney Morning Herald, 12 November 
2008. http://www.smh.com.au/news/entertainment/film/aussie-films-nobody-goes-to-
see-them/2008/11/12/1226318729492.html> 
31 There is no available breakdown of the sources of private equity. They were probably 
mostly private individuals such as the group of private investors recruited by producer 
Ted Albert for Strictly Ballroom. The figures possibly include equity investments by 
film distributors but this would have been unusual, since distributors usually invest in 
independent films by way of advances (which are preferentially recouped) rather than 
equity funds (which are recouped last). 
32 All five figure in the top 100 Australian feature films of all time, ranked by total 
reported gross Australian box office (as at March 2011). Babe at #3 with $36.8 million 
box office, Moulin Rouge at #5 with $27.7 million, The Dish at #8 with $18 million, The 
Piano at #18 with $11.2 million and The Castle at #23 with $10.3 million. 
<http://www.screenaustralia.gov.au/research/statistics/mrboxaust.asp>. 
33 See for example the chairman’s letter transmitting the FFC’s final, 2007/08 annual 
report, which confirms the organisation’s pride, at the end of 20 years, in ‘the many 
memorable film, television and documentaries we have invested in. Projects that have 
enriched the lives of Australians, as well as showcasing our rich and diversified creative 
talents to the world’. This was an organisation pursuing multiple goals beyond mere 
commerce. <http://www.screenaustralia.gov.au/ffc/annual/FFC_07_08.pdf> 
34 To model this doubled hit rate, I have assumed an additional nine profitable film 
investments exactly mirroring the performance of the original nine hits. 
35 Both Napoleon and Strictly Ballroom — which in Table 4 seem to do better 
domestically — did big business in Japan. 
36 A 2013 report by the British Film Institute estimated that 7 percent of of British films 
were profitable. The report was based on a study of 613 films produced or co-produced 
in the UK between 2003 and 2010. Profits were calculated using a ‘statistical method of 
estimated profitability that the BFI developed by looking at a large data set of lottery 
funded films’, according to a report in Screen Daily (Rosser 2013).  
37 In 2000 the New Zealand Government set up a Film Fund to invest as a charitable 
trust in New Zealand films, augmenting the investment program of the New Zealand 
Film Commission. As at March 2009 the Fund had invested in eight films, of which six 
had been released. Total returns for the six films released to that date were 
NZ$7,555,000, against total investment by the Fund of NZ$21,650,000, or 35 percent 
(and an average rate of return of 37 percent). The Fund had two hits, Whale Rider and 
The World’s Fastest Indian. If we add these six films to the New Zealand Film 
Commission’s 58, we get an average recoupment of 23 percent for New Zealand films. 
Of course this figure excludes Sir Peter Jackson’s Lord Of The Rings trilogy, which was 
funded within the Hollywood system. 
38 Adjusted for ticket price inflation, E.T. The Extra Terrestrial comes in at #4, Jurassic 
Park at #20 and Forrest Gump at #24, according to a ranking by Box Office Mojo based 
on US domestic grosses adjusted to 2012 ticket prices. The top three films on this 
adjusted basis are Gone With The Wind, Star Wars and The Sound Of Music. Viewed at 
<http://boxofficemojo.com/alltime/adjusted.htm> 
39 Here we may note that the costs charged to a film by its distributor are invariably 
exhaustive and fully priced. There is no incentive to discount them; on the contrary, 
since profits when they are reached must be shared with other ‘participants’, the 
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distributor has every incentive to load the film with every conceivable cost and so delay 
the arrival of profits. For example, while Warner Bros put the production cost of Harry 
Potter And The Order Of The Phoenix at US$316 million, professional observers pegged 
it differently. The International Movie Database (IMDB) gives an estimate of US$150 
million, as does Box Office Mojo. Wikipedia gives £75-100 million, citing a report in 
The Scotsman. It is probably safe to conclude that Warner Bros has missed nothing in its 
accounting and, at US$316 million, is not just recovering actual costs but also overheads 
and internal profit margins that would all go to boost its bottom line.  
40 The ratio varies in the telling, depending whether it’s a studio or a filmmaker in the 
frame. Studios do better than filmmakers, as we’ve seen. Using an 11-year data set from 
EDI/Neilson, De Vany (2006) modeled outcomes at the studio level and estimated a one-
in-five ratio of profitable-to-unprofitable films: ‘Seventy-eight percent of movies lose 
money and only 22 percent are profitable.’ (p214) Pokorny and Sedgwick (2010) tell a 
more positive story, suggesting that the ratio of profitable films doubled in the 20 years 
to 2009, from about 40 percent of films to 90 percent (again at the studio level). The 
discrepancy between the two studies can probably be attributed to differences in the 
method of calculating profitability. Remember, this is profitability at the distribution 
level, a very different thing to profits at the copyright equity level.   
41 In the first edition of Entertainment Industry Economics, published in 1986, Vogel 
presented a table showing ‘Estimated average profit (or loss) on national distributor 
releases, 1970-84’ (table 3.4, p87). The average in the last five years was a modest loss; 
in the preceding 10 years it was a modest profit. The table was not reprised in 
subsequent editions. 
42 Personal communication 30 March 2012: ‘Registerable material includes scripts, 
treatments, synopses, outlines and written ideas specifically intended for radio, 
television and film, video cassettes/discs, or interactive media. The WGAW Registry 
also accepts stageplays, novels and other books, short stories, poems, commercials, 
lyrics, drawing, music and other media work.’  
43 Personal communication 4 April 2012: ‘The Writers Guild of America, East registers 
material for thousands of writers each year. Before writers start sending work to agents, 
producers and actors, we recommend it is protected with the Writers Guild Online Script 
Registration service... Last year the WGAE received approximately 10,000 registrations, 
we anticipate an increase this year.’ 
44 Caves (2000, p113) quotes a Twentieth Century Fox executive who stated that the 
company each year receives 10,000 screenplays, treatments, books and oral pitches, puts 
70-100 projects into development, but makes just 12 films. 
45 Neil Netanel (2008, p136) quotes studies by C. Merle Crawford and Eric Berggren & 
Thomas Nacher showing that ‘from 37 to more than 80 percent of all new consumer 
goods and between 20 and 40 percent of new industrial goods fail in the market’. He 
observes that copyright industries ‘also rely far more heavily on revenues from new 
products than most manufacturers’.  
46 Dutch photographer, painter and economist Hans Abbing (2002, p114) gives six 
explanations for artists’ low incomes: ‘1. The winner-takes-all principle… 2. Unfitness 
for non-arts professions… 3. An orientation toward non-monetary rewards… 4. An 
inclination to take risks… 5. Overconfidence and self-deceit… 6. Wrong information.’ 
These explanations map closely to analysis I present in this chapter, with the exception 
of ‘unfitness for non-arts professions’, which Abbing elaborates as follows: ‘Because 
artists believe they are unfit for other, non-art professions, they believe they are better 
off in the arts despite the prospect of a low income.’ In our survey of film producers, 
described below, more than 80 percent expected they would earn the same or more 
income if they chose another occupation.   
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47 The Screen Content Producer Survey was developed by David Court with Allan 
Cameron (AFTRS), Deb Verhoeven (RMIT), Simon Molloy (SKC Pty Ltd) and John 
Berenyi (Bergent Research). It was conducted by Bergent Research and funded by the 
ARC Centre of Excellence for Creative Industries and Innovation. An interactive 
visualization of the survey data was developed by Massive Interactive and can be 
accessed at http://csb.aftrs.edu.au/survey/. There were 247 respondents to the survey 
from a sample of 2,000 and an estimated producer population of 4,500. They included 
producers working in film, television, corporate communications and new media. In 
terms of income, 47 percent said television provided most of their income, 24 percent 
said film, 21 percent said corporate communications and 8 percent new media. However, 
43 percent said film was the most important to them personally. While the chances of a 
‘big hit’ obviously vary between these categories, between film and television they are 
broadly similar. 
48  American economist Lester Thurow (1978) defined psychic income as the 
opportunities provided by work ‘for nonmonetary benefits and costs — fame, power, 
friends, physical discomfort, risk to life etc’, noting that while economists traditionally 
added it to money income and talked about total income maximization, ‘there is often 
the implicit assumption that psychic income makes little difference to the conclusions 
which follow’. He set out to show that it does matter, a conclusion supported here too. 
Landes and Posner use the term ‘nonpecuniary income’, which they define in terms of 
prestige and celebrity (2003, p48). 
49 The survey was led by Mark Ryan and Stuart Cunningham at Queensland University 
of Technology with David Court (AFTRS), Deb Verhoeven (now at Deakin University) 
and John Berenyi (Bergent Research). 
50 A small proportion of producers (five percent) thought they would earn less in their 
next best alternative job. 
51 The results are summarised below: 
 Mean ($) Median ($) Standard 
Deviation ($) 
Current income as 
producer 
76,190 62,050 56,360 
Projected income in 
alternative 
occupation 
 
138,820 
 
119,890 
 
65,040 
 
52 The upper bound, at $295 million, was based on a weighted estimation of psychic 
income for the 13,844 persons reported by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (2008) to 
be employed in ‘film and video production and post-production services’, weighted 
according to educational attainment and position in the industry, being either ‘creative 
principal’, ‘senior creative’ or ‘below-the-line personnel’. The lower bound, at $150 
million, makes allowance for possibility that some producers are investing in the future 
rather than earning psychic income. 
53 This calculation is based on an assumption that between half and two-thirds of all 
psychic income generated in the sector is generated in connection with drama production 
(that is, feature film and television drama production). According to Screen Australia 
(2011), drama production spending in Australia averaged $661 million in the four years 
to 2010/11. Within this, feature film production spending averaged $225 million, or just 
over one-third. Given total psychic income equal to $150–295 million, this yields a low 
estimate of $25 million and a high estimate of $67 million for the value of psychic 
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income generated in connection with feature film production. 
54 UK screen reporter Geoffrey Macnab tells this story, describing how Laemmle 
promoted Lawrence into ‘America’s foremost moving picture star’ and in doing so gave 
birth to the concept of movie stardom (Macnab 2010). Lawrence, down on her luck, 
committed suicide in 1938. 
55 1920s movie star Louise Brooks, who came to see movie stardom as a ‘pestiferous 
disease’, wrote: ‘To a film star, on the other hand, to be let alone for an instant is 
terrifying. It is the first signpost on the road to oblivion.’ (2000/1982) 
56 The idea of a currency based in movie stars has an interesting echo in the Hollywood 
Stock Exchange, a web-based ‘fair and orderly’ market where players use a virtual 
currency of ‘Hollywood dollars’ to buy and sell ‘MovieStocks’ and ‘StarBonds’. The 
market is owned by financial services firm Cantor Fitzgerald and operates at 
http://www.hsx.com/. Cantor Fitzgerald’s efforts to establish a market in box office 
futures contracts was thwarted by the major studios, which successfully lobbied 
Congress to ban the move. (Lang 2010) 
57 De Vany argues that stars ‘only change the odds [of success] slightly and at high cost’. 
They also expose the studios to what he calls ‘the curse of the superstar’ (p225-6). 
Because the distribution of movie returns is skewed positively, ‘the expected value [is] 
substantially greater that the most likely outcome’. If the superstar is able to negotiate 
payment based on the expected value, the most likely result will therefore be a loss to the 
studio. Studios seeking to avoid this outcome should offer the superstar ‘some form of 
contingent compensation in exchange for a reduced fixed fee.’ Such deals in fact are 
common. 
58 Peter Bart (2007) suggests Lord Of The Rings may have been ‘the bravest gamble in 
the history of filmmaking’. Director Peter Jackson had won attention with his low-
budget ‘splatter’ films Brain Dead and Meet The Feebles. But Lord Of The Rings was on 
a completely different scale: a trilogy of films that eventually cost $361 million to make. 
New Line Cinema’s Bob Shaye backed Jackson to produce them after every other studio 
had passed. Jackson asked Shaye to fund two films; after a few minutes’ reflection, 
Shaye reportedly decided it should be three. He also agreed that Jackson could make 
them in faraway Wellington, New Zealand. Former Viacom chief executive Tom Freston 
said of the deal: ‘Bob was a calculating gambler in the old Hollywood spirit. He just 
tripled down and did it. And in this risk-averse day of modern Hollywood, no one else 
was going to make that decision.’ (DiGiacomo 2009) 
59 De Vany writes: ‘There really is nothing that is predictable, not costs, not performance 
value and certainly not revenue. Genre means nothing; rating has only a small effect on 
probabilities and varies so much that only a portfolio of films is capable of capturing the 
difference. Stars only change the odds slightly and at high cost. These are the overriding 
lessons.’ (p267) 
60 Box Office Prophecy was developed in 2006 by Professor Plott and David Court. It 
was designed to test whether a pari-mutuel market mechanism could be used to 
aggregate information privately held (in the form of intuitions and opinions) by industry 
professionals and whether it could provide reliable forecasts of the box office revenues 
of unreleased films. Two further iterations of the study were conducted in 2010 and 
2012 with Jordi McKenzie from University of Sydney.  
61 Film producer Al Clark interviewed by David Court for AFTRS Centre for Screen 
Business. Edited interview at http://csb.aftrs.edu.au/ 
62  The slogan was popularised by a blog launched in August 2011 called 
wearethe99percent.tumblr.com. 
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63 Mean income from film producing was $43,090, the median was $27,720 and the 
standard deviation $41,090. Mean income from all sources was $76,190, the median 
$62,050 and the standard deviation $56,360. 
64 According to the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, the 
poverty line for a single person for the June quarter, 2011, was $446.47 (equivalent to an 
annual income of $23,216) and for a couple was $597.24 (equivalent to $31,056 
annually). See ‘Poverty Lines: Australia, ISSN 1448-0530, June Quarter 2011’. 
65 This sketch of the author’s perspective is based on my personal dealings with 
filmmakers and writers over 30 years. I believe it is uncontroversial. However, it would 
be interesting to track authors’ views of their connection with their creative works as 
publication shifts online and the integrity of works becomes more permeable. 
66 Aston and Mansfield came to the view that authors had a common law copyright in 
their works, independent of statute. Their majority decision, with Justice Willes, was a 
great victory for London’s booksellers. But it was overturned just five years later in the 
landmark case of Donaldson v. Becket. 
67 The system of moral rights is an exception, being grounded in justice. Authors’ moral 
rights are primarily rights of attribution and of protection of the integrity of works. They 
are a European tradition, first adopted in France and Germany and only much later and 
in weaker form, in the US, UK and Australia. Article 6bis (1) of the Berne Convention 
states: ‘Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the 
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object 
to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory action in 
relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.’  
68 There are many accounts of the history of copyright. I have relied primarily on John 
Feather’s A History of British Publishing, Lyman Ray Patterson’s Copyright in 
Historical Perspective, Mark Rose’s Authors and Owners and William St Clair’s The 
Reading Nation in the Romantic Period. 
69 The Stationers Company’s members included printers and booksellers. Their modern 
day equivalent is publishers. I use the terms stationers and publishers interchangeably.  
70 The publishers could not have foreseen that they and their descendants would spend 
the next 300 years crouching behind the Human Shield they raised up in the Statute of 
Anne. In a modern example, the Record Industry Association of America published a 
game called ‘Starving Artist’, intended to educate secondary students about the evils of 
file-sharing (Holson 2003). ‘Starving Record Industry Executive’ presumably would not 
have had the same educative effect. 
71 What began as a standard 14 year term in the Statute of Anne (renewable for a further 
14 years if the author lived beyond the first 14 years) and applying only to books, maps 
and charts, now stands at ‘author’s life plus 70 years’, applying to books, maps, 
photographs, music, films and software. 
72 This breakdown is from The economic contribution of Australia’s copyright industries 
1996-97 to 2010-11, prepared for the Australian Copyright Council by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2012. In this section I have also drawn on Stephen E 
Siwek’s Copyright industries in the US economy: the 2011 report, prepared for the 
International Intellectual Property Alliance and Professor Ian Hargreaves’ Digital 
opportunity: a review of intellectual property and growth, prepared for the UK 
Government in 2011. 
73  PwC follows ‘the standardised global framework for assessing the economic 
contribution of copyright industries developed by the World Intellectual Property 
Organisation (WIPO 2003)’. It describes the core copyright industries as ‘Primarily 
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involved in the creation, manufacture, production, broadcast and distribution of 
copyrighted works and have a substantial level of copyright activities. These are 
industries that would not be in existence if not for the copyright subject or matter’. The 
‘interdependent’ copyright industries are ‘Involved in the manufacture, performance, 
broadcast and communication of copyright material, in order to support and facilitate the 
creation of copyrighted works and other protected subject matter’. Essentially they are 
equipment manufacturers. ‘Partial’ copyright industries have ‘A portion of activities 
which are related to copyright through manufacture, performance, exhibition, broadcast, 
communication or distribution and sales’. These are industries involved in craft goods 
and services such as jewelry, furniture, toys and interior design. ‘Non-dedicated’ 
copyright industries are those where ‘Part of the activities are related to broadcast, 
communication, distribution and sales in protected subject matter and not included in the 
core copyright industries’. These include ‘general wholesale and retailing, general 
transportation and telephony and internet’. (PwC 2012, p8-10) The framework measures 
the value added by each of these sectors in connection with copyrighted works. 
74 In How to Fix Copyright Patry challenges the idea that the creative industries are the 
drivers of 21st century economies. Drawing on Ruth Towse, he notes that the use of very 
general industry classifications may result in inflated figures. Furthermore ‘the aggregate 
figures for those industries are derived by attributing all revenues generated as being 
dependent on copyright… These are vast, vertically integrated multinational companies, 
with revenue sources from thousands of activities, many of which have nothing to do 
with the production or distribution of copyrighted works’ (Patry 2012, p125) Towse 
provides a useful history of attempts to quantify the value of the cultural industries. 
While advising caution in methodology she notes also that ‘the true value of copyright 
cannot be fully captured by measuring value-added in the cultural industries, however 
accurate those measures are, because there are external benefits that are not priced 
through the market place; the national culture, a creative environment and freedom of 
expression are examples of non-appropriable benefits’. (Towse, 2001, p37) However, 
not everyone is convinced. Economists Michele Boldrin and David Levine maintain ‘the 
“copyright” industry is about on par with the furniture industry in terms of economic 
importance.’ Even so, ‘in a classic case of the tail wagging the dog, [it] manages to 
threaten our freedom and our culture’ (2008, p97). 
75 See for example Towse (2001, p9): ‘The acknowledged economic role of copyright 
law is to provide incentives to create and disseminate the expression of ideas.’ See also 
Ku (2002, p27): ‘Arguably, the need to ensure adequate compensation to distributors is 
at the heart of the neo-classical economic theory of copyright… It should not come as a 
surprise, then, that distributors have influenced copyright law’s development from its 
inception…’ 
76 The fourth volume, The Passage of Power, was published in May 2012. A fifth 
volume is under way. Gottlieb, now 80, has edited all four volumes. Asked if the books 
were profitable he said: ‘So what if at the end of 45 years it turns out we lost money by 
one kind of accounting?...Think of what he has given us, what he has added. How do 
you weigh that?’ (McGrath 2012) 
77 The ‘work for hire’ doctrine supplies copyright’s closest approach to ‘financier’s 
copyright’. ‘If a work is made for hire, an employer is considered the author even if an 
employee actually created the work. The employer can be a firm, an organization, or an 
individual.’ (US Copyright Office 2012) In the US, the term of protection for a work 
made for hire is 95 years from date of publication or 120 years from date of creation, 
whichever expires first. In Australia, the term is the life of the actual author plus 70 
years. 
78 Liebowitz and Margolis have argued that it is misleading to describe a copyright as 
equivalent to a monopoly: ‘Although copyright provides a monopoly over the particular 
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title, there might be many close substitute titles available. This monopoly is no different 
than the fact that every firm has a monopoly on the name of its product. Kia and 
Mitsubishi have a monopoly over automobiles with their names, although few would 
argue that they have monopoly power in the automobile market.’ (2005, p441, footnote 
12) Boldrin and Levine will have none of this: ‘A realistic view of intellectual monopoly 
is that it is a disease rather than a cure. It arises not from principled effort to increase 
innovation, but from an obnoxious combination of medieval institutions – guilds, royal 
licenses, trade restrictions, religious and political censorship – and the rent-seeking 
behaviour of would-be monopolists seeking to fatten their purse at the expense of public 
prosperity.’ (2008, p244) 
79 There is an opportunity in US law for the author to reclaim the copyright in a work 35 
years after first publication or 40 years after the rights were granted to the publisher, 
whichever comes first. See Ginsburg (2009).   
80  See Patry (2012, p109): ‘Trickle-down economics works just as poorly in the 
copyright market as it does in the general economy.’ 
81 Macaulay’s arithmetic was confirmed by 17 prominent economists who joined a 
‘friends of the court’ brief in a case challenging the Sonny Bono Copyright Term 
Extension Act (Ackerlof et al 2003). The 17 economists, among them five Nobel 
laureates, said the incentive effect for authors of a 20 year extension was negligible: 
‘Because the additional compensation occurs many decades in the future, its present 
value is small, very likely an improvement of less than 1% compared to the pre-CTEA 
term. This compensation offers at most a very small additional incentive for an 
economically minded author of a new work. The term extension for existing works 
makes no significant contribution to an author’s economic incentive to create, since in 
this case the additional compensation was granted after the relevant investment had 
already been made.’ Liebowitz and Margolis have critiqued this analysis, arguing inter 
alia that ‘small increases in payment need not have small impacts on the creation of 
additional works. There is a possibility that for some authors, in some range of income 
and propensity to create, a small increase in present value could make an important 
difference in creative output, perhaps because they reach a point where they switch to 
full-time writing’ (2005, p439). 
82 Towse, writing in 2001, noted: ‘Apart from Plant, no economist seems to have raised 
the question of whether the interests of author and publisher are the same or whether 
they conflict, although there are numerous instances (including court cases) of disputes.’ 
(p115) 
83 William St Clair, reviewing publishers’ contracts with authors in the 18th and early 
19th centuries, noted that it was publishers who decided how a work should be published 
and at what price. His research showed there were four main types of contract: 1. 
outright sale of the copyright, 2. sale of copyright for a single edition, 3. sharing of net 
profits and 4. publishing ‘on commission’ ie at the author’s risk. St Clair’s conclusion: 
‘under all four main types of contract commonly used in the romantic period the 
interests of the publishers and the authors were sharply divergent’ (2004, p166-7). 
84 The worldly economist John Maynard Keynes decided to take on the publisher’s role 
for his breakthrough work The Economic Consequences of the Peace, for which he bore 
the printing costs and contracted Daniel Macmillan as distributor for 10 percent of the 
profits. As soon as he learned the printing costs, Keynes decided to raise the price of the 
book from 7s 6d to 8s 6d per copy. The venture was very successful and Keynes 
thereafter paid for the printing of all the English editions of his books. (Skidelsky 1983, 
p381) 
85 Landes and Posner (2003) have modeled this aspect of copyright, noting that ‘the 
absence of copyright protection is, paradoxical as this may seem, a benefit to authors as 
! 247 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
well as a cost to them. It reduces the cost of writing by enabling an author to copy freely 
from his predecessors. Shakespeare would have had to work harder and so might have 
written fewer plays, had he not been able to copy gratis from works of history and 
literature…’ (p52) 
86 The Chinese writer Yu Hua in an opinion piece for the New York Times drew 
attention to the extreme poverty of China’s poorest 100 million citizens, noting: ‘They 
live surrounded by contaminated rice, adulterated milk powder, tainted vegetables, 
spoiled ham, unsafe toys, even fake eggs. Day after day, year after year, they consume 
substandard food and rely on defective supplies. Reading offers a means to improve their 
condition and low-cost, pirated books are the only ones they can afford. ‘Years ago, in a 
talk at a university, I said: “I am opposed to counterfeiting in all forms, but so long as 
poverty is a huge problem in China, I think it’s only proper that my books be pirated. I 
make enough to support my family from the regular sales of my books.” Some of my 
fellow writers disagree, but I still believe it.’ (Yu Hua 2013) 
87 See for example Mark Rose, who has observed that ‘With its concerns for origins and 
first proprietors, the liberal discourse of property blended readily with the eighteenth-
century discourse of original genius’ (1993, p6). 
88 In No Law American academics David L Lange & H Jefferson Powell argue the case 
for abolition of copyright on free speech grounds. The ‘No Law’ of their title is a 
reference to the First Amendment to the US Constitution: ‘Congress shall make no law 
abridging freedom of speech or of the press’. On their fundamentalist view, copyright 
fails this injunction because it gives authors ownership in their words and with it the 
right to abridge others’ use of those words. No quibbling, no caviling: ‘Now think the 
supposedly unthinkable: the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
forbids American government, in any of its parts including the courts, to undertake in 
any fashion to create or maintain a monopoly over expression.’ (2009, p301) 
89 Economists Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo in a discussion of global poverty 
describe the poverty trap as an S-shape curve. For those in the poverty trap zone (the 
lower curve of the S) ‘income in the future is lower than income today: the curve is 
below the diagonal line’ (2011, p11). 
90 Average creative income was $18,900 (median $7,000). Other arts-related income 
(mean $8,800) and income from other sources (mean $13,500) brought total average 
income up to $41,200 (median $35,900). 
91 The Gini Co-efficient ranges between 0 and 1. 0 represents perfect equality (everyone 
receives the same income); 1 is perfect inequality (one person receives all the income). 
92 Watts rose to become Keeper of Printed Books at the British Museum but did not live 
to see his idea debated at the Royal Commission on Copyright (1876-78). 
93 In the account of the Royal Commission that follows I have relied on Paul Saint-
Amour’s The Copywrights: intellectual property and the literary imagination, as well as 
the Report of the Commission, the Minutes of Evidence and Ronan Deazley’s 
‘Commentary’. 
94 Mallet was Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India and argued in favour of the 
royalty system. Sir Arnold Plant in his 1934 paper praised ‘the uniformly high quality of 
reasoning in Sir Louis Mallet’s minority report’ (p192, footnote). 
95 There have been numerous proposals for the reform, replacement and even abolition 
of the copyright system. Lessig (2001a) argued that copyright should be measured out in 
renewable five-year terms to a maximum of 75 years; Patry (2012, p201) argued for 
terms that were ‘dramatically cut back and tailored to each type of work’. He also 
recommended the abolition of national and regional licensing for digital works, so that 
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there would be ‘worldwide exhaustion of digital rights once a work has been licensed in 
one country’ (p182). William Fisher III proposed a more fundamental change — ‘a 
governmentally administered reward system’ where works would be registered and the 
government would compensate creators in proportion to their measured usage by the 
public; once the system was in place ‘we would modify copyright law to eliminate most 
of the current prohibitions on authorized reproduction, distribution, adaptation, and 
performance of audio and video recordings. Music and films would thus be readily 
available, legally, for free.’ (2004, p202) More broadly, Sunder (2012, p20-1) ‘makes 
the case for broadening our methodological approaches to intellectual property to 
include perspectives from fields including but beyond economics, such as development 
economics, anthropology, cultural studies, and philosophy… Call it the ripping, mixing, 
and burning of law.’ Boldrin and Levine (2008, p11) go further: concluding that 
‘intellectual property is an unnecessary evil’, they propose its abolition. The reason why 
I have focused here on Thomas Watts is that his proposal directly addresses the 
‘doubleness’ of the copyright system by distinguishing the author from the publisher and 
awarding them differing interests in the copyright work. Further, Watts’ proposal 
received serious consideration at a Royal Commission and thus has counterfactual 
plausibility. 
96 Kretschmer and Kawohl (2004) note: ‘The normal exploitation cycle of cultural 
products suggests that a short exclusive term would be sufficient. If the first statutory 
copyright, the Statute of Anne, granted a term of 14 years (renewable once), the faster 
dissemination and exploitation environment of digital technologies would suggest an 
even shorter term.’ They give the example of the UK’s first design copyright (1787) 
which granted an exclusive right to print and reprint ‘linens, cottons, calicos and 
muslins’ for just two months. 
97 To be clear, I am not proposing any change to authors’ moral rights. We should note, 
however, that it may be more difficult to enforce these rights in a royalty system where a 
work has many publishers, compared to the present system where there is generally only 
one exclusive publisher in each territory, who is in a continuing, contractual relationship 
with the author. But then again, a royalty system would likely induce some illegal 
publishers (‘pirates’) to come within the fold of legal publication — and that should 
result in fewer injuries to authors’ moral rights. 
98 See Patterson (1968, p52): ‘…the procedure for obtaining copyright was for the 
stationer to present a copy — that is, a manuscript — licensed by the official authorities 
to the company wardens for the endorsement of their permission, after which the owner 
would submit the approved copy for entering on the register.’ 
99 Registration is also a necessary step in filing a suit for infringement of copyright in a 
US court. 
100  Landes and Posner proposed registration in 2003 as part of their concept of 
‘indefinitely renewable copyright’; Lessig proposed it in 2004 as a way of reducing the 
burden of copyright; and Hargreaves proposed a ‘digital copyright exchange’ in his 2011 
report. 
101 New York editor and publisher Jason Epstein notes: ‘Traditionally, Random House 
and other publishers cultivated their backlists as their major asset, choosing titles for 
their permanent value as much as for their immediate appeal, so that even firms grown 
somnolent with age and neglect tottered along for years on their backlist earnings long 
after their effective lives were over.’ (Epstein, 2002, p16-17). Elsewhere he has 
described the backlist as ‘the vital annuity on which book publishers… relied for year-
to-year stability through bad times and good’ — and reports that he has been obsessed 
with ‘the preservation and distribution of backlist’ since the start of his career (2010). 
102 In this account of the congers, I am following Feather (p68-72) and St Clair (p93-98). 
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103 St Clair is referring to the period between 1710 and 1774 when publishers believed 
and acted upon the belief that — beyond the statutory copyright established by the Act 
of 1710 — there was a common law copyright which was perpetual. St Clair calls this 
the ‘high monopoly period’ and describes it thus: ‘At the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, the London book industry thus found itself with all the privileges and 
institutions of the guild system, but without any of [the] controls which normally 
accompanied such a regime. They were able to act as an unregulated and unrestrained 
private commercial monopoly over the whole text-based culture of England, and this is 
what they proceeded to do.’ (p93) 
104 Ruth Towse notes that in the music industry, the capture of live performance in a 
recording transforms the performance ‘from labour to capital’. The record company 
controls the capital asset and may transact it without the performer’s consent. Control of 
such assets drives the record companies’ growth. Towse concludes that ‘copyrights are a 
double-edged sword that are instrumental in the growth of large corporations with huge 
market power and bargaining power over the division of revenues that only really 
successful artists…can assail.’ (Towse 2001, p134-5) 
105 St Clair describes the many resistances of the booksellers in their long efforts to 
control the book market. Wu updates the story in The Master Switch (2010), detailing 
the controlling practices of the ‘information empires’ of the 20th century. 
106 See ‘Frequently asked questions about Amazon.com’ at amazon.com: ‘Because we 
exist virtually on the Web, we have unlimited shelf space and can offer a selection of 
more than 14 million titles. Compare that to mall bookstores in the physical world, 
which typically carry about 25,000 titles, or superstores in the physical world, which 
carry around 170,000 titles.’ 
107 ‘Bandwidth’ is both 1. a measure (in hertz) of the width of radio frequencies used in 
broadcasting and 2. a measure (in bits per second) of the rate of data transfer in 
computing. In Australia, the National Broadband Network Company will offer 
‘superfast’ connection speeds to 93 percent of homes, schools and businesses using 
fibre, wireless and satellite technologies. 
108 Here for example is vibewire blogger Tom Langshaw (2012): ‘If we had a crude 
representation of today’s cultural business model, it would be a Venn diagram in which 
two circles, ‘Artist’ and ‘Consumer’, are being squeezed together with increasing force. 
Fans wield greater influence and artists receive a greater cut of profits — everyone wins, 
except vested corporate interests.’ 
109 Plant (1934) quotes at length from a petition of 1643 from the Stationers’ Company 
to the English Parliament which was ‘cunningly designed to make the flesh of an 
uncertain authority creep’ and which he notes ‘would not discredit an “economic 
adviser” to a modern publishers’ association’ (p175-77). 
110  In its annual review of the global media and entertainment sector, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers forecast compound annual growth of 6 percent for the period 
2011-15, (PwC 2011, p51). The highest growth was in Internet (9.6 percent), interactive 
games (8.2 percent) and subscription television (7.8 percent); and the fastest growing 
region was Latin America, at 10.8 percent, followed by Asia Pacific at 6.7 percent. The 
only negative growth was in recorded music, where the firm forecast a 1.1 percent 
annual contraction. Even there the firm predicted a turnaround in 2014. As things turned 
out, the industry beat the forecast, returning to growth in 2012 (Luckerson 2013). 
111 The music industry was the first to respond to the possibilities of ‘disintermediation’, 
with many bands building direct relationships with their fan bases. For example, Nine 
Inch Nails, after its split from Interscope Records, independently released its sixth 
album, Ghosts I-IV, via its website, in formats ranging from free download to a $300 
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limited-edition package. 
112 Kaufmann (2013) reports that while self-published authors receive no advance, they 
typically receive 70 percent of sales, compared to 25 percent of digital sales under a 
standard publishing contract and just 7-12 percent of list price for bound books. 
113 St Clair (2004, p89-90) traces the use of the term to the late 17th century and quotes 
English writer and politician Joseph Addison, who compared the efforts needed to 
produce a book to fitting out a ship for a hazardous voyage, which may then be 
‘plundered by privateers’. Professor of comparative literature Daniel Heller-Roazen 
recounts the history of piracy in legal and political thought in The enemy of all: piracy 
and the law of nations (2009). Historian Adrian Johns explores the deep history of 
intellectual piracy in Piracy: the intellectual property wars from Gutenberg to Gates 
(2009). Johns (p415) reports that Sir Arnold Plant researched ‘the origin of the usage in 
the context of intellectual property of the term pirate’ and says he hopes to publish a 
study of Plant’s research. 
114  IndieGoGo (www.indiegogo.com) was launched in 2008, Kickstarter 
(www.kickstarter.com) in 2009 and the Australian site Pozible (www.pozible.com) in 
2010 as Fundbreak.  
115 There are echoes here of the stationers’ petition of 1643 to the English parliament, 
which concluded ‘that all such importation of foreign books ought to be restrained as 
tends to the disadvantage of our native stationers’ (quoted in Plant 1934, p177). 
116 The Productivity Commission was unmoved, noting in its report: ‘[W]hile the 
removal of [parallel import restrictions] should see an increase in imported books where 
these represent better value, it is probable that most Australian publishers, including the 
major publishing houses, would generally adapt to the new regime, that Australian 
stories and content will continue to be demanded and that talented and marketable 
Australian authors would continue to be widely published.’ (pXXIII) The Australian 
Government was less sanguine. It chose to retain the import restrictions. 
117  Biographer Peter Ackroyd conjectures that Southampton may have given 
Shakespeare the £50 he invested to become a ‘sharer’ in the Lord Chamberlain’s Men on 
its formation (Ackroyd 2006, p226-7). 
118 After his unhappy experience with Chesterfield, Johnson rewrote a couplet in his 
poem ‘The Vanity of Human Wishes’. In the original version, it read: 
‘There mark what ills the scholar’s life assail, 
Toil, envy, want, the garret and the gaol.’ 
In the later, post-Chesterfield version, the second line becomes: 
‘Toil, envy, want, the patron and the gaol.’ 
English scholar Marjorie Garber, recounting the story, observes: ‘The fact that a patron 
could so readily be summed up as part of the problem, rather than presented as the 
solution to it, tells the whole story in brief — for Johnson’s London, and for the ages’ 
(Garber 2008, p6).  
119 St Clair reports that Wordsworth lived in fear that the patronage system would be 
reformed. He notes also the irony that the appointment made him ‘a direct personal 
beneficiary of an abuse of state power aimed at discouraging reading’ — that is, the 
stamp duties applied to newspapers (St Clair, p310-11). 
120 Literary scholar Dustin Griffin has observed that some recent studies ‘broadly share 
the view that patronage was an old and dying cultural form that never provided adequate 
support to authors and fortunately gave way, in the eighteenth century, to a superior 
system in which authors were at last properly recognised as independent owners and 
professionals’ (Griffin 1996, p3). In this view, copyright ownership transformed authors 
into professionals, able to make a living from their work and thus rescued them from 
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dependence on patronage. But as Griffin demonstrates, the ‘patronage economy’ 
continued to operate alongside the emerging ‘literary marketplace’; they were 
‘overlapping’ systems and most authors needed both. 
121 The account that follows is drawn from Janet Adam Smith’s short history of the 
Fund. She describes Williams, the Fund’s founder, as ‘a dissenting minister apt to 
quarrel with his congregations; a friend of Garrick and of Benjamin Franklin, to whom 
he gave shelter in 1774; a correspondent of Voltaire and Frederick the Great; author of 
many works, including Sermons, chiefly upon Religious Hypocrisy; honorary citizen of 
France, in recognition of his enthusiasm for the Revolution, expressed on a visit in 
1792.’ (Smith 2005) 
122 Benefactors of the Fund include W Somerset Maugham and Winnie-the-Pooh author 
A A Milne. Their combined bequests increased the Fund’s income ten-fold. 
123 The pleasures of giving are strongest for patronage systems, where assistance is given 
selectively. Choosing who will benefit, and who will not, not only fulfills the patron’s 
mission but may satisfy a sense of husbandry, of carefully awarding (and withholding) 
the available resources. Patrons may view the choices they make as critical and defining 
— and so they may be. There are pleasures too, of proximity and involvement in the 
creative process, of anointing the talented and quickening the work. There is also the 
glamour of association, the dinner parties and receptions. There is gratitude too. The 
newly-chosen recipients find themselves drawn into a world of connections and 
opportunity. They feel vindicated by their discovery and tied now to their discoverer. 
124 Australia is one. It offers an incentive payment in the form of a 30 percent offset or 
grant for ‘post, digital and visual effects production’ carried out in Australia ‘regardless 
of where a project is shot’. See http://arts.gov.au/film-tv/australian-screen-production-
incentive. 
125 Presales are sales made before production of a film begins. They may be a license fee 
or an outright sale of rights, or an advance (or minimum guarantee) against future sales. 
Financiers set the benchmark rate at a level designed to ensure that investors at least 
broke even on an after-tax basis. 
126 Here we may observe that there is a direct correlation between the diffusion of a 
subsidy (that is, how widely the subsidy is distributed among the population of potential 
recipients) and its impact on price expectations. Broadly, the more widely diffused a 
subsidy is, the greater its impact on price expectations. For any given producer, a 
subsidy will have a negative value when he or she judges that the probability of 
receiving it is outweighed by the likely deflationary effect on buyers’ price expectations 
— or more precisely, when the price falls are greater than the expected value of the 
subsidy. Notice that this equation will yield differing results depending on the 
producer’s confidence in winning, or being eligible for, the subsidy. 
127 Not all subsidies induce price deflation. They may have the effect of simply 
advantaging their recipients — increasing their prestige, lowering their cost of capital, or 
subsidizing their costs. Whatever the effect, the consequence for non-recipients is 
relative disadvantage.  
128 Filmmaker Robert Connolly (The Turning, Balibo, Romulus My Father) has argued 
that Australian funding agencies have favoured an entrenched production methodology 
‘based on the inappropriate template of the Hollywood film’ and resulting in 
unnecessarily high costs of production (Connolly 2008, p5). Connolly makes the case for 
a radical rethinking of production and financing methods.  
129 The ‘beauty contest’ dimension arises where a subsidy is selectively distributed 
among qualifying applicants, rather than being distributed equally to all qualifying 
applicants. This of course describes the patronage model. In the film industry, through 
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four decades of subsidy, there has always been a patronage agency, distributing funds 
selectively to filmmakers. Thus the Australian Film Development Corporation (1970-75) 
became the Australian Film Commission (1975-2008), which sponsored the Film 
Finance Corporation (1988-2008), and was finally merged with it to form Screen 
Australia (2008-). In the same period there have been two great experiments in open-
ended subsidy: the 10BA tax concession and the Producer Offset. Both widened the 
subsidy net, distributing the same benefit to all qualifying filmmakers on the same terms. 
Neither displaced the patronage agency. 
130 Jungian analyst Mario Jacoby has explored the close connection between shame and 
self-esteem. He notes: ‘Shame is intricately tied to one’s social context. It revolves 
around the question of what respect I enjoy in others’ eyes and what effect they have on 
my sense of worth as a person.’ (Jacoby 1994, pviii)  
131 Perhaps if writers and filmmakers paid more attention to audiences, their work would 
be more appealing and they would make more money? In my professional life, I have 
often heard comments to this effect. The situation is more complicated than it appears. 
Authors who are not strongly engaged with their subject matter are unlikely to achieve 
the insights and novel perspectives that audiences expect. They may also find it difficult 
to sustain interest over the long haul of creative work. My own experience — a small 
sample but a clear finding — is that successful filmmakers combine an almost obsessive 
focus on subject matter with a canny awareness of audience. I would concur also with 
the American poet John Ashbery’s observation: ‘It’s that old idea, of each of us having 
only one or two ideas in life and spending our years expressing them, and expressing 
them, and expressing them’ (quoted in Shekerjian 1990, p79). Another American poet, 
Robert Frost, put it more strongly: ‘All that makes a writer is the ability to write strongly 
and directly from some unaccountable and almost invincible prejudice’ (quoted in Parini 
1999, p198). 
132 Ortner reports Boyd’s injunction in a discussion of film producers’ ‘agency’, which 
she defines as ‘a number of interrelated ideas revolving around self-confidence, around 
the idea of being able to make things happen in the world, around activity rather than 
passivity, around energy and will’ (Ortner, p158). She goes on to cite producer Louis 
Drubner (a pseudonym): ‘a kind of forcefulness’; Vance Van Petten, executive director 
of the Producers Guild of America: ‘individualism, entrepreneurialism and 
independence’; producer Christine Vachon: ‘I think producing is about being fearless’; 
and producer Lynda Obst: ‘Unfortunately, nerve, not talent, is the one necessary and 
sufficient trait for success’. 
133 Of course, there are authors who voluntarily stop working as authors. The poet Arthur 
Rimbaud gave up poetry when he was 19 and spent the rest of his short life as a 
commercial agent and merchant. J D Salinger, author of The Catcher in the Rye, 
published his last work in 1965, 45 years before his death. Harper Lee published just one 
work, To Kill A Mockingbird, in 1960. But such examples are rare enough to attract 
attention and in these three cases, continuing wonder. 
134 Frost wrote the poem after an all-night session at his kitchen table, writing the poem 
‘New Hampshire’. After finishing this, he reported, ‘I went outdoors, got out sideways 
and didn’t disturb anybody in the house, and about nine or ten o’clock went back in and 
wrote the piece about the snowy evening and the little horse as if I’d had an 
hallucination’. (Parini, p212) In a letter to Louis Untermeyer, Frost called it his ‘best bid 
for remembrance’.  
135 Like a new technology, the work of an author must climb the S-curve of diffusion, 
described by Everett Rodgers, a professor of rural sociology, in 1962 (Rodgers 
1995/1962). In Rodgers’ model, the adoption of a new idea or technology is a process 
driven by communication among members of a social system. Graphically, it resembles 
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an elongated S that leans to the right. The foot of the S is the potentially long period 
when the innovator (in this case, the author) is unknown, except to a small circle of 
‘innovators’. The upward curve of the S begins only when the author/innovator gains a 
wider circle of ‘early adopters’. The curve then steepens with acceptance by the ‘early 
majority’ and reaches the inflection point (where the curve turns down) with acceptance 
by the ‘late majority’. Finally, the curve flattens out, as ‘laggards’ catch up to the 
majority. Of course, the curve may give out at any point; a work may fail to attract a 
following. 
136 ‘The only reliable, durable, and perpetual guarantor of independence is profit.’ So 
said media scion James Murdoch in a speech to the Edinburgh International Television 
Festival in 2009 (Murdoch 2009). Subsequent events have impugned the speaker; the 
force of his observation, however, is undiminished. 
137 In this account I draw on D M Thomas’s Alexander Solzhenitsyn: a century in his life 
(1998, pp255-68). The quotation from Solzhenitsyn is from The Oak And The Calf, 
translated by H T Willetts. According to Thomas, Solzhenitsyn’s reference to his head 
breaking water draws on an image of ‘dashing warriors emerging from the sea’ in 
Pushkin’s 1831 poem The Tale of Tsar Sultan. 
138 The thaw, however, did not last: Khrushchev was ousted in 1964 and Solzhenitsyn 
quickly fell from favour. In 1974, he was deported from the Soviet Union. Tvardovsky, 
whose enthusiasm was so instrumental, lost his post at Novy Mir in 1970. 
139 James C Scott discusses the world-upside-down tradition as part of the ‘arts of 
resistance’ and of political disguise (Scott 1990, pp166-72). He reports that Russian 
censors under Peter the Great required changes to a popular series of prints called ‘the 
war of the rats against the cat’ — so that the cat did not resemble the Czar (p168). 
140 The classic example of a gestalt switch is the image of a rabbit-duck. At first glance 
the viewer sees a rabbit (or duck); on closer examination the image ‘switches’, becoming 
a duck (or rabbit). 
141 Rose makes clear that ‘the focus of my discussion of authorship is not on subjectivity 
but on discourse’ (p7). In other words, he is mainly concerned with the way that the idea 
of authorship has been used to sustain the commercial activity of publishing. 
Nevertheless, in his comments about authoring, such as the suggestion that authors ‘do 
not really create in any literal sense’, he veers close to denying even the possibility of 
authoring.  
142  Op-Docs are published by The New York Times’ editorial department, which 
describes them as ‘short, opinionated documentaries, produced with wide creative 
latitude and a range of artistic styles, covering current affairs, contemporary life and 
historical subjects…by both renowned and emerging filmmakers who express their 
views in the first person, through their subjects or more subtly through an artistic 
approach to a topic.’ http://www.nytimes.com/ref/opinion/about-op-docs.html. 
143 The Shoah Foundation’s archive is the largest of its kind in the world and has secured 
the support of a who’s who of the movie business including the Wasserman Foundation, 
Universal Studios Foundation, the Ovitz Family Foundation, Paramount Pictures Group, 
Sony Corporation of America and the Time Warner group. In 2006 the Foundation 
moved to the University of Southern California and was renamed the USC Shoah 
Foundation Institute for Visual History and Education, reflecting ‘the broadened mission 
of the Institute: to overcome prejudice, intolerance, and bigotry — and the suffering they 
cause — through the educational use of the Institute’s visual history testimonies’. See 
https://sfi.usc.edu/about/institute. In 2013, as part of this larger mission, the Foundation 
added Rwandan testimonies to its Archive and IWitness website. 
144 Pauline Kael, herself the child of Holocaust survivors, panned the film as a ‘long 
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moan’, and it was strongly criticised in Poland when released there (Schatz 2012). 
145 Lanzmann has written about the scene with the barber, Abraham Bomba, in his 
memoir The Patagonian Hare (2102). It had taken him several years to track Bomba 
down and he proved an extraordinary witness, one of 17 professional hairdressers whose 
task was to cut the hair of Jewish women before they were gassed at Treblinka. 
Lanzmann describes the critical moment, when Bomba is suddenly unable to continue, 
as ‘a conversation between two supplicants, he pleading with me to stop, me gently 
urging him to continue… The camera kept turning, Abraham’s tears were as precious to 
me as blood, the seal of truth, its very incarnation. Some people have suggested some 
sort of sadism on my part in this perilous scene, while on the contrary I consider it to be 
the epitome of reverence and supportiveness, which is not to tiptoe away in the face of 
suffering, but to obey the categorical imperative of the search for and the transmission of 
truth.’ (pp434-35) 
146 Biographer Hermione Lee reports that Virginia Stephen had inherited capital of 
£9,013 when she married Leonard Woolf in 1912. This yielded an income of just under 
£400 a year. In 1928 — the year of the lectures that became A Room Of One’s Own — 
the sale of family real estate brought a further £4,925. In present day terms the two 
capital sums would be worth £655,000 using the retail price index or £2,100,000 using 
average earnings (MeasuringWorth calculations). Lee notes that until 1929, despite their 
prolific output, Virginia and Leonard could not have lived on the earnings from their 
books (Lee 1996, pp320-1).   
147 Officer and Williamson give the example of an accountant earning US$2,250 in 
1931. In terms of the goods and services he could buy, the comparative purchasing 
power in current dollars would be $31,700. But his contemporary standard of living was 
over twice that amount, or $70,700, while his economic status was close to $170,000 in 
current terms and his economic power close to $420,000. ‘The interpretation is that his 
wage enabled him to go to the same country club as someone today earning $170,000 
and that he would be perceived to have the same economic influence as someone with a 
current annual income of almost half a million dollars’ (Oliver & Williamson, p4). 
148 Even if we take the lowest estimate from Table 12, £24,720, and tax it at the 1928 
rate of 30 percent, leaving £17,304, the recipient would be among the richest 5.1 percent 
of the world’s population, according to Giving What We Can, a website that forms part 
of the Centre for Effective Altruism in the UK (http://www.givingwhatwecan.org). 
National Geographic, in a study published on the occasion of the world’s population 
reaching seven billion, classified incomes above US$12,196 (about £7,980 in August 
2013) as High, with one billion people in this range, the rest below (Kolbert 2011). 
149 This is an idea that perhaps bears comparison with Keynes’ notion of the ‘animal 
spirits’ that sometimes drive human action. Keynes wrote that ‘…our decisions to do 
something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to 
come, can only be taken as the result of animal spirits—a spontaneous urge to action 
rather than inaction, and not as the outcome of a weighted average of quantitative 
benefits multiplied by quantitative probabilities.’ (Keynes 2007/1936, pp161-2) 
150 When I first began thinking about the questions developed in this thesis nearly 20 
years ago, I thought the case for reforming copyright was clear-cut. But the question of 
social intent — whether society ‘knew what it was about’ — brought me up short. It is a 
hard question. It is the question that sent me off on the long errand of this thesis. 
151 I am not addressing here the questions of public access and fair dealing that dominate 
much of the public discussion of copyright. These are very significant questions but they 
lie beyond the scope of this thesis.  
152 This appears to be a confusion caused by the similarity of names. John Man recounts 
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the story of an early rival to Gutenberg whose secrets were reported to have been stolen 
by an apprentice named Johann Faustus. This person seems to have been confused with 
Gutenberg’s financial backer, Johann Fust. The implication was that Gutenberg 
benefited from the alleged theft — a story that continued in circulation ‘well into the 
twentieth century’. (2002, p120-1) 
153 Nietzsche suffered a mental collapse in 1889 from which he did not recover, though 
he lived on until 1900. Tertiary syphilis was suspected but the diagnosis has been 
challenged in recent years by Schain (2001) and others. 
154 Fishburn reports that people convicted of protecting books were forced to work on 
Emperor Ch’in Shih-huang-ti’s other great project, the construction of the Great Wall 
(p2). 
155 One mechanism for restricting circulation is price. St Clair drew attention to the 
deliberate use of price as an exclusionary mechanism by England’s 18th century political 
elite: ‘Among the main arguments put forward in the parliamentary bill that introduced a 
stamp duty on periodicals in 1701 was that the resulting higher prices would keep such 
print from the ‘poorer sort of people’, and so reduce the allure and enticement of reading 
among their children. In 1757, Soame Jenyns argued that to “encourage the poor man to 
read and think, and thus to become more conscious of his misery, would fly in the face 
of divine intention”.’ (2004, p109) 
156 Essayist and cartoonist Tim Kreider in an op-ed piece for the New York Times about 
the common expectation that artists should work for free wrote: ‘Not getting paid for 
things in your 20s is glumly expected, even sort of cool; not getting paid in your 40s, 
when your back is starting to hurt and you are still sleeping on a futon, considerably less 
so. Let’s call the first 20 years of my career a gift. Now I am 46, and would like a bed… 
Practicalities aside, money is also how our culture defines value, and being told that 
what you do is of no ($0.00) value to the society you live in is, frankly, demoralizing. 
Even sort of insulting. And of course when you live in a culture that treats your work as 
frivolous you can’t help but internalise some of that devaluation and think of yourself as 
something less than a bona fide grown-up.’ (Kreider 2013) 
157 And dangerous to look at. Lady Liddell reportedly instructed her daughter to avert her 
eyes when they encountered Byron on the rooftop of St Peters in Rome: ‘Don’t look at 
him, he is dangerous to look at.’ (McCarthy 2002) 
158 Roosevelt made the observation in his State of the Union address of January 11, 
1944. He apparently drew on an English law case, Vernon v Bethell, in which Lord 
Henley observed: ‘Necessitous men are not, truly speaking, free men, but, to answer a 
present exigency, will submit to any terms that the crafty may impose upon them.’ 
Vernon v Bethell (1762) 28 ER 838 
159 Love begins: ‘Today I want to talk about piracy and music. What is piracy? Piracy is 
the act of stealing an artist’s work without any intention of paying for it. I’m not talking 
about Napster-type software. I’m talking about major label recording contracts.’ She 
proceeds through an analysis of the economics of releasing a music album, concluding 
‘the band may as well be working at a 7-Eleven’ (Love 2000). A more recent example is 
musician David Byrnes’ deconstruction of Spotify, in which he documents the near 
impossibility of earning a viable wage from streaming services (Byrnes 2013). 
160 Disclosure would also give authors absolution. One of the most pernicious aspects of 
copyright’s poor outcomes is the message of failure this conveys to authors. A system of 
disclosure would counter this by letting authors see how common ‘failure’ was. In a 
personal example, a filmmaker who read this thesis reported feeling first anger and then 
relief when she realised that the poor returns she had earned for her investors were 
entirely within the normal range for film investments.  
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161 Shakespeare’s investment was £440, equivalent in 2011 to £85,250 in terms of 
‘historic standard of living’ or £2,298,000 in ‘economic status’ or £16,940,000 in 
‘economic power’ (Officer & Williamson 2013). Tithes were entitlements to a 10 
percent share of the produce of the district originally paid to the Church but acquired by 
the Stratford Corporation at the time of the Reformation and made available to wealthy 
investors like Shakespeare seeking regular, annuity income. The tithes also bestowed the 
right to be buried in Stratford Church, as Shakespeare later was. 
162 There is a growing body of Shakespeare scholarship. In this account I have relied in 
particular on Lukas Erne’s Shakespeare and the Book Trade, Bart Van Es’s Shakespeare 
in Company, Stephen Greenblatt’s Will in the World, Andrew Gurr’s The Shakespeare 
Company 1594-1642, James Marino’s Owning William Shakespeare, Charles Nicholl’s 
The Lodger Shakespeare and James Shapiro’s 1599: A Year in the Life of William 
Shakespeare. It is difficult to engage with this literature and not lose patience with 
theories that it was the Earl of Oxford or Christopher Marlowe or someone other than 
William Shakespeare who ‘wrote Shakespeare’.  
163 Thus writer and activist Jonathan Tasini (2012): ‘Creative people, especially writers, 
are a funny breed. We are the only profession I know of who work for free. No coal 
miner, nurse, shipyard worker, accountant, or any other person with bills to pay works 
for free. But, that is what writers are often being forced to do. And the consequences for 
creativity and democracy are dire.’ Tasini sued the Huffington Post in a class action on 
behalf of bloggers whose work was aggregated on the Post site. The suit sought a share 
of the US$315 million sale of the site to AOL. Judge John Koeltl rejected the claim on 
the basis that the bloggers knew in advance they would not be paid. (Pilkington 2012) 
164 The tenancy was created through an ingenious system of collective ‘gift and re-
grant’. The details were revealed in a court case brought by the new husband of 
Augustine Phillips’ widow some 20 years later. See Bart Van Es (2013, pp157-8). 
165 The sharers in the Admiral’s Men owed £300 to Henslowe at the turn of the century, 
when the Chamberlain’s Men were already well in profit. By the final years of his life 
Alleyn ‘was spending over £1000 per annum where ordinary playwrights would do well 
to earn £30’ (Van Es, p49). 
166 Gurr lists 99 men and boys known to have worked for the company from its inception 
to its close, including 27 sharers and housekeepers (Appendix 1, pp217-246). 
 
